Japan

Highlights We would fade fears of an “earnings recession.” EPS growth should increase during the remainder of this year. While high debt burdens around the world may exacerbate deflationary pressures by restraining spending, they may also motivate policymakers to raise inflation in order to reduce the real value of outstanding debt. Ultimately, whether high debt levels turn out to be deflationary or inflationary depends on the extent to which policymakers have both an incentive and the means to increase inflation. The spread of political populism has made governments more inclined to boost nominal incomes by allowing economies to overheat. Central bankers have also become increasingly convinced that they should wait to see “the whites of inflation’s eyes” before tightening monetary policy any further. With inflation expectations still well anchored, it may take at least another 18 months for inflation in the U.S. to break out, and longer still elsewhere. Stay bullish on global stocks for now. However, be prepared to dial back equity exposure late next year, while shifting bond duration to a maximum underweight. Feature Fade Fears Of An “Earnings Recession” We upgraded global stocks in December following the post-FOMC meeting selloff. Our recommendation to go long the MSCI All-Country World Index has gained 9.0% since we initiated it. Although our enthusiasm for stocks has waned somewhat given the recent run-up, we continue to see upside for global bourses over the next 12-to-18 months. Admittedly, earnings growth has come down sharply from a year ago. To some extent, this reflects base effects (U.S. EPS rose by 23% in Q1 of 2018, thanks in part to the tax cuts). However, slower global growth and higher tariffs have also taken their toll. The good news is that the trade war is likely to stay on hiatus over the coming months. We also expect nominal GDP growth in the U.S. and the rest of the world to pick up by the middle of this year. Chart 1 shows that earnings growth tends to move in lock-step with nominal GDP growth. Chart 1Earnings And Nominal GDP Growth Move In Lock-Step Equity prices usually bottom when earnings growth bottoms (Chart 2). Analyst estimates based on IBES data foresee EPS growth troughing in Q1 and then accelerating modestly over the remainder of the year. If this happens, global equities will move higher over the coming months. What’s The Bigger Risk? Deflation Or Inflation? Last week, we argued that the next global economic downturn would probably be sparked by a surge in inflation which forces central banks to raise interest rates more aggressively than they would like.1 Given the absence of inflationary pressures today, and the still-ample spare capacity that exists in many economies, we noted that such an outcome is far from imminent. This implies that the global expansion still has plenty of room to run, thus justifying an overweight stance towards risk assets. One common objection to this thesis posits that deflation, rather than inflation, is the main risk to the global economy. And unlike its inflationary cousin, the next deflationary shock could be lurking just around the corner. Italy serves as a good example of the dangers of high debt levels. While many things can contribute to deflationary pressures, elevated debt levels are often cited as being the most important. An excessive debt burden can lead to a prolonged period of deleveraging. Since borrowers typically spend a larger share of their cash flows than lenders, overall spending could decline, leading to lower prices and wages. High debt levels can also make an economy vulnerable to interest-rate shocks. This is particularly the case when a country is reliant on external debt or issues debt in a currency it does not control. The Italian Lesson Italy serves as a good example of the dangers of high debt levels. Italy entered the euro area with one of the highest public debt ratios in the world. Private debt also soared in anticipation of euro membership as well as during the period leading up to the Global Financial Crisis, almost doubling as a share of GDP between 1998 and 2008 (Chart 3). Chart 3Italy's Debt Inferno Worries about high indebtedness, poor growth prospects, and contagion from Greece sent the 10-year Italian bond yield to nearly 7.5% on November 9, 2011. Yields tumbled after Mario Draghi pledged to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the common currency, but rose again last April after Italians brought an anti-austerity populist government into power. Today, the Italian government finds itself in the unenviable position of having to devote 3.4% of GDP to interest payments, more than double the euro area average (Chart 4). Domestic investors own less than half of Italian government debt, so most of those interest payments do little to stimulate domestic spending. Chart 4The Italian Government's Interest Payments Are Higher Than Elsewhere In The Euro Area The Inflation Solution When debt reaches elevated levels, faster nominal growth via higher inflation becomes an increasingly appealing solution for reducing debt ratios. A one percentage-point increase in nominal GDP will cut debt-to-GDP by half a percentage point when it stands at 50%, but by three full percentage points when it stands at 300%. Given the attractiveness of inflating away debt burdens, why don’t more governments pursue this strategy? Part of the answer is politics. The long history of hyperinflation in Europe and many other economies has cast a long shadow over how central banks operate. Unanticipated inflation also redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors. While the latter usually outnumber the former, the former typically have more political sway. Means And Opportunities Political will is a necessary condition for generating inflation, but it is not a sufficient one. Policymakers also need to possess the ability to accomplish their goal. What determines whether they will succeed? The answer, to a large extent, is the level of the neutral rate of interest. The neutral rate of interest is the long-term interest rate that is appropriate for the economy. When interest rates are above the neutral rate, growth will tend to fall below trend, while inflation will decline. Conversely, when rates are below their neutral level, the economy will grow at an above-trend pace and inflation will accelerate. Many things can influence the neutral rate of interest. These include: Trend GDP growth: Faster growth will incentivize firms to expand capacity in anticipation of rising demand. This will push up the neutral rate of interest. National savings: Lower taxes and increased government spending will drain national savings, while stimulating aggregate demand. This will push up the neutral rate of interest. Likewise, a decrease in private-sector savings — whether it be the result of easier access to credit or greater optimism about future income growth — will raise the neutral rate. The capital intensity of the economy: Economies that require a lot of physical capital will tend to have a higher neutral rate of interest. By the same token, economies where the capital stock needs to be replenished quickly in order to offset depreciation will have a higher neutral rate of interest.  The exchange rate: A weaker exchange rate will boost net exports. This resulting increase in aggregate demand will translate into a higher neutral rate of interest. With the exception of the currency effect, all of the factors listed above are captured by the canonical Solow growth model which undergraduate economics students usually encounter in their studies (See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the neutral rate of interest in this model). Inflation And The Neutral Rate Economists tend to define the neutral rate in real terms. However, when thinking about inflation, it is useful to consider the neutral rate’s nominal counterpart. Conceptually, the nominal neutral rate of interest can be either negative or positive. When the nominal neutral rate is negative, even a policy rate of zero will be insufficient to allow the economy to overheat. One might call this outcome the “strong form” version of the secular stagnation thesis. In contrast, when the neutral rate is low, but still positive, an interest rate of close to zero will be low enough to allow the economy to overheat, which will eventually generate inflation. One may refer to this as the “weak form” version of the secular stagnation thesis. Political will is a necessary condition for generating inflation, but it is not a sufficient one. The Danger Of Strong-Form Secular Stagnation In situations where the strong form version of secular stagnation prevails, deflationary pressures will feed on themselves. If an economy suffers from a chronic shortfall of aggregate demand, inflation is liable to drift lower. A lower inflation rate will push down the nominal interest rate that is consistent with any given real rate. For example, if the economy requires a real rate of -1% in order to grow at trend and inflation is 2%, a 1% nominal rate will suffice. But if inflation is 0%, then the policy rate would need to be -1%, which may be difficult to achieve. Japan serves as a case study for how this vicious circle can unfold. Following the simultaneous bursting of the property and stock market bubbles in the early 1990s, the Japanese private sector entered a prolonged deleveraging cycle. Inflation drifted steadily lower, ultimately falling into negative territory during the 1997-98 Asian Crisis (Chart 5). High debt levels in Japan were deflationary because the nominal neutral rate of interest was negative. Even if the Bank of Japan wanted to, it was greatly constrained in its ability to raise inflation. Chart 5Japan: A Case Study In Strong-Form Secular Stagnation Europe Is Not Japan… Yet Next to Japan, the euro area comes the closest to meeting the criteria for strong form secular stagnation. The euro area has low trend growth, owing to its slow population growth rate, as well as a banking system that is still focused on deleveraging. There is a silver lining, however: Despite the many woes the euro area has experienced, long-term inflation expectations are still over 100 basis points higher than in Japan (Chart 6). Fiscal policy is also turning somewhat more accommodative. Our base case is that the ECB will be slow to unwind its balance sheet and will only raise rates if the economy is showing more verve. This should be enough to move inflation towards target over the next two years. Chart 6Long-Term Inflation Expectations In The Euro Area Are Still Well Above Japanese Levels Inflation In The U.S. When inflation does break out early next decade, it will probably happen first in the United States. A large structural budget deficit and the revival of credit growth to the household sector following an intense period of deleveraging have boosted the neutral rate of interest. An overheated labor market is driving up real wages, which will lead to more consumer spending. December’s weaker-than-expected retail sales report will prove to be a fluke. Not only was it influenced by the sharp drop in the stock market and worries about a pending government shutdown (both of which have reversed), but the report itself was probably compromised by delays in the collection of data, which may have pushed some responses into January (historically, the weakest month for retail sales). This interpretation is consistent with strong holiday sales reported by online retailers and solid growth in the Johnson Redbook index of same-store sales. The latter captures over 80% of the sales surveyed by the Department of Commerce in its retail sales report, and featured a 9.3% year-over-year increase in sales in the final week of December, the fastest since the start of this series in 1997 (Chart 7). Chart 7The December Retail Sales Report Was Probably A Fluke Yes, corporate debt in the U.S. is high, but it is not particularly elevated relative to most other countries (Chart 8). Despite the collapse in equity prices and the spike in credit spreads late last year, U.S. corporations are still eager to expand capacity (Chart 9). This is not an economy teetering on the brink of recession. Chart 8U.S. Corporate Debt Is Not Extreme By Global Standards Chart 9U.S. Capex Plans Have Come Off Their Highs, But Remain Solid Policymakers in the U.S., and in much of the world, have grown more comfortable in letting economies overheat. Whether it be Trump’s unfunded tax cuts or the “Green New Deal” championed by the more liberal members of the Democratic Party, fiscal stimulus is in, austerity is out. Policymakers in the U.S., and in much of the world, have grown more comfortable in letting economies overheat. Even mainstream voices have given their nod of approval. Just this week, former IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard argued that the U.S. could safely increase public debt without endangering economic stability.2 Meanwhile, central banks have increasingly bought into the mantra, famously espoused by Larry Summers, that they should wait to see the “the whites of inflation’s eyes” before tightening monetary policy.3 What this mantra overlooks is that inflation is a highly lagging indicator. By the time you see the whites of a tiger’s eyes, you are already destined to be its dinner. Investment Conclusions The spread of populist economic policies offers a one-two punch to inflation. Not only are populist prescriptions apt to stimulate demand, but that stimulus will raise the neutral rate of interest, thereby giving central banks greater traction to further boost spending by keeping rates below their neutral level. For investors, this implies a dichotomy between the medium-term and longer-term asset market outlook. Easy money policies are a boon to risk assets when they are first introduced, as they typically combine low interest rates with fast nominal GDP growth. But the path to higher rates is lined with lower rates, meaning that the longer central banks keep rates below their neutral level, the more economies will overheat, and the larger the eventual inflation overshoot will be. As growth outside the U.S. begins to accelerate in the second half of 2019, the dollar will come under downward pressure. As such, investors should overweight global equities and high-yield credit for the next 12 months. However, be prepared to dial back equity exposure late next year, while shifting bond duration to a maximum underweight. In terms of regional equity allocation, we continue to see global growth bottoming by the middle of this year. As growth outside the U.S. begins to accelerate in the second half of 2019, the dollar will come under downward pressure. The resulting reflationary impulse will be manna from heaven for the more cyclically-sensitive sectors of the stock market, as well as Europe and EM. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com   Laura Gu Research Associate Footnotes 1      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Minsky’s Corollary,” dated February 8, 2019. 2       Olivier Blanchard, “Public Debt and Low Interest Rates,” Peterson Institute for International Economics and MIT American Economic Association (AEA) Presidential Address, (January 2019); Noah Smith, “The U.S. Can Take on a Lot More Debt Within Limits,” Bloomberg Opinion, (February 2019). 3      Lawrence Summers, “Only raise US rates when whites of inflation’s eyes are visible,” Financial Times, (February 2015). Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights The U.S. basic balance is the strongest it’s been in decades. However, the White House’s profligacy threatens this positive. The euro area basic balance is also healthy. Now that the European Central Bank has ended its asset purchasing program, aggregate portfolio flows in Europe have much scope to improve, creating long-term support for the euro. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are likely to suffer deteriorating balance-of-payments trends, which will hamper their performance. Norway is the commodity driven economy that is likely to buck this trend. Stay positive the NOK against the SEK and the EUR as well as against other commodity currencies. Feature Balance-of-payments dynamics can often be overplayed when forecasting G10 FX. While their capacity to forecast FX moves is small on a 12-month horizon, the state of the balance of payments can occasionally take primacy over any other consideration. This is particularly true when global liquidity conditions deteriorate, as it makes financing current account deficits more expensive, often requiring sharp adjustment in currency valuations. Since we have experienced a period of rising financial market volatility and global liquidity has deteriorated, this gives us a momentous occasion to review balance-of-payments conditions across the G10. While the balance-of-payments situation for the U.S. is not as dire as is often argued, the deteriorating fiscal balance suggests that this situation is temporary. This means that balance-of-payments risks are likely to grow for the dollar over the coming years. Meanwhile, depressed portfolio flows into the euro area have a lot of scope to improve, which point to a bullish long-term outcome for the euro. Finally, other than Norway, the commodity currency complex sports tenuous balance-of-payments dynamics, which are likely to deteriorate. This suggests that the CAD, AUD and NZD have downside. As a long-term allocation, selling these currencies against the NOK makes sense as well. The U.S. Despite a strong economy that is lifting import growth, the U.S. trade and current account balances have remained stable since 2014, hovering near -3% of GDP and -2.3% of GDP, respectively. This stability is a consequence of the shale revolution, which has curtailed U.S. oil imports by 3.3 million bpd since 2006. However, thanks to robust growth due in large part to the Trump administration’s deregulatory push as well as last year’s tax cut, the U.S. has been the recipient of large FDI inflows, amounting to 1.4% of GDP, the highest level since 2006. Consequently, the U.S.’s basic balance of payments has rebounded, hitting a record high (Chart 1). Chart 1U.S. Balance Of Payments A strong basic balance of payments has been an important factor behind the greenback’s strength this cycle as net portfolio flows in the U.S. have not been particularly strong, having mostly been driven by weaker official purchases. In this context, the current M&A wave bodes well for the dollar as the U.S. has historically been the recipient of such flows. The U.S. equity market’s overweight towards tech and healthcare stocks strengthens this view. From a balance-of-payments perspective, the biggest risk for the dollar is Washington’s profligacy, which is forcing the world to digest a large stock of USD-denominated liabilities. However, if history is any guide, this risk is likely to drive the dollar lower only once U.S. real rates begin to become less appealing compared to their peers. Since BCA expects U.S. real rates to increase more, widening real rate differentials in the process, the dollar should continue to remain supported this year, especially as investors continue to expect a shallower path for rates than we do. The Euro Area After peaking at 2.4% of GDP, the euro area trade balance has softened to 1.8% of GDP. Rebounding economic activity in the European periphery explains this small deterioration as rising domestic demand tends to lift imports growth, hurting trade balances in the process. Despite this worsening trade balance, the euro area current account surplus remains as wide as ever, clocking in at 3.4% of GDP. This reflects both recent improvements in the European net international investment position as well as the fact that low European rates are curtailing the costs of liabilities. Poor FDI performance mitigates the benefits of the large European current account surplus. Hampered by low rates of return, lingering worries about European cohesion and banks’ health, long-term investors have flown out of the euro area – not in. Nonetheless, despite this negative, the euro area basic balance remains in surplus, creating a small positive for the euro (Chart 2). Chart 2Euro Area Balance Of Payments The biggest problem for the euro in recent years has been portfolio outflows, especially in the fixed income sphere. While the weakness in portfolio flows has been a crucial factor preventing the good value in the euro – EUR/USD trades at a 12% discount to its purchasing-power parity equilibrium – from realizing itself, the outlook on this front is improving. The European Central Bank’s negative interest rate policy coupled with its Asset Purchase Program have created a powerful repellent for private fixed-income investors. However, the APP is now over, and European policy rates should move back above zero by year-end 2020. As a result, euro area portfolio flows have room to improve considerably. Once this happens, since the basic balance is already in surplus, the euro will have scope to rally significantly. Japan Burdened by slowing exports to both China and emerging markets, the Japanese trade balance is vanishing quickly. However, it still remains at a wide 3.8% of GDP. This is a direct artefact of Japan’s extraordinarily large net international investment position of 60% of GDP, which generates such large net investment income that even when Japan runs a trade deficit of more than 2% of GDP, as it did in 2014, the current account remains balanced (Chart 3). Chart 3Japanese Balance Of Payments The flipside of Japan’s structural current account surplus is an FDI balance constantly in deficit. The Japanese private sector generates more savings than the country can use, even after the profligacy of the government is satiated. Essentially, Japanese firms are reluctant to expand capacity in ageing, expensive and deflationary Japan. They prefer to do so outside of the national borders, closer to potential new customers. As a result of this dichotomy between the current account surplus and FDI deficit, Japan’s basic balance of payments is a much more modest 1.1% of GDP. Thus, the long-term and stable components of the Japanese balance of payments are mildly positive for the yen. In terms of stock and bond flows, Japan is currently experiencing significant outflows, driven by Japanese investors moving funds outside the country. Historically, these portfolio flows have been a poor indicator for the yen’s direction, often moving into deficit territory as the yen strengthens. This is because Japanese investors are often hedging their foreign asset purchases. Consequently, money market flows will likely once again determine the yen’s fate. For now, the Bank of Japan remains firmly on hold and U.S. rates are rising, suggesting USD/JPY has room to rally this year. However, the JPY’s cheapness and the favorable balance-of-payments picture of Japan argue that the yen’s weakness is in its final innings. The next big structural move in the yen is higher. The U.K. Despite the post-referendum cheapening of the pound, the U.K. continues to run a massive trade deficit of 6.7% of GDP. The current account looks a bit better but remains at a large deficit of 3.9% of GDP. A current account deficit is not a problem for a currency so long as it can be financed cheaply. Historically, the U.K. has been attractive to long-term foreign investors, with a widening current account deficit often met with a growing net FDI balance, leaving only a small basic balance to finance through other channels (Chart 4). Chart 4U.K. Balance Of Payments This time around, the current account remains wide but net FDI flows have collapsed, from 8% of GDP in 2017 to 1.8% of GDP today. The uncertainty surrounding Brexit explains this deterioration. The financial services sector accounts for more than 50% of the stock of inward foreign investments in Great Britain. As financial services will suffer the brunt of Brexit, those investments have also melted. This means the U.K. will have to depend on portfolio flows to finance its current account deficit. Portfolio investments in the U.K. have grown since mid-2017, explaining the stability in the pound. However, this masks some heightened short-term volatility for the GBP against both the dollar and the euro. In the short-term, as the Brexit deadline quickly approaches, this volatility in both flows and the currency will remain high. On a long-term basis, we expect a benign resolution to Brexit. While large FDIs into the financial sector are forever something of the past, flows into British market securities are likely to improve, as the Bank of England will have room to increase rates once economic activity picks up again after the Brexit fog lifts. Canada The Canadian trade balance never recovered from its pre-Great Financial Crisis health. The rebound in oil prices since January 2016 has done little to help the Canadian trade balance, as Canadian oil trades at a large discount to global benchmarks – a consequence of a lack of pipeline capacity that has trapped Canadian oil where it is not needed. The Canadian current account balance offers little solace, and at -2.7% of GDP is in even worse shape than the trade balance (Chart 5). However, the Canadian basic balance is currently in better condition, as Canada continues to attract net FDIs equal to 2% of GDP. The problem for the country is that FDI inflows have become much more limited by the fact that Canadian oil sands generate little profits at current oil prices – a problem amplified by the lack of exporting capacity. This trend is unlikely to change anytime soon. Chart 5Canadian Balance Of Payments Portfolio flows remain positive, but at 1.1% of GDP, they are falling sharply. The poor profitability of Canadian resources stocks is obviously a problem there, but the growing risks to the Canadian housing market are also likely to hurt banks’ profitability as well as the aggregate financial sector, which accounts for nearly 40% of the country’s stock market capitalization. As a result, with Canadian yields still lagging the U.S., portfolio flows could also deteriorate further. This combination implies that the balance-of-payments picture for Canada is becoming a growing headwind. Australia Two factors are lifting the Australian trade balance, which stands at a surplus of 0.6% of GDP. As the exploitation of Australia’s large mineral deposits mature, the need for mining capex has declined, which has been limiting the growth of Australian machinery imports. On the other hand, this same maturity means that more minerals are being exported out of Australia. Consequently, since iron ore prices have rebounded 88% since their December 2015 lows, representing a generous boost to Australian terms of trade, the country’s trade balance has significantly improved. The current account balance has mimicked this improvement; however, it remains at a deficit of 2.6% of GDP (Chart 6). Much of the investment required to develop the mineral deposits present in the country came from outside Australia’s borders. As a result, foreign investors are receiving large amounts of income from their investment, generating a negative income balance for the country. Nonetheless, the Australian basic balance is now positive as net FDI flows represent more than 3% of GDP. Chart 6Australian Balance Of Payments Going forward, we worry that China’s slowdown has not fully played out. This means that Australia’s nominal exports could suffer under the weight of falling metals prices, generating a deterioration in the trade balance, the current account and the basic balance. Worryingly, portfolio inflows into the country would also suffer. Finally, Australian households’ high indebtedness, coupled with pronounced overvaluation evident in key cities like Sydney and Melbourne, could further impede capital inflows into the country. This suggests that from a balance-of-payments perspective, the AUD could witness further depreciation, especially as AUD/USD still trades 10% above its purchasing-power-parity fair value. New Zealand The New Zealand trade balance has fallen to -1.8% of GDP, its lowest level in 10 years. This principally reflects stronger imports growth, as exports are currently growing at a 11% annual rate. A consequence of this worsening trade balance has been a widening current account deficit, which now stands at 3.6% of GDP. New Zealand has not been able to attract enough FDI to compensate for its structural current account deficit. As a result, its perennially negative basic balance currently stands at 2.6% of GDP (Chart 7). This lack of structural funding for its current account deficit is linked to its interest rates, which always stand above the G10 average. Thanks to immigration, New Zealand has an economy with an elevated potential growth rate, and thus a higher neutral rate. This means that on average it tends to run a capital account surplus that is matched by a current account deficit. Inversely, the perennial current account deficit requires higher interest rates in order to be financed via capital inflows. Chart 7New Zealand Balance Of Payments The problem facing the NZD is that kiwi rates, both at the long and short end of the curve, currently stand below U.S. rates. With a negative basic balance of payments, this creates a natural downward bias to the NZD. The kiwi needs to cheapen enough today that its future returns will be expected to be large enough to compensate for the lower yields offered by domestic securities. Since the real trade-weighted NZD currently trades at a 7% premium to its long-term fair value, so long as the interest rate handicap remains, the path of least resistance points south. Only a sustained rebound in global activity will be able to revert this trend in a durable manner. So far, a sustained rebound in global growth is not in the cards. Consequently, any tactical rally in the kiwi will be temporary. Switzerland The Swiss trade surplus may have declined, but it still remains at a very healthy 4.2% of GDP. This deterioration reflects a pick-up in imports, which have been boosted by a rebound in domestic activity in place since late 2015, as well as the expensive nature of the CHF. The Swiss current account surplus is even larger, standing at 10% of GDP. This large surplus is mainly the consequence of Switzerland’s extremely large net international investment position, which stands at almost 120% of GDP. Such a large pool of foreign assets yields a large income balance, which boosts the current account. After a sudden pickup in net FDI flows last year to 10% of GDP, these flows have violently morphed into a net outflow of 8.3% of GDP. Last year’s positive FDI balance was odd, as countries like Switzerland, which run persistent large positive current account balances, tend to export capital, not import it. A consequence of this sudden reversal was to push the basic balance from a surplus of 17% of GDP to a small surplus of 1.5% of GDP (Chart 8). Chart 8Switzerland Balance Of Payments In contrast, Swiss portfolio flows have moved back into a very small surplus, reflecting investors’ desire for safety in a 2018 year full of volatility and global growth disappointments. These flows suggest that generally, investors have been parking their funds in Switzerland, explaining the strengthening of the CHF last year against the EUR. Now that global financial conditions are easing, setting the stage for stabilization in global growth, the expensive CHF is likely to depreciate. The more dovish tone of the Swiss National Bank is likely to catalyze this change. Sweden Since 2016, the Swedish trade balance has been in negative territory, currently standing at 0.6% of GDP. This is a phenomenon not experienced in this country for more than three decades. Two forces have hurt the trade balance. On one hand, boosted by negative interest rates, Swedish consumers have taken on debt and consumed aggressively. This has lifted domestic demand, propping up imports in the process. On the other hand, Sweden is very sensitive to global trade and industrial activity. The slowdown witnessed at the end of last year has dampened Swedish exports. In response to these developments, the Swedish current account balance has declined meaningfully, from 8.3% of GDP in 2007 to 2.2% today. Since Sweden’s net FDI balance is at zero, the basic balance stands at 1.8% of GDP. However, this is toward the low end of its historical distribution (Chart 9). If the deterioration in the current account continues, something we expect as the Riksbank is keeping interest rates at extraordinarily accommodative levels of -0.25%, thus ensuring that import growth will remain robust, the krona will face an increasingly onerous balance-of-payments backdrop. Chart 9Swedish Balance Of Payments The saving grace for the SEK is likely to come from portfolio flows into securities. The trade-weighted krona is cheap, trading at a nearly 2-sigma discount to its long-term fair value, implicitly boosting expected returns from holding SEK-denominated assets. Moreover, the combination of a Riksbank having finally abandoned its efforts to dampen the krona, and some signs of rebound in economic domestic economic activity such as strong PMI readings, points to a high probability of funds flowing into the country. Norway Thanks to rebounding oil prices since 2016, the Norwegian trade balance has also recovered, having moved from a low of 3.8% of GDP to 6.9% of GDP today. This is still well below the levels that prevailed from 2001 to 2013, when the trade balance averaged 14% of GDP. Meanwhile, the Norwegian current account has followed the trend in the trade balance. However, since Norway sports a massive net international investment position equal to 207% of GDP, the current account stands at 7.9% of GDP, boosted by a large income stream from foreign investments. As a country sporting a structural current account surplus, Norway is also an exporter of capital, which means its FDI balance is normally negative. Even though net FDIs today are -4.6% of GDP, the basic balance is nonetheless in surplus at 3% of GDP (Chart 10). This is still a much smaller basic balance than what prevailed from 2001 to 2013. This means that the long-term component of the balance of payments is not as supportive to the NOK as it once was. Chart 10Norway Balance Of Payments Norway also tends to suffer from portfolio outflows. This again is a consequence of the country’s large current account surplus, which is a channel outward via Norway’s massive sovereign wealth fund. Today, the portfolio balance is quite narrow, a consequence of declining oil receipts. However, Norwegian oil production is expected to increase by 50% by 2022. This means that the Norwegian current account will rebound, and portfolio outflows will once again grow. But since portfolios outflows are the mirror image of the current account dynamics, this is likely to be a neutral force for the NOK. Ultimately, we like the NOK because it is very cheap: the real trade-weighted NOK enjoys a one-sigma discount to its long-term fair value. Due to trade-weights, this means the NOK is cheap versus both the EUR and the SEK. Hence, with BCA’s positive view on oil prices and the positive outlook for Norwegian oil production, we would anticipate the NOK performing well against these two currencies on a 12- to 18-month basis.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights We always strive to develop new analytical methods to complement our focus on judging currencies based on global liquidity conditions and the business cycle. This week, we introduce a ranking method based strictly on domestic factors: We call it the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking. Using this method alone, the USD, the NZD, the AUD, and the NOK are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the JPY, the GBP, the EUR and the CHF are the least attractive ones. If we further filter the results using a valuation gauge, the USD, the NOK and the CAD are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the CHF, the JPY and the GBP are the least attractive ones. Ultimately, the message is clear: if the dollar corrects, domestic factors suggest it will be shallow. However, buying pro-cyclical commodity currencies at the expense of countercyclical ones makes sense no matter what. Feature This publication places significant emphasis on understanding where we stand in the global liquidity and business cycle in order to make forecasts for G-10 currencies. However, we also like to refer to other methods to add supplementary dimensions to our judgment calls. In this optic, we have focused on factor-based analyses such as understanding momentum, carry and valuation considerations. This week, we take another approach: We build a ranking methodology using domestic economic variables only, intentionally excluding global business cycle factors. Essentially, we want to create an additional filter to be used independently of our main method. This way, we can develop a true complement to our philosophy rooted in understanding the global business cycle. With this approach, we rank currencies in terms of domestic growth, slack, inflation, financial conditions, central bank monitors, and real rates. We look at the level of these variables as well as how they have evolved over the past 12 months. After ranking each currency for each criterion, we compute an aggregate attractiveness ranking incorporating all the information. We then compare the attractiveness of each currency to their premiums/discounts to our Intermediate-Term Timing Models. Based on this methodology, the USD, the NOK and the CAD are the most attractive currencies over the coming three months, while the CHF, the JPY, and the GBP are the least attractive ones. Building A Domestic Attractiveness Ranking Domestic Growth The first dimension tries to capture the strength and direction of domestic growth. We begin by looking at the annual growth rate of industrial production excluding construction, as well as how this growth rate has evolved over the past 12 months. Here, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. As Chart I-1 illustrates, Sweden is performing particularly well on this dimension, while the euro area, Switzerland, the U.K, and Japan are not. The U.S. stands toward the middle of the pack. When aggregating this dimension on both the first and second derivative of industrial production, Sweden ranks first, followed by the U.S. and Norway (Chart I-2). The U.K. and the euro area rank at the bottom. When trying to gauge the impact of domestic growth on each currency’s attractiveness, we also look at the forward-looking OECD leading economic indicator (LEI). As with industrial production, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. This changes the ranking. New Zealand exhibits the highest annual growth rate, followed by the U.S. Meanwhile, when looking at how the annual rate of change has evolved over the past 12 months, Australia shows the least deterioration, and the euro area the most (Chart I-3). Putting these two facets of the LEI together, Australia currently ranks first, followed by the U.S. and New Zealand. Switzerland and the U.K perform the most poorly (Chart I-4). Slack Then, we focus on slack, observing the dynamics in the unemployment gap, calculated using the OECD estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Here, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are least attractive, while those at the bottom left are most attractive. Switzerland enjoys both a very negative and rapidly falling unemployment gap (Chart I-5). The U.K. also exhibits a clear absence of slack, but in response to the woes surrounding Brexit, this tightness is decreasing. Interestingly, the euro area looks good. Despite its high unemployment rate of 7.9%, the unemployment gap is negative, a reflection of its high NAIRU. Combining the amount of slack with the change in slack, Switzerland, New Zealand and the euro area display the best rankings, while the U.S. and Sweden exhibit the worst (Chart I-6). The poor rankings for both the U.S. and Sweden reflect that there is little room for improvement in these countries. Inflation When ranking currencies on the inflation dimension, we look at core inflation and wages. We assume that rising inflationary pressures are a plus, as they indicate the need for tighter policy. We begin with core inflation itself; the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. Canada and the U.S. both sport higher core inflation than the rest of the sample, as well positive inflationary momentum (Chart I-7). Switzerland displays both a very low level of inflation as well as declining momentum. U.K. inflation displays the least amount of momentum. On the core CPI ranking, the Canadian dollar ranks first, followed by the USD. Unsurprisingly, Japan and Switzerland rank at the bottom of the heap (Chart I-8).   We also use wages to track inflationary conditions as G-10 central banks have put a lot of emphasis on labor costs. Similar to core inflation, we measure each country’s level of wage growth as well as its wage-growth momentum. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. This time, the U.S. and the U.K. display both the highest annual growth rate of wages as well as the fastest increase in wage inflation (Chart I-9). Meanwhile, Norwegian wage growth is very poor, but improving. The U.S. and the U.K. rank first on this dimension, while Switzerland and Canada rank last, the latter is impacted by its very sharp deceleration in wage growth (Chart I-10). Financial Conditions The Financial Conditions Index (FCI) has ample explanatory power when it comes to forecasting a country’s future growth and inflation prospects. This property has made the FCI a key variable tracked by G-10 central banks. Here we plot the level of the FCI relative to the annual change in FCI. A low and easing FCI boosts a nation’s growth prospects, while a high and tightening FCI hurts the outlook. Consequently, the currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are least attractive, while those at the bottom left are most attractive. While Switzerland has the highest level of FCI – courtesy of an overvalued exchange rate – the U.S. has experienced the greatest tightening in financial conditions (Chart I-11). Combining the level and change in FCI, we find that New Zealand currently possess the most pro-growth conditions, followed by both Sweden and Norway. On the other end of the spectrum, Japan and the U.S. suffer from the most deleterious financial backdrop (Chart I-12). Central Bank Monitors   We often use the Central Bank Monitors devised by our Global Fixed Income Strategy sister publication as a gauge to evaluate the most probable next moves by central banks. It therefore makes great sense to use this tool in the current exercise. The only problem is that we currently do not have a Central Bank Monitor for Switzerland, Sweden and Norway. Nonetheless, using this variable to create a dimension, we compare where each available Central Bank Monitor stands with its evolution over the past 12 months. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. Currently, Canada and the U.S. show a clear need for tighter policy, without a pronounced fall in their respective Central Bank Monitors (Chart I-13). However, while the U.K. could stand higher rates right now, the British Central Bank Monitor is quickly falling, suggesting the window of opportunity for the Bank of England is dissipating fast. The euro area and Australia do not seem to justify higher rates right now. On this metric, Canada and the U.S. stand at one and two, while Australia and the euro area offer the least attractive conditions for their currencies (Chart I-14). Real Interest Rates   The Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) hypothesis has been one the workhorses of modern finance in terms of forecasting exchange rates. To conduct this type of exercise, our previous work has often relied on a combination of short- and long-term real rates, a formulation with a good empirical track record.1 Accordingly, in the current exercise, we use this same combination of short- and long-term real rates to evaluate the attractiveness of G-10 currencies. This dimension is created by comparing the level of real rates to the change in real rates over the past 12 months. The currencies of countries at the top right of the chart are most attractive, while those at the bottom left are least attractive. The U.S. dollar is buoyed by elevated and rising real rates, while the pound is hampered by low and falling real rates (Chart I-15). This results in the dollar ranking first on this dimension, and the pound ranking last (Chart I-16). Interestingly, the yen ranks second because depressed inflation expectations result in higher-than-average and rising real rates. Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking and Investment Conclusions   Once we have ranked each currency on each dimension, we can compute the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking as a simple average of the ranking of the eight different dimensions. Based on this method, domestic fundamentals suggest that the USD, the NZD, the NOK and the AUD are the most attractive currencies over the next three months or so, while the JPY, the GBP, the EUR and the CHF are the least attractive ones (Chart I-17). Interestingly, this confirms our current tactical recommendation espoused over recent weeks to favor pro-cyclical currencies at the expense of defensive currencies. However, it goes against our view that the U.S. dollar is likely to correct further over the same time frame. This difference reflects the fact that unlike our regular analysis, the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking does not take into account the global business cycle, momentum and sentiment. We can refine this approach further and incorporate valuation considerations. We often rely on our Intermediate-Term Timing Model to gauge if a currency is cheap or not. Chart I-18 compares the Aggregate Domestic Attractiveness Ranking of G-10 currencies to their deviation from their ITTM. Countries at the bottom left offer the most attractive currencies, while those at the upper right are the least attractive currencies. This chart further emphasizes the attractiveness of the dollar: not only do domestic factors support the greenback, so do its short-term valuations. The CAD, the NOK and the SEK also shine using this method, while the less pro-cyclical EUR, CHF and JPY suffer. The pound too seems to posses some short-term downside. Ultimately, this tells us that if the global environment is indeed unfavorable to the U.S. dollar right now, we cannot ignore the strength of U.S. domestic factors. Consequently, we refrain from aggressively selling the USD during the tactical anticipated correction. Instead, if the global environment favors the pro-cyclical commodity currencies on a three-month basis, it is optimal to buy them on their crosses, especially against the CHF and JPY. Meanwhile, the pound has very little going for it, and selling it against the SEK or the NOK could still deliver ample gains.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "In Search Of A Timing Model" dated July 22, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: January U.S. consumer confidence index surprised to the downside, coming in at 120.2.  U.S. unemployment rate in January increased to 4.0%, from a previous 3.9% reading; however, this data point was likely distorted by the government shutdown Non-farm payrolls in January surprised to the upside, coming in at 304k. The DXY index rebounded by 0.9% this week. Tactically, we remain bearish on the dollar, as we believe that the current easing in financial conditions will help global growth temporarily surprise dismal investor expectations. Nevertheless, we remain cyclical dollar bulls, as the Fed will ultimately hike more than what is currently priced this year, and as China’s current reflation campaign is about mitigating the downside to growth, not generating a new upswing in indebtedness and capex. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 So Donald Trump Cares About Stocks, Eh? - January 9, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The recent data in euro area has been negative: The Q4 euro area GDP on a year-over-year basis fell to 1.2%, in line with expectations. Euro area headline inflation in January on a year-over-year basis decreased to 1.4%, from the previous 1.6% in December 2018, core inflation rose to 1.1%. January Markit euro area composite PMI fell to 51.0. Euro area retail sales in December fell to 0.8% on a year-over-year basis, from the previous 1.8%. In response to this poor economic performance, EUR/USD has fallen by 0.8% this week. We remain cyclically bearish on the euro, as we believe that the Fed will hike more than anticipated this cycle and that Europe is more negatively impacted by China’s woes than the U.S. is. Hence, slowing global growth will force the ECB to stay dovish much longer than expected. Moreover, our Intermediate Term Timing Model, is showing that the euro is once again trading at a premium to short term fundamentals. Report Links: 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 Six Questions From The Road - November 16, 2018 Evaluating The ECB’s Options In December - November 6, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Annual inflation increased to 0.4% from previous 0.3%, core inflation increased to 0.7% from 0.6%, and inflation ex fresh food increased to 1.1% from 0.9%. December retail trade weakened to 1.3% from the previous 1.4%. Japanese unemployment rate in December has fallen to 2.4%. January consumer confidence index fell to 41.9, underperforming the expectations. USD/JPY has risen by 0.3% this week. We remain bearish on the yen on a tactical basis. The recent FOMC meeting kept the U.S. key interest rate unchanged, so did many other central banks. The resulting ease in global financial conditions could be a headwind for safe havens, like the yen. Moreover, U.S. yields are likely to rise even after the easing in financial conditions is passed, as BCA anticipates the Fed to resume hiking in the second half of 2019. This will create additional downside for the yen. Report Links: Yen Fireworks - January 4, 2019 2019 Key Views: The Xs And The Currency Market - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 The recent data in Britain has been negative: Markit U.K. composite PMI has surprised to the downside, falling to 50.3 in January; service PMI dropped to 50.1 while construction PMI fell to 50.6.  Halifax house prices yearly growth, surprised to the downside, coming in at 0.8%. Finally, Markit Services PMI also underperform, coming in at 50.1. The Bank of England rate decided to keep rates on hold at 0.75%. GBP/USD has lost 0.8% this week. On a long-term basis, we remain bullish on cable, as valuation for the pound are attractive. However, we believe that the current stalemate in Westminster, coupled with the hard-nose approach of Brussels has slightly increase the probability of a No-deal Brexit. This political uncertainty implies that short-term risk-adjusted returns remains low. Report Links: Deadlock In Westminster - January 18, 019 Six Questions From The Road - November 16, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been negative: Building permits in December has surprised to the downside, coming in at -8.4% on a month-over-month basis.  December retail sales has slowed down, coming in at -0.4%. Finally, in December, with exports contracted at a -2% pace, and imports, at -6% pace. The RBA decided to leave the cash rate unchanged at 1.5%. While it was at first stable, AUD/USD ultimately has fallen by 2% this week. Overall, we remain bearish on the AUD in the long run. The unhealthy Australian housing market coupled with very elevated debt loads, could drag residential construction and household consumption down. Moreover, the uncompetitive Australian economy could fall into a potential liquidity trap as the credit conditions tighten further. Report Links: CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The recent data in New Zealand has been negative: The participation rate underperformed expectations, coming in at 70.9%. Moreover, employment growth also surprised to the downside, coming in at 0.1%. Finally, the unemployment rate surprised negatively, coming in at 4.3%. NZD/USD has fallen by 2.3% this week. Overall, we remain bullish on the NZD against the AUD, given that credit excesses are less acute in New Zealand than in Australia. Moreover, New Zealand is much less exposed to the Chinese industrial cycle than Australia. This means that is China moving away from its current investment-led growth model will likely negatively impact AUD/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Clashing Forces: The Fed And EM Financial Conditions - October 19, 2018 In Fall, Leaves Turn Red, The Dollar Turns Green - October 12, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The recent data in Canada has been negative: GDP has fallen to 1.7% on a year-over-year basis from the previous 2.2%. The December industrial production growth came in at -0.7% month-on-month, a negative surprise. Canadian manufacturing PMI in January decreased to 53. On the back of these poor data and weaker oil prices, USD/CAD rose by 1.6% this week, more than undoing last week’s fall. We expect the CAD to outperform other commodity currencies like the AUD and the NZD, oil prices are likely to outperform base metals on a cyclical basis. Moreover, the Canadian economy is more levered to the U.S. than other commodity driven economies. Thus, our constructive view on the U.S. implies a positive view on the CAD on a relative basis. Report Links: CAD And AUD: Jumping Higher To Plunge Deeper - February 1, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Clashing Forces: The Fed And EM Financial Conditions - October 19, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2   Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Real retail sales yearly growth improved this month, coming in at -0.3% versus -0.6% last month. However, the SVME Purchasing Manager’s Index underperformed expectations, coming in at 54.3. EUR/CHF has fell 0.2% this week. Despite this setback, we remain bullish on EUR/CHF. Last year’s EUR/CHF weakness tightened Swiss financial conditions significantly and lowered inflationary pressures. Given that the Swiss National Bank does not want a repeat of the deflationary spiral of 2015, we believe that it will continue with its ultra-dovish monetary policy and increase its interventionism in the FX market, in order to weaken the franc, and bring back inflation to Switzerland. Moreover, on a tactical basis, the ease in financial conditions should hurt safe havens like the franc. Report Links: Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been negative: The December retail sales missed the consensus estimates, coming in at -1.80%. December credit indicator decreased to 5.4%. Registered unemployment rate in January has increased to 2.6%, surprising to the downside. USD/NOK has risen by 1.8% this week. We are positive on USD/NOK on a cyclical timeframe. Although we are bullish on oil prices, USD/NOK is more responsive to real rate differentials. This means, that a hikes later this year by the Fed will widen differentials between these two countries and provide a tailwind for this cross. Nevertheless, the positive performance of oil prices should help the NOK outperform non-commodity currencies like the AUD. We also expect NOK/SEK to appreciate and EUR/NOK to depreciate. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been negative: Consumer confidence surprised to the downside, coming in at 92. Moreover, retail sales yearly growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 5.6%. Finally, manufacturing PMI came in line with expectations at 51.5. USD/SEK has risen by 2.2% this week. Overall, we remain long term bullish on the krona against the euro, given that Swedish monetary policy is much too easy for the current inflationary environment, a situation that will have to be rectified. However, given our positive view on the U.S. dollar on a cyclical basis, we are cyclically bullish on USD/SEK, since krona is the G-10 currency most sensitive to dollar moves. Report Links: Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Global equity markets have managed to recoup some of last year’s plunge since we upgraded stocks to overweight in late December. The equity rally has been tentative, however, and so far feels more like a technical bounce from oversold levels than a resumption of the bull market. One driving factor behind last year’s market swoon was that policy uncertainty spiked at a time when the last pillar of global growth, the U.S., was showing signs of cracking. Investors thus welcomed the Fed’s signal that it would pause in March. Nonetheless, shrinkage in the Fed’s balance sheet is proving to be troublesome. Quantitative tightening does not necessarily imply permanently higher risk premia, but it will be a source of volatility. There are hopeful but tentative signs that a U.S. slowdown is not the precursor to a recession. The hit to GDP from the U.S. government shutdown will be reversed next quarter. The FOMC has also signaled that policymakers are attuned to the economic risks associated with tightening financial conditions, and that the calm inflation backdrop provides room to maneuver. The FOMC will stand pat in March, but should restart rate hikes in June as the economic soft patch ends. We still see only a modest risk of a U.S. recession this year. In contrast, our outlook for growth outside the U.S. remains downbeat for at least the first half of the year. Among the advanced economies, Japan and Europe are being the most affected by the Chinese economic slowdown and global trade tensions. This means that monetary policy divergence will continue to be a tailwind for the dollar. China continues to stimulate at the margin, but efforts so far have been insufficient to put a floor under growth. The contraction in Chinese exports has just begun. It is still too early to upgrade EM assets or base metals. Despite the cloud still surrounding Brexit, sterling is beginning to look attractive as a long-term punt. Our decision to upgrade corporate bonds to overweight this month, similar to our reasoning for upgrading equities in December, is based on improved value and a sense that investor pessimism had become excessive. Just as the selloff in risk assets was overdone, so too was the rally in government bonds. It is highly unlikely that the Fed is done tightening, as is currently discounted in the money market curve. A resumption of Fed rate hikes around mid-year means that the 10-year Treasury yield will move back above 3% by year end. Feature Global equity markets have managed to recoup some of last year’s plunge since we upgraded the asset class back to overweight in the latter half of December. A decline in the VIX and high-yield bond spreads are also positive signs that global risk appetite is recovering, following an overdone investor ‘panic attack’ last quarter. The equity rally has been tentative, however, and so far feels more like a simple technical bounce from oversold levels than a resumption of the bull market. One problem is that policy uncertainty has spiked at a time when the last pillar of global growth, the U.S., is showing signs of cracking (Chart I-1). Investors are skittish while they await a clear de-escalation of U.S./China trade tensions, an end to the U.S. economic soft patch, an end to the U.S. government shutdown, and signs that global growth is bottoming (especially in China). There has only been some modestly positive news on a couple of these issues. Chart I-1Policy Uncertainty Has Spiked Another factor that appeared to play a role in last quarter’s market swoon is the fear that the end of asset purchases by the European Central Bank and the normalization of the Fed’s balance sheet necessarily imply a structural de-rating for all risk assets. A related worry is that the de-rating might intensify the global economic slowdown, resulting in a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. Does QT Imply Lower Multiples? The question of balance sheet normalization is a difficult one because there is widespread disagreement on how, or even whether, quantitative easing (QE) works. We have always maintained that QE was not about creating a wave of central bank liquidity that flowed into asset prices. Central banks did not “print money” – they created bank reserves. These reserves did not result in a major acceleration in broader measures of money growth, including M1 and M2, largely because there was little demand for loans and because banks tightened lending standards. In other words, the credit channel of monetary policy was broken. The implication is that investors should not worry that quantitative tightening (QT) implies a withdrawal of central bank liquidity that must mechanically come from the sale of risk assets. Rather, we believe that QE operates mostly through the portfolio balance effect. There are two ways to think about this channel. First, the central bank forced investors to move into riskier assets by purchasing large amounts of “safe” assets, such as government bonds. Investors had little choice but to redeploy the capital into other riskier areas, pushing up asset prices. The second perspective is that central bank purchases of government bonds depressed both the yield curve and bond volatility. Volatility fell because investors could forecast the policy rate with certainty – it would be glued to zero (or negative) for the foreseeable future in most of the advanced economies. This is akin to strong forward guidance that flattened the yield curve. Aggressive monetary stimulus, such as QE, also helped to reduce the perceived risk that the economy would succumb to secular stagnation or fall back into recession. Reduced bond volatility, lower bond yields, and less economic risk all increased the attractiveness of the riskier asset classes. These explanations represent two sides of the same coin. Either way, QE boosted a broad array of asset prices. If this is true, then unwinding QE must be bearish for risk assets, all else equal. In the case of the U.S., the fed funds rate is much more difficult to forecast than was the case when the Fed was buying bonds. Higher yields and bond volatility imply a lower equilibrium multiple in the equity market and wider equilibrium corporate bond spreads. Nonetheless, all else is not equal. If interest rates and bond volatility are rising in the context of healthy economic and profit growth, then it is likely that the perceived risk of secular stagnation is falling. It would be a sign that the economy has finally put the financial crisis firmly in the rear-view mirror. It could be the case that the upgrade in economic confidence overwhelms the negative impact of the reverse portfolio balance effect related to quantitative tightening, allowing risk assets to rise. No one can prove this thesis one way or the other and we are not making the case that unwinding the Fed’s balance sheet will necessarily go smoothly, especially since interest rates are rising at the same time. The problem is that both investors and the Fed are trying to figure out where the neutral fed funds rate lies. If the so-called level of R-star is still very low, then the Fed might have already made a policy mistake by raising rates too far. We discussed in last month’s Overview the market implications of four scenarios for the level of R-star and the Fed’s success in correctly guessing it. If the economy holds up and the economic soft patch ends in the coming months as we expect, then investors will revise their estimate of the neutral rate higher and risk assets will rally even as bond yields rise. The Doom Loop One risk to our base-case scenario is the so-called financial conditions “doom loop”. Irrespective of whether or not QT is playing a role, the doom loop scenario involves a shock to investor confidence that leads to a tightening in financial conditions and market liquidity as stock prices fall and credit spreads widen. More onerous financial conditions, in turn, undermine economic activity, which then feeds back into even tighter financial conditions. One could make the argument that risk assets are even more exposed to this type of negative feedback loop today than in past monetary tightening cycles because of program trading, the Fed’s balance sheet shrinkage and investors’ lingering shell shock from the Great Recession and financial crisis. Nonetheless, there are a few mitigating factors to consider. We believe that a doom loop is more likely to unfold when economic growth becomes very sensitive to changes in financial conditions. This normally happens when economic and financial imbalances are elevated. On a positive note, unlike in the lead-up to the last two recessions, the U.S. private sector is a net saver whose income outstrips spending by 2.1% of GDP (Chart I-2). The highly cyclical parts of the U.S. economy are not stretched to the upside as a share of GDP, reducing the risk that overspending in one part of the economy will required a deep contraction to correct the imbalance (Chart I-3). Chart I-2U.S. Private Sector: A New Saver Chart I-3U.S. Cyclical Spending Not Extended In terms of financial excesses, the good news is that the U.S. household sector is in its best shape in decades. Our main concern is debt accumulation in the corporate sector. We reviewed the related risks in a Special Report published in the November 2018 issue.1 We concluded that corporate leverage will not cause the next U.S. recession, because high levels of debt will only become a problem when profits begin to contract (i.e. when the economic downturn is already underway). Nonetheless, when a recession does occur, corporate spreads will widen by more than in the past for any given degree of economic contraction (see below). ‘Fed Put’ Still In Play Another factor that tempers the risk of a doom loop is that the so-called ‘Fed Put’ is still operating. The December FOMC Minutes and comments by various FOMC members communicated to investors that the Fed is attuned to the economic risks associated with tightening financial conditions, and that the calm inflation backdrop provides policymakers with room to maneuver. Chair Powell even said he was willing to adjust the Fed’s balance sheet run-off if necessary. One important reason for policymakers’ willingness to be flexible is that the fed funds rate is still not far from the zero-lower-bound, making it potentially more difficult for the FOMC to respond adequately in the event of a recession this year because the fed funds rate can only be cut by 250 basis points. Several U.S. data releases have been delayed due the government shutdown, but what has been released has been mixed. The downdraft in the January reading of the manufacturing ISM was eye-opening, highlighting that the global manufacturing slowdown has reached U.S. shores. The good news is that the non-manufacturing ISM and the small business survey, although off their peaks, remain consistent with solid underlying growth. The December U.S. payroll report revealed that wage growth continued to accelerate on the back of gangbusters job creation at the end of the year. There have also been some recent hints that the soft patch in capital spending and housing is ending (Chart I-4). Existing home sales fell sharply in December, but extremely low inventories suggest that it is more of a supply than a demand problem. The impressive bounce in home mortgage applications for purchases is a hopeful sign. U.S. commercial and industrial loan growth is also accelerating. Chart I-4Some Tentative Signs These tentative signs that the economic soft patch is close to an end will not be enough to get the FOMC to tighten in March, after so many members have gone out of their way to signal a pause in recent weeks. Nonetheless, we believe the economy will remain strong enough for the Fed to resume hiking in June. The U.S. government shutdown will complicate interpreting incoming economic data. Ultimately, while its impact on Q1 real GDP growth will be non-trivial, it will be reversed the following quarter and we do not expect any permanent damage to be done. U.S. inflation should edge higher by mid-year, supporting our view that the Fed will resume tightening in June. The decline in oil prices will continue to feed into a lower headline inflation rate in the coming months, but that does not mean that the core rate will fall. Indeed, core CPI has increased by roughly 0.2% in each of the past three months, translating into an annualized rate of approximately 2.4%. Base effects will depress annual core inflation in February but, thereafter, this effect will begin to reverse. The acceleration in wage growth according to measures such as average hourly earnings and the Employment Cost Index highlights that underlying inflationary pressures continue to percolate (Chart I-5). The implication is that the Treasury bond market is overly complacent in discounting that the fed funds rate has peaked for the cycle. Chart I-5U.S. Wage Pressure Is Percolating Looking further ahead, our base case remains that the next U.S. recession will not occur until 2020, and will be the result of tighter fiscal policy and further Fed tightening that takes short-term rates a step too far. No Bottom Yet For Global Growth Our outlook for growth outside the U.S. remains downbeat for at least the first half of the year. Our global economic indicators still show no sign of a turnaround, except for a bottoming in the diffusion index based on BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator (Chart I-6). The global ZEW economic sentiment index continued to fall in January, while business and consumer confidence readings in the advanced economies eroded heading into year end. Chart I-6Global Leading Indicators Still Deteriorating A better global growth dynamic awaits more serious policy stimulus in China. Real GDP growth decelerated further to 6.4% year-over-year in the last quarter of 2018. This is no disaster, but the point is that there are still no signs of stabilization. The Chinese authorities continue to tweak the policy dials at the margin, most recently providing some tax cuts and a liquidity injection into the banking system. Nonetheless, the central government has so far abstained from stimulating the property market due to existing speculative excesses. This is very different from the previous two policy easing episodes, including 2015/16 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7China: No Property Market Stimulus... The stimulus undertaken so far has been insufficient in terms of putting a floor under growth according to our 12-month Credit Impulse (Chart I-8). It is a hopeful sign that broad money growth is trying to bottom, but this does not guarantee that the credit impulse is about to turn. The latter is required to confirm that Chinese import demand will accelerate, providing a lift to EM exporters, EM asset prices and commodity prices. Without a positive credit impulse, China’s investment and construction activity will continue to moderate, leading to lower imports of machinery and raw materials. Chart I-8...And No Credit Impulse The economic situation in China is likely to get worse before it gets better. Dismal trade figures in December confirmed that the trade war is beginning to bite. The period of export ‘front-running’ related to higher U.S. tariffs is over as total exports fell by 4.4% year-over-year. Last year’s collapse in export orders indicates that the woes are just beginning. In turn, moderating production related to the Chinese export sector will bleed into domestic consumption and imports, suggesting that it is too early to expect a durable rally in EM assets or commodity prices. Lackluster Chinese demand and growing trade concerns have weighted on global business confidence, contributing to the pullback in capital goods orders, manufacturing PMIs and industrial production in the advanced economies (Chart I-9). Even the average service sector PMI and consumer confidence index in the advanced economies have fallen in recent months, although both remain at a high level. Chart I-9The Fallout From Trade Europe and Japan, in particular, are feeling the pinch. German GDP only grew 1.5% in 2018, implying that Q4 GDP growth was in the vicinity of just 0.2% QoQ. Meanwhile, European industrial production contracted by 3.3% year-over-year in December. The German Ifo and ZEW surveys do not point to any significant improvements in this trend. A few idiosyncratic factors explain some of this poor performance, including new emissions testing standards that have weighted on the German auto industry, a tightening in financial conditions in Italy, and the ‘gilets jaunes’ protests in France. Nonetheless, the euro area slowdown cannot be fully explained by one-off factors. The economy is highly sensitive to global trade fluctuations given that 18% of the euro area’s gross value added is generated in the manufacturing sector. Hence, China’s poor economic health has been painful for Europe, and the trend in Chinese credit does not bode well for the near term (Chart I-10). The European Central Bank (ECB) is likely to stay on the defensive as a result, especially as euro area core inflation, which has been stuck near 1% for three years, is unlikely to pick up if growth remains on the back foot. The ECB stuck with the view that the economic soft patch is temporary after the January policy meeting, but policymakers will consider providing more stimulus in March if the economy does not pick up (using forward guidance or a new TLTRO). This will weigh on the euro. Chart I-10China's Woes Are Infecting Europe Japan is suffering from similar ills. Exports are no longer growing, and foreign machinery and factory orders are contracting at a 4.1% and 4.3% pace, respectively. This weakness is not mimicked in domestic growth, but the disproportionate contribution of the external sector to Japan’s overall economic health means that this country is also falling victim to the malaise witnessed in China and emerging markets, the destination of 19% and 45% of Japanese shipments, respectively (Chart I-11). Collapsing oil prices and a firming trade-weighted yen have amplified this deflationary backdrop. It is therefore far too early to bet that the Bank of Japan will tighten the monetary dials. Chart I-11Japan Hit By The Chinese Cold As Well If we are correct that the U.S. economic soft patch will soon end, then the dollar will once again look to be the best of a bad lot. Interest rate expectations will move in favor of the dollar. We expect the dollar to rise by about 6% this year on a trade-weighted basis, appreciating most strongly against the AUD and SEK. As for sterling, it is beginning to look attractive as a long-term punt. Brexit Deadlock We are a month closer to the end-March deadline and a Brexit deal seems even farther out of reach. It could play out in one of three ways: (1) a “no deal” where the U.K. leaves the EU with no alternative in place; (2) a “soft Brexit” involving an agreement to form a permanent customs union or some sort of “Norway plus” arrangement; or (3) a decision to reverse the results of the original referendum and stay in the EU. There is no support for the “no deal” option in Parliament, which means that it won’t happen. We do not have a strong view on which of the latter two scenarios will occur. The odds of another referendum are rising and the polls are swinging away from any sort of Brexit, suggesting that the original referendum result may be over-turned via another referendum (Chart I-12). Nonetheless, for investors, it does not matter much whether it is scenario 2 or 3; either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Overweight sterling positions are attractive as a long-term play, although it could be some time before the final solution emerges. Chart I-12Brexit Result May Be Overturned Upgrade Corporate Bonds To Overweight Given the recent global economic dynamics, it is perhaps surprising that U.S. corporate financial health actually improved in 2018 according to our Corporate Health Monitors (CHM). We highlighted in the aforementioned Special Report the risks facing U.S. corporate bonds when the economic expansion ends. High levels of corporate leverage mean that the interest coverage ratio for the median corporation in the Barclays-Bloomberg index will plunge to near or below all-time historic lows. The potential for a large wave of fallen angels implies that downgrade activity will be particularly painful for corporate bond investors. The surge in lower-quality issuance has led to a downward trend in the average credit rating and has significantly raised the size of the BBB-rated bonds relative to the IG index and relative to the broader universe of corporate bonds. Moreover, poor market liquidity and covenant erosion will intensify pressure for corporate spreads to widen when the bear market arrives. Rapid debt accumulation is reflected in our bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors (CHM) for the U.S. investment-grade and high-yield sectors (Chart I-13). The CHMs are constructed from six financial ratios that the rating agencies use when rating individual companies. The companies in our bottom-up sample were chosen so as to mimic the sector and quality distribution in the Bloomberg-Barclay’s corporate bond index. Chart I-13U.S. Corporate Health The debt-to-book-value of equity ratio for both the U.S. IG and HY sample of companies has risen to nose-bleed levels, although the ratio appears to have flattened off for the latter. Despite rising leverage, the HY CHM has shifted into “improved health” territory and the IG CHM is on the verge of doing the same. Last year’s upturn in the profitability measures, such as the return on capital, overwhelmed the deteriorating leverage trend. In Europe, where we distinguish between domestic and foreign issuers, rising leverage has been concentrated among the latter until recently (Chart I-14). In any event, the CHM for both types of issuers is close to the neutral zone. Chart I-14Euro Area Corporate Health Improving U.S. corporate health on its own would not justify increasing exposure to corporate bonds within balanced portfolios or moving down in quality. Profit growth is likely to moderate this year, especially in Europe, such that last year’s improvement in corporate health is likely to reverse. And, as previously discussed, the economic cycle is well advanced and this sector is particularly vulnerable to a recession. Nonetheless, value has improved enough to warrant a tactical upgrade to overweight within fixed-income portfolios, at a time when the FOMC has signaled a pause and the next recession is at least a year away. Implied volatility should continue to moderate and spreads should narrow, similar to dynamics in 2016, the last time that the Fed signaled patience following a period of market turmoil (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Fed Patience To Narrow Spreads Spreads have already narrowed from the peak in late December, but 12-month breakeven spreads for most credit tiers are all still close to or above their historical means, except for AA-rated issues (Chart I-16). For example, the 12-month breakeven spread2 for the Baa credit tier is 46%. This means that the spread has been tighter than its current level 46% of the time since 1988 and wider than its current level 54% of the time. Historically, spreads tend to hover within the tight-end of their historical range during this phase of the credit cycle, and only cheapen significantly when the yield curve inverts and the default rate moves higher. Chart I-16Value Restored In IG Corporates... For U.S. high yield, our estimate of the spread adjusted for expected defaults has risen to 237 bps (Chart I-17). This implies that investors are discounting a 2019 default rate of 3.2%, in line with Moody's forecast. Since we do not foresee recession this year, high-yield bonds are not expensive enough to be avoided within a portfolio. Chart I-17...And In HY Too Value has also improved in the European corporate bond market, but our global fixed-income team still recommends favoring the U.S. market for global credit investors. Leverage is higher in the U.S., especially relative to domestic issuers in Europe, but the U.S. economic and profit outlook for 2019 is better. Conclusions Our decision to upgrade corporate bonds this month, similar to our reasoning for upgrading equities to overweight in December, is based on improved value and a sense that investor pessimism had become excessive. For the equity market, the S&P 12-month forward P/E is an attractive 15.4 as we go to press, and bottom-up estimates for 2019 EPS have been slashed to a very reasonable 8%. Just as the selloff in risk assets late last year was overdone, so too was the rally in government bonds. It is highly unlikely that the Fed is done tightening. A resumption of Fed rate hikes, probably in June, means that the 10-year Treasury yield will move back above 3% by year end. Across the major countries, market expectations for yields 5-10 years from now are close to current levels, which is extremely complacent (Chart I-18). Investors should keep duration short of benchmark. Chart I-18Forward Rates Far Too Low Our shift to overweight in both equities and corporate bonds is tactical in nature. We fully expect to move back to neutral and then to underweight later this year or into 2020, as the peak in U.S. GDP draws nearer. Timing will be difficult as always, which means that investors should be prepared to trim risk exposure earlier than implied by our base-case economic timeline.  The tactical upgrade does not imply that we have become more sanguine on the economic and geopolitical risks for 2019. We do not believe that quantitative tightening or U.S. corporate leverage will truncate the U.S. expansion prematurely. Nonetheless, there is a plethora of other risks to keep us up at night. These include a Fed policy mistake, a hard economic landing in China, a full-blown financial crisis in Italy and an escalation in U.S./China trade tensions. The last one has diminished marginally in probability. We have a sense that the recent equity market downdraft unnerved President Trump, such that he now has a diminished appetite for upsetting investors with talk of an escalating trade war ahead of next year’s election. Outside of these well-known risks, our geopolitical team has recently published its “Black Swans” report for 2019. These are deemed to be risks that are off of most investors’ radar screens, but that would have profound implications if they were to occur: It is premature to expect armed conflict over Taiwan, but an outbreak of serious tensions between China and Taiwan is possible as Sino-American strategic distrust continues to build. Russia and Ukraine may have a shared incentive to renew hostilities this year. Saudi Arabia has received a “blank cheque” from Donald Trump, and thus it may continue to be provocative. This could boost the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices. Tensions are building in the Balkans. A renewed conflict on Europe’s doorstep could be the next great geopolitical crisis. A “Lame Duck” Trump could stage a military intervention in Venezuela. We encourage interested readers to see our Special Report for details.3 As for emerging market assets and base metals, we continue to shy away until we receive confirmation that China is aggressively stimulating. We expect better news on this front by mid-year, but watch our China Credit Impulse indicator for timing. In contrast, investors should be overweight oil and related assets now because our commodity specialists still see the price of Brent rising above US$80/bbl sometime this year. Recent political turmoil in Venezuela buttresses our bullish oil view. Finally, this month’s fascinating Special Report, penned by BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, examines the long-term implications of the peaking in the average IQ in the advanced economies. Average intelligence is falling for both demographic and environment reasons. The impact will be far from benign, potentially leading to lower productivity growth, lower equity multiples, larger budget deficits and higher equilibrium bond yields. The report begins on page 20. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Mathieu Savary Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy January 31, 2019 Next Report: February 28, 2019   II. The Most Important Trend In The World Has Reversed And Nobody Knows Why After rising for thousands of years, human intelligence has begun to decline in developed economies. This can be seen in falling IQ scores and a decline in math and science test scores. Environmental factors appear to account for the bulk of this decline, but no one knows what these factors are. If left unchecked, falling intelligence will severely undermine productivity growth. This could lead to lower equity multiples, larger budget deficits, and ultimately, much higher government bond yields. Technological advances, particularly in the genetic realm, promise to radically raise IQs. In a complete abandonment of its one-child policy, China will combine these controversial technologies with pro-natal measures in order to boost sagging birth rates. The coming Eugenic Wars will be one of the most important economic and geopolitical developments of the 21st century. Part 1: What The Tame Fox Says In 1959, a Soviet scientist named Dmitry Belyaev embarked on an ambitious experiment: to domesticate the silver fox. A geneticist by training, Belyaev wanted to replicate the process by which animals such as cats and dogs came to live side-by-side with humans. It was a risky endeavor. The Soviets had essentially banned the study of Mendelian genetics in favor of the blank slate ideology that is popular in progressive circles today. Belyaev persevered. Working under the guise of studying vulpine physiology, he selected foxes based on only one trait – tamability. Less than 10% of foxes made it to the subsequent generation, with the other 90% being sent off to fur farms. By the fourth generation, the changes were undeniable. Rather than fleeing humans, the foxes sought out their attention with no prompting whatsoever. They even wagged their tails and whined and whimpered like dogs do. The tame foxes also displayed physical changes. Their ears flopped over. Their snouts became shorter and their tails stood upright. "By intense selective breeding, we have compressed into a few decades an ancient process that originally unfolded over thousands of years," wrote Lyudmila Trut, who began as Belyaev’s assistant and took over the project when her boss died in 1985.  Genetically Capitalist? Evolution can broadly proceed in two ways. The first way is through random mutations. This form of evolution, which scientists sometimes refer to as genetic drift, can take thousands of years to yield any discernable changes. The second way is through natural selection, a process that exploits existing variations in genetic traits. As the Russian fox experiment illustrates, evolution driven by selective pressures (either natural or artificial) can occur fairly quickly. Did selective pressures manifest themselves in human evolution in the lead up to the Industrial Revolution? Did humans, in some sense, domesticate themselves? In his book, A Farewell To Alms, economic historian Gregory Clark argued in the affirmative. Clark documented that members of skilled professions in Medieval England had twice as many surviving children as unskilled workers (Chart II-1). Indeed, the fledgling middle class of the time had even more surviving children than the aristocracy, who were often out fighting wars. As a result, the wages of craftsmen declined by a third relative to laborers between 1200 and 1800, implying that the supply of skilled labor was growing more quickly than the demand for skilled workers over this period. In subsequent work, Clark and Neil Cummins argued that the spread of bourgeois values across pre-industrial England was more consistent with a model of genetic transmission than a cultural one (see Box II-1 for details). Similar developments occurred in other parts of the world. For example, in China, the gateway into the bureaucracy for a thousand years was the highly competitive imperial exam. Xi Song, Cameron Campbell, and James Lee showed that high-status men had more surviving children during the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries (Chart II-2).4 The 10,000 Year Explosion Stephen Jay Gould famously said that “There’s been no biological change in humans in 40,000 or 50,000 years. Everything we call culture and civilization we’ve built with the same body and brain.” Gould was wrong. Data from the International HapMap Project show that human evolution accelerated by 100-fold starting around 10,000 years ago (Chart II-3). In their book The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution, Gregory Cochran and the late Henry Harpending explained why evolution sped up so rapidly.5 The advent of agriculture led to a surge in population levels. This, in turn, increased the absolute number of potentially beneficial genetic mutations that could be subject to selection effects. Farming and the rise of city states also completely reshaped the environment in which people lived. Basic biology teaches us that environmental dislocations of this kind tend to generate selective pressures that cause evolution to accelerate. John Hawks, professor of anthropology and genetics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, put it best: “We are more different genetically from people living 5,000 years ago than they were different from Neanderthals.” Many of the changes to our genomes relate to diet and diseases. The various genetic resistances that people have built up to malaria are all less than 10,000 years old. Mutations to the LCT gene, which confers lactose tolerance into adulthood, occurred independently in three different geographical locations: one in East Asia, one in the Middle East, and one in Africa. The Middle Eastern variant was probably responsible for the rapid enlargement of the Indo-European language group, which now stretches from India to Ireland. The African variant likely facilitated the Bantu expansion, which started near the present-day border of Nigeria and Cameroon, and then spread out across almost all of sub-Saharan Africa. Evolution Of The Human Brain About half of the genes in the human genome regulate some aspect of brain function. Given the rapid acceleration in evolution, it would be rather surprising if our own brains had not been affected. And indeed, there is plenty of evidence that they were. The frontal lobe of the brain has increased in size over the past 10,000 years. This is the part of the brain that regulates such things as language, memory, and long-term planning. Testosterone levels have also declined. That may explain the steady reduction in violent crime rates (Chart II-4). We know that certain genes that are associated with higher intelligence have been under recent selective pressure. For example, the gene that leads to torsion dystonia – a debilitating movement disorder – appears to have increased in frequency. Why would a gene that causes a known disease become more widespread? The answer is that individuals who have this particular mutation tend to have IQs that are around 10-to 20-points above the population average. Why IQ Matters IQ has a long and contentious history. Yet, despite numerous efforts to jettison the concept, it has endured for one simple reason: It has more predictive power than virtually anything else in the psychological realm. A simple 30-minute IQ test can help predict future educational attainment, job performance, income, health, criminality, and fertility choices (Table II-1 and Chart II-5). IQ even predicts trader performance!6   Like most physiological traits, IQ is highly heritable.7 The genetic contribution to IQ increases from 20% in early childhood to as high as 80% by one’s late teens and remains at that level well into adulthood.8 This makes IQ almost as heritable as height (Chart II-6). Although there is a great deal of variation among individuals, on average, more intelligent people earn higher incomes (Chart II-7). If the same relationship existed in the pre-industrial era, as seems likely, then human intelligence probably increased in a way that facilitated the economic explosion that we associate with the Industrial Revolution. The stunning implication is that the emergence of the modern era was a question of “when, not if.” Part 2: The Flynn Effect By the late-19th century, it had become clear that the rich were no longer having as many children as the poor. This realization, together with the growing popularity of Darwin’s theories, helped galvanize the eugenics movement. Contrary to popular belief, this movement was not a product of the far-right. In fact, the most vocal proponents of eugenics were among the progressive left. John Maynard Keynes, for example, served as the Director of the British Eugenics Society between 1937 and 1944. Yet, a funny thing happened on the road to idiocracy: The concerns of eugenicists did not come to pass. Rather than becoming dimmer, people became smarter. This phenomenon is now known as the Flynn Effect, named after James Flynn, a psychologist who was among the first to document it. Chart II-8 shows the evolution of IQ scores in a sample of countries between 1940 and 1990. The average country recorded IQ gains of three points per decade over this period, a remarkably large increase over such a relatively short period of time. Explaining The Flynn Effect The Flynn Effect must have been entirely driven by environmental factors since genetic factors – namely the tendency of less-educated people to have more children, and to have them at an earlier age – would have reduced average IQs over the past two hundred years. But how could environmental factors have played the dominant role in light of the strong role of genes discussed above? The answer was proposed by geneticist Richard Lewontin in the 1970s. Lewontin suggested imagining a genetically-diverse sack of seed corn randomly distributed between two large identical fields. One field had fertilizer added to it while the other did not. Genetic variation would explain all of the differences in the height of corn stalks within each field, while environmental factors (the addition of fertilizer) would explain all of the difference in the average height of corn stalks between the two fields. This logic explains why genes can account for the bulk of the variation in IQs within any demographic group, while environmental effects may explain most of the variation across groups, as well as why average scores have changed over time. And what environmental effects are these? The truth is that no one really knows. Plenty of theories have been advanced, but so far there is still little consensus on the matter. Bigger, Healthier Brains It has long been known that learning increases the amount of grey matter in the brain. For example, a recent study showed that the hippocampi of London taxi drivers tend to be larger due to the need for drivers to memorize and navigate complex routes.9 The emergence of modern societies likely kicked off a virtuous circle where the need to solve increasingly complex tasks forced people to hone their learning skills, leading to higher IQs and further technological progress. The introduction of universal primary education amplified this virtuous circle. Better health undoubtedly helped as well. Early childhood diseases reduce IQ by diverting the body’s resources away from mental development towards fighting off infections. There is a strong correlation between measured IQ and disease burden across countries (Chart II-9). A number of studies have documented a strong relationship between the timing of malaria eradication in the U.S. and other parts of the world and subsequent observed gains in childhood IQs.10 Brain size and IQ are positively correlated. Forensic evidence from the U.S. suggests that the average volume of adult human skulls has increased by 7% since the late 1800s, or roughly the size of a tennis ball.11 Part 3: The End Of A 10,000 Year Trend The problem with environmental effects is that they eventually run into diminishing returns. This appears to have happened with the Flynn Effect. In fact, not only does the recent evidence suggest that the Flynn Effect has ended, but the data suggest that IQs are starting to decline. Chart II-10 shows that average math and science test scores fell in the OECD’s Program For International Scholastic Achievement (PISA) between 2009 and 2015, the latest year of the examination. The drop in math and science test scores has been mirrored in falling IQ scores. Flynn observed a decade ago that IQs of British teenagers were slipping.12 Similar results have been documented in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and most recently, Norway. The Norwegian results, published last year, are particularly noteworthy.13 Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg examined three-decades worth of data on IQ tests of Norwegian military conscripts. Military duty has been mandatory for almost all men in Norway since 1814, which means that the study’s authors were able to collect comprehensive data on most Norwegian men and their fathers.  Their paper clearly shows that IQ peaked with the generation born in the mid-1970s and declined by about five points, or one-third of a standard deviation, for the one born in 1990 (Chart II-11). For the first time in recorded history, Norwegian kids today are not scoring as well as their parents. A Mystery What caused the sudden reversal of the Flynn Effect in Norway and most other developed economies? Nobody knows. We can, however, offer three possible theories: New Technologies For much of human history, rising intelligence and technological innovation were complementary processes, meaning that the smartest people were the ones who could best exploit the new technologies that were coming their way. Moreover, as noted above, even those who were less gifted benefited from the mental stimulation that a technologically advanced society provided. It remains to be seen how future technological advances such as generalized AI will affect human intelligence, but recent technological advances seem to have had a dumbing down effect.14 For example, the GPS has obviated the need for people to navigate unfamiliar locations, thus blunting the development of their visuospatial skills. Modern word processors have made spelling skills less important. Having all the information in the world just a click away is a wonderful thing, but it has reduced the need for our brains to retain and codify what we learn. Meanwhile, the constant bombardment of information to which we are subject has made it difficult to concentrate on anything for long. How many youth today can read a report of this length without checking their Facebook feed multiple times? My guess is not many. Diminishing Returns To Education The ability to take young bright minds, who would have otherwise spent their lives doing menial labor, and provide them with an education was probably the greatest tailwind to growth that the 20th century enjoyed. There is undoubtedly still scope to continue this process, but the low-hanging fruits have been picked. Educational attainment has slowed dramatically in most of the world (Chart II-12). Economist James Heckman estimates that U.S. high-school graduation rates, properly measured, peaked over 40 years ago.15 Despite billions of dollars spent, efforts to improve school performance have generally fallen flat. A recent high-level report by the U.S. Department of Education concluded that “The panel did not find any empirical studies that reached the rigor necessary to determine that specific turnaround practices produce significantly better academic outcomes.”16 This gets to a point that most parents already know, which is that when people talk about “bad schools," they are really talking about “bad students.” Deteriorating Health Better health probably contributed to the Flynn Effect. But is it possible to have too much of a good thing? More calories are welcome when people are starving, but today’s calorie-rich, nutrient-poor diets have led to a surge in obesity rates. A clean environment reduces the spread of germs, but it also makes children hypersensitive to foreign substances. Following German reunification, researchers observed that allergies were much more common among West German children than their Eastern peers, presumably because of the West’s more salubrious environment.17 All sorts of weird and concerning physiological changes are occurring. Sperm counts have fallen by nearly 60% since the early 1970s.18 Testosterone levels in young men are dropping. Among girls, the age of first menarche has declined by two years over the past century.19 Are chemical agents in the environment responsible? If they are, what impact are they having on cognitive development? Nobody knows. Reported mental illness is also on the rise. The share of U.S. teenagers with a reported major depressive episode over the prior year surged by over 60% between 2010 and 2017 (Chart II-13). The fraction of young adults that made suicide plans nearly doubled.20 More than 20% of U.S. women over the age of 40 are on antidepressants.21 Five percent of U.S. children are receiving ADHD medication.22 Implications For Economic Growth And Asset Markets So far, the reversal of the Flynn Effect has been largely confined to the developed economies. Test scores are still rising in the developing world, albeit from fairly low levels. For example, two recent studies have documented significant IQ gains in Kenya and Brazil.23 In the poorest countries, opportunities for improving health abound. Even small steps such as fortifying salt with iodine (which costs about five cents per person per year) have been shown to boost IQ by nearly one standard deviation.24 Measures to reduce inbreeding are also likely to boost IQ scores.25 Yet, we should not underestimate the importance of falling cognitive skills in developed economies. Chart II-14 shows that there is a clear positive correlation between student score on math and science and per capita incomes. Most technological innovation still takes place in developed economies. There is an extremely tight relationship between visuospatial IQ and the likelihood of becoming an inventor (Chart II-15). Since IQ is distributed along a bell curve, a 0.1 standard deviation drop in IQs across the entire distribution will result in an 8% decline in the share of people with IQs over 100, a 14% decline in those with IQs over 115, and a 21% decline in those with an IQ over 130 (by convention, each standard deviation on an IQ test is worth 15 points). Falling IQs could result in slower productivity growth, which could further strain fiscal balances. Lower IQs are also associated with decreased future orientation.26 People who live for the moment tend to save less. A decline in savings would push up real rates, leading to less capital accumulation. History suggests that a deceleration in productivity growth and higher real rates will put downward pressure on equity multiples (Chart II-16). Part 4: Generation E For 200 years, the environmentally-driven Flynn Effect disguised the underlying genetically-driven decline in IQs that began not long after the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Flynn has acknowledged this himself, noting at the 2017 International Society For Intelligence Research Conference that “I have no doubt that there has been some deterioration of genetic quality for intelligence since the late Victorian times.”27 Now that the Flynn Effect has reversed, both genes and the environment are working together to reduce cognitive abilities in developed economies. This means that the most important trend in the world – a trend that allowed the human population to increase during the Malthusian era and later allowed output-per-worker to soar following the Industrial Revolution – has broken down. Yet, there may be another twist in the story – one that began just a few months ago: the first members of Generation E were born. E Is For Edited ... Or Eugenics Lulu and Nana will be like most other children, but with one key difference: They will be the first humans ever to have their genomes edited through a procedure know as CRISPR-Cas9. Rogue Chinese scientist He Jiankui deactivated their CCR5 gene, which the HIV virus uses as a gateway into the body. His actions were rightfully condemned around the world for endangering the twins’ health by using a procedure that has not yet been fully vetted in animal studies, let alone in human trials (Lulu and Nana’s father is HIV+ but it is debatable whether the children were at an elevated risk of infection). He Jiankui remains under house arrest at the university where he worked. But whatever his fate, the dam has been broken. For better or for worse, the era of personal eugenics has arrived. The Return Of The Silver Fox It is easier to delete a gene than to add one. It is even more difficult to swap out a large number of genes in a way that achieves a predictable outcome. Thus, the successful manipulation of highly polygenic traits such as intelligence — traits that are linked to hundreds of different genes – may still be decades away.28 Predicting a trait is much simpler than modifying it, however. The cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen by more than 99% since 2001 (Chart II-17). Start-up company Genomic Prediction has already developed a test for fertilized embryos for IVF users that predicts height within a few centimetres and IQ with a correlation of 0.3-to-0.4, roughly as accurate as standardized tests such as the SAT or ACT.29 Other companies are following suit.30 Some will recoil in horror at the prospect of selecting prospective children in this manner. They will argue that such technologies, beyond being simply immoral, will widen social inequality between those who can afford them and those who cannot. Others will counter that screening embryos for certain traits is not that dissimilar to what people already do with prospective romantic partners. They will also point out that mass usage of these technologies will drive down prices to the point that even poor people will be able to access them, thus giving low IQ parents the chance to have high IQ kids. They might also note that such technologies may be the only way to reverse the ongoing accumulation of deleterious mutations within the human germline that has been the unintended by-product of the proliferation of life-saving medicines.31 We will not wade into this thorny debate, other than to note that there will be huge incentives for people to avail themselves of these technologies. The Coming Eugenic Wars And not just individuals either – governments too. While the initial impact of eugenic technologies will be small, the effects will compound over time. Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom estimate that genetic screening could boost average IQs by up to 65 points in five generations (Table II-2). China has been investing heavily in genetic technologies. As Geoffrey Miller has argued, China’s infatuation with eugenics spans into the modern day.32 Like most other countries, fertility in China is negatively correlated with IQ. Mingrui Wang, John Fuerst, and Jianjun Ren estimate that China is currently losing nearly one-third of a point in generalized intelligence per decade, with the loss having accelerated rapidly between the 1960s and mid-1980s.33 The decline in the genetic component of Chinese IQs is coming at a time when the population itself is about to shrink. According to the UN’s baseline forecast, China will lose 450 million working-age people by the end of the century (Chart II-18). Meanwhile, the country is saddled with debt, the result of an economic model that has, for decades, recycled copious household savings into debt-financed fixed-investment spending in an effort to shore up domestic demand. The authorities may be tempted to tackle all three problems simultaneously by adopting generous pro-natal measures – call it the “at least one-child policy”– which increasingly harnesses emerging eugenic technologies. The resulting baby boom would strengthen domestic demand, thus making the economy less dependent on exports, while ensuring China’s long-term geopolitical viability. The Eugenic Wars are coming, and they will be unlike anything the world has seen before. BOX II-1 The Diffusion Of Bourgeois Values: Culture Or Genes? Higher-income people had more surviving children in the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution. Real per capita income was broadly stable during this period. This implies that there must have been downward social mobility, with sons, on average, being less wealthy than their fathers. This downward mobility, in turn, spread the characteristics of higher-income people across the broad swathe of society. What were these characteristics? Cultural values that emphasized thrift, diligence, and literacy were undoubtedly part of what was passed on to future generations. But surprisingly, it also appears that genetic transmission played an important, and perhaps pivotal, role. Models of genetic transmission make very concrete predictions about the correlations in economic status that one would expect to see among relatives. Biological brothers share 50% of their genes, as do fathers and sons. Likewise, first cousins share 25% of their genes, the same as grandfathers and sons. These facts yield two testable predictions: The first is that the correlation coefficient on status measures such as wealth, occupation, and education should be the same for relatives that share the same fraction of genes such as sibling pairs and father-son pairs. Box Chart II-1 shows that this is borne out by the data. The second prediction is that the correlation between status and genetic distance should follow a linear trend so that, for example, the correlation in wealth among brothers is twice that of first cousins and four times that of second cousins. Box Chart II-2 shows that this is also borne out by the data.   Other evidence supports the importance of genes in the transmission of status across generations. The correlation in measures such as wealth, education, and occupation is much higher among identical twins than fraternal twins. Adopted children turn out to be more similar to their biological parents on these measures when they reach adulthood than their adopted parents, even when the children have never met their biological parents. The parent-child correlation also remains the same regardless of family size, suggesting that spreading the same resources over more children may not harm life outcomes to any discernible degree, at least on the measures listed above. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our tactical equity upgrade to overweight last month has still not been confirmed by most of our proprietary indicators. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. is falling fast. It is also eroding for Europe, although it has ticked higher in Japan. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors have clearly moved funds away from the U.S. equity market and there is no sign yet that this is reversing. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continued to issue a ‘sell’ signal in January. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. While the RPI is still cautious, value has improved significantly according to BCA’s composite valuation indicator. It is a composite of 11 different valuation measures. This indicator almost reached the fair value line in December. Moreover, our Monetary Indicator has suddenly shifted out of negative territory for stocks, rising to the neutral line in December. Calming words from the Fed has improved the monetary backdrop by removing expected rate hikes from the money market curve. Given the improvement in both value and the monetary backdrop, the RPI could generate a ‘buy’ signal next month. Our Composite Technical indicator for stocks broke down last month, providing a clear ‘sell’ signal, and has not yet delivered a ‘buy’. However, sentiment is now washed out and earnings expectations have been revised heavily downward. These signals are bullish from a contrary perspective.  The 10-year Treasury yield is in the neutral range according to our valuation model. Bonds are not overbought, despite the rally in December, because they were still working off oversold conditions. Contrary to the bond valuation model, the 10-year term premium moved further into negative territory in January, suggesting that yields are unsustainably low. Our bond-bearish bias is consistent with the view that the Fed rate hike cycle is not over. The U.S. dollar is somewhat overbought and very expensive on a PPP basis. Nonetheless, we believe it will become more expensive in the first half of 2019, before its structural downtrend resumes in broad trade-weighted terms. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators   Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator   Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields   Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP   Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator   Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals   Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators   Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop   Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot   Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions   Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis," dated October 25, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2       The amount of spread widening required for corporate returns to break-even with duration-matched U.S. Treasuries on a one-year horizon. 3       Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Five Black Swans In 2019," dated January 16, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4       Xi Song, Cameron Campbell, and James Lee, "Descent Line Growth and Extinction From A Multigenerational Perspective, Extended Abstract," American Sociological Review 80:3, (April 21, 2015): 574-602. 5       Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending, "The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution," Basic Books, (2009). 6       Mark Grinblatt, Matti Keloharju, and Juhani T. Linnainmaa, “IQ, Trading Behavior, and Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 104:2, (May 2012): 339-362. 7       Thomas Bouchard, "Genetic Influence On Human Psychological Traits - A Survey," Current Directions in Psychological Science 13:4, (August 2004): 148-151. 8      The tendency for the genetic contribution to IQ to increase until early adulthood and then to remain at high levels until old age is known as the Wilson Effect. There is no consensus on what causes it, but it probably reflects a number of factors: 1) It may take some children longer than normal to reach full intellectual maturity. Testing their IQs at a young age will result in scores that are lower than those expected based on their parents’ IQs. The opposite is true for children whose IQs increase relatively quickly in young age, but possibly top out earlier; 2) Environmental effects are probably more important in young age when a child’s brain is still quite malleable; 3) Self-reinforcing gene-environment interactions tend to increase with age. Children do not have much control over their environment, but as they get older, they will seek out activities that are more in keeping with their genetic predispositions. For example, a studious child may pursue a career that reinforces their love of learning. 9       "Cache Cab: Taxi Drivers' Brains Grow to Navigate London's Streets," Scientific American, (December 2011). 10       Atheendar Venkataramani, "Early Life Exposure to Malaria and Cognition in Adulthood: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Health Economics 31:5, (July 2012): 767-780; Hoyt Bleakley, "Health, Human Capital and Development," Annual Review of Economics 2, (March 2010): 283-310; Hoyt Bleakley, "Malaria Eradication in the Americas: A Retrospective Analysis of Childhood Exposure," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, (April 2010): 1-45. 11       "Anthropologists Find American Heads Are Getting Larger," ScienceDaily, (May 2012). 12       "British Teenagers Have Lower IQs Than Their Counterparts Did 30 Years Ago," The Telegraph, (February 2009). 13     Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg, "Flynn Effect And Its Reversal Are Both Environmentally Caused," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115:26, (June 2018): 6674-6678. 14     On the face of it, artificial intelligence would appear to be a substitute for human intelligence. Many applications of AI would undoubtedly have this feature, especially those that allow computers to perform complex mental tasks that humans now must do. However, there are several ways that AI may eventually come to complement human intelligence. First, and most obviously, AI could be used to augment human capabilities either directly by hardwiring it into our brains, or indirectly through the development of drugs or genetic techniques which improve cognition. Second, looking further out, the benefits of highly intelligent AI systems would be limited if humans did not possess the requisite intelligence to understand certain concepts that are currently beyond our mental reach. No matter how well intentioned, trying to explain string theory to a mouse is not going to succeed. There are probably a multitude of ideas that AI could reveal that we simply cannot comprehend at current levels of human intelligence. 15     James Heckman and Paul La Fontaine, "The American High School Graduation Rate: Trends and Levels," The Review of Economics and Statistics 92:2, (May 2010): 244–262. 16     "Turning Around Chronically Low-Performing Schools," The Institute of Education Sciences (IES), (May 2008). 17     E. von Mutius, F.D. Martinez, C. Fritzsch, T. Nicolai, G. Roell, and H. H. Thiemann, "Prevalence Of Asthma And Atopy In Two Areas Of West Germany And East Germany," American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 149:2, (February 1994): 358-64. 18     "Sperm Counts In The West Plunge By 60% In 40 Years As ‘Modern Life’ Damages Men’s Health," Independent, (July 2017). 19     Kaspar Sørensen, Annette Mouritsen, Lise Aksglaede, Casper P. Hagen, Signe Sloth Mogensen, and Anders Juul, "Recent Secular Trends in Pubertal Timing: Implications for Evaluation and Diagnosis of Precocious Puberty," Hormone Research in Paediatrics 77:3, (May 2012): 137-145. 20     “Results from the 2017 National Survey On Drug Use And Health: Detailed Tables,” Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Rockville (Maryland), (September, 2018). 21     Laura A. Pratt, Debra J. Brody, and Qiuping Gu, "Antidepressant Use Among Persons Aged 12 and Over: United States, 2011–2014," NCHS Data Brief No. 283, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (August 2017). 22     Some, but not all, of the increase in reported rates of mental illness may be due to more aggressive diagnosis by health practitioners. For example, a recent study revealed that children born in August were 30% more likely to receive an ADHD diagnosis than those born in September, simply because they were less mature compared to other kids in the first few years of elementary school. See: Timothy J. Layton, Michael L. Barnett, Tanner R. Hicks, and Anupam B. Jena, "Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder and Month of School Enrollment," New England Journal of Medicine 379:22, (November 2018): 2122-2130. 23     Tamara C. Daley, Shannon E. Whaley, Marian D. Sigman, Michael P. Espinosa, and Charlotte Neumann, "IQ On The Rise: The Flynn Effect In Rural Kenyan Children," Psychological Science 14:3, (June 2003): 215-9; Jakob Pietschnig and Martin Voracek, "One Century of Global IQ Gains: A Formal Meta-Analysis of the Flynn Effect (1909-2013)," Perspectives on Psychological Science 10:3, (May 2015): 282-306. 24     N. Bleichrodt and M. P. Born, “Meta-Analysis of Research on Iodine and Its Relationship to Cognitive Development,” In: ed. J. B. Stanbury, "The Damaged Brain of Iodine Deficiency," Cognizant Communication Corporation, New York, (1994): 195-200; "Iodine status worldwide: WHO Global Database on Iodine Deficiency," World Health Organization, Geneva, (2004). 25     Mohd Fareed and Mohammad Afzal, "Estimating the Inbreeding Depression on Cognitive Behavior: A Population Based Study of Child Cohort," PLOS ONE 9:12, (October 2015): e109585. 26     H. de Wit, J. D. Flory, A. Acheson, M. McCloskey, and S. B. Manuck, "IQ And Nonplanning Impulsivity Are Independently Associated With Delay Discounting In Middle-Aged Adults," Personality and Individual Differences 42:1, (January 2007): 111-121; W. Mischel and R. Metzner, "Preference For Delayed Reward As A Function Of Age, Intelligence, And Length Of Delay Interval," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 64:6, (July 1962): 425-31. 27     James Flynn, “IQ decline and Piaget: Does the rot start at the top?” Lifetime Achievement Award Address, 18th Annual meeting of ISIR, (July 2017). 28     For a good discussion of these issues, please see Richard J. Haier, “The Neuroscience of Intelligence,” Cambridge Fundamentals of Neuroscience in Psychology, (December 2016). 29     "The Future of In-Vitro Fertilization and Gene Editing," Psychology Today, (December 2018). 30     "DNA Tests For IQ Are Coming, But It Might Not Be Smart To Take One," MIT Technology Review, (April 2018). 31     Michael Lynch, "Rate, Molecular Spectrum, And Consequences Of Human Mutation," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107:3, (January 2010): 961-968. 32     Geoffrey Miller, "What *Should* We Be Worried About?" Edge, (2013). 33     Mingrui Wang, John Fuerst, and Jianjun Ren, "Evidence Of Dysgenic Fertility In China," Intelligence 57, (April 2016): 15-24. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights All of our recent investment recommendations have performed very strongly but have further to go: 1.   Own a combination of European banks plus U.S. T-bonds. 2.   Overweight EM versus DM. 3.   Overweight European versus U.S. equities. 4.   Overweight Italian assets versus European assets. 5.   Overweight the JPY. Feature Chart of the WeekBank Outperformance Corroborates A Growth Rebound 2019 will be the investment mirror-image of 2018. Last year started with growth fading and inflation on the cusp of picking up, both in Europe and around the world. This year has started with the European and global economies in the mirror-image configuration: growth likely to rebound, albeit modestly, and inflation set to fade (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Why 2019 Is The Mirror-Image Of 2018 However, as 2019 unfolds, the configuration will reverse, requiring a flip from a pro-cyclical to a pro-defensive investment tilt later in the year. This contrasts with 2018 which started pro-defensive and ended pro-cyclical. In this regard, the economic and investment shape of 2019 will be the mirror-image of 2018. Growth To Rebound, Inflation To Fade A tell-tale sign of a growth rebound is the recent outperformance of banks. Around the world, yield curves have flattened – or even inverted – meaning that banks’ net interest margins have compressed. This compression of bank profit margins is normally bad news for bank equities. Yet banks have been outperforming, not just in Europe but globally (Chart I-3). If margins are compressing, the plausible explanation for outperformance would be an improved outlook for asset growth, reflecting both a reduction in bad debt provisioning and a pick-up in bank credit growth. Chart I-3Banks Have Been Outperforming Since October Independently and reassuringly, our proprietary credit impulse analysis supports this thesis (Chart of the Week). Six-month credit impulses have been rebounding not only in Europe, but also in the United States and very impressively in China (Chart I-4).   Chart I-46-Month Credit Impulses Have Rebounded Everywhere At the same time, inflation is set to disappoint as the recent near-halving of the crude oil price feeds into both headline and core consumer price indexes. With central banks now promising even greater “dependence on the incoming data”, this unfolding dynamic will force them to temper any hawkish intentions and rhetoric, limiting the extent of upside in bond yields. In this configuration, the combination of European banks plus U.S. T-bonds which we first recommended in November is still appropriate (Chart I-5). The position is up 3 percent in little more than a month and has further to go.1 Chart I-5Own A Combination Of Banks And Bonds Europe’s largest economy, Germany, should benefit from another support to growth. Last year, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German motor vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from Germany’s €3.4 trillion economy (Chart I-6). Now, if auto exports stabilize, this drag will disappear. And if auto exports recover to the pre-WLTP level after this one-off and temporary shock, Germany will receive a 0.6% mirror-image boost to growth.2 Chart I-6German Auto Exports Suffered A WLTP Hit Regional Allocation Is Always And Everywhere About Sectors The European equity earnings cycle is tightly connected with global growth oscillations (Chart I-7). The simple reason is that the European equity market is over-exposed to classically growth-sensitive sectors such as banks and industrials. Chart I-7The European EPS Cycle Is Tightly Connected With Global Growth Oscillations The emerging market earnings cycle is also connected with global growth oscillations (Chart I-8) because emerging markets have a very high exposure to banks. But the much less understood reason is that emerging markets have a near-zero exposure to healthcare (Table I-1). In sharp contrast, the U.S. equity earnings cycle has almost no connection with global growth oscillations (Chart I-9) because the U.S. equity market is over-exposed to technology and healthcare, neither of which are classically cyclical sectors. Chart I-8The EM EPS Cycle Is Also Connected With Global Growth Oscillations... Chart I-9...But The U.S. EPS Cycle Is Not Connected With Global Growth Oscillations Hence the allocation to emerging market (EM) versus developed market (DM) equities, and to Europe versus the U.S. reduce to simple equity sector calls. A quick glance at Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 will reveal two fundamental and inescapable truths: Chart I-10EM Outperforms DM When Global Banks Outperform Healthcare Chart I-11European Equities Outperform U.S. Equities When Global Banks Outperform Technology EM outperforms DM when global banks outperform global healthcare. European equities outperform U.S. equities when global banks outperform global technology. But is this just about so-called ‘beta’? No, banks can outperform in a rising market by going up more or, as recently, in a falling market by going down less. So this is always and everywhere about head-to-head sector relative performances. My colleague Arthur Budaghyan, our chief emerging market strategist, remains steadfastly pessimistic on the structural outlook for EM versus DM. We agree with Arthur, albeit we arrive at the structural conclusion from a completely different perspective. To reiterate, for EM to outperform DM global banks must outperform global healthcare. However, over an extended period this will prove to be an extremely tall order. As detailed in European Banks: The Case For And Against, blockchain is a long-term extinction threat to banks’ business models and profitability. Whereas healthcare is still a major growth sector as people focus more spending on improving the quality and quantity of their lifespans.3  Nevertheless, from a purely tactical perspective, the growth up-oscillation phase that started in October can continue for a little while longer allowing the recent countertrend moves to persist – especially as the recent decline in bond yields could further spur credit growth in the near term. So for the moment stay overweight: EM versus DM. European equities versus U.S. equities. Italian assets versus European assets. Bargain Basement Currencies Another of my colleagues Doug Peta, our chief U.S. strategist, has coined a lovely metaphor: “you cannot get hurt falling out of a basement window”. The metaphor beautifully captures the asymmetry when you are near the floor or ‘zero-bound’. Doug uses it to explain that small contributors to an economy have a limited capacity to damage economic growth because they cannot fall very far. We think the metaphor applies equally to interest rates when they are at or near their lower bound, which is to say, in the basement. This begs the obvious question: if interest rates are in the basement, then what is it that cannot get hurt much? The answer is: the exchange rate. The payoff profile for exchange rates just tracks expected long-term interest rate differentials. This means that when the expected interest rate is in or near the basement, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, for any central bank already at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy – such as the BoJ and ECB – policy rate expectations are effectively in the basement. They cannot go significantly lower. In contrast, policy rate expectations for the Federal Reserve are somewhere between the seventh and twelfth storey of the building (Chart I-12). From which you can get seriously hurt if you fall out of the window! Chart I-12You Cannot Get Hurt Falling Out Of A Basement Window The upshot is that currency investors should always own at least one currency whose interest rate is in the basement against one whose interest rate is high up in the building, susceptible to fall out at some point, and get seriously hurt. The near term complication is the risk, albeit low, of a no-deal Brexit which would hurt European economies and currencies to a greater or lesser extent. Until the Brexit fog shows some signs of clearing, we would prefer the currency whose interest rate is in the basement to be a non-European currency. So for the moment, our favourite major currency remains the JPY. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System* We are pleased to report that the 50:50 combination of Litecoin and Ethereum has surged by 42 percent in just two weeks! Also, long EUR/NZD achieved its 2.5 percent profit target and is now closed. This week’s trade is in line with the recommendation in the main body of this report to become pro-cyclical. Go long global industrials versus global utilities with a profit target of 3 percent and a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-13 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions.   *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The European banks position is relative to the broader equity market, and the recommended combination is 25 cents in the banks and 75 cents in the bonds. 2 German auto net exports and GDP are quoted at annualized rates. The Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle test Procedure (WLTP) is a new standard for auto emissions that took effect on September 1, 2018. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “European Banks: The Case For And Against”, November 8, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights The yen’s sharp rally this week reflected a liquidation of carry trades. EUR/JPY has hit our target of 120, it is time to close our longstanding bearish recommendation on this pair. The downside in AUD/JPY is limited. The Bank of Japan will not stand idly by in front of the deflationary impact of a stronger yen. The coming weeks could witness some dollar softness, but this should prove temporary. Feature The FX market started the year with a bang. The yen rallied massively Thursday morning, during the so-called “witching hour” between the New York close and the Tokyo open. As is now usual, algorithms have been blamed. We agree that poor liquidity and automatized trading accentuated the speed of the move, but ultimately, the strength of the yen is rooted in fundamental reasons. As we have been arguing, the yen should be strong in the current environment, especially against the euro, the Australian dollar and high-yielding EM currencies. When global growth weakens and safe heaven yields fall, the yen benefits. Not only do Japanese domestic savers, who park their funds abroad in hope of higher yields, repatriate there money when growth slows, but also, carry-traders, who fund their purchases of high-yielding assets by selling the yen, buy back the JPY once volatility rises. The above-dynamics have driven the yen’s eye-catching move. The yen has been strong, but the AUD, the EUR, the TRY and the ZAR have also been weak, suggesting that investors who bought the yen also sold these currencies. This was a carry-trade reversal. What should we do with our long-held negative biases on EUR/JPY and AUD/JPY? Last night, EUR/JPY and AUD/JPY moved below 119 and 71, respectively. Our target for these pairs were EUR/JPY 120 and AUD/JPY 72. We are inclined to close these recommendations. As we have repeatedly highlighted, EUR/JPY is a function of global bond yields (Chart I-1). As a firm, BCA sees upward pressure on yields. Currently, the futures market is pricing in potential rate cuts in 2019 and 2020. We think that the U.S. economy is strong enough that the Fed will not cut rates over this timeframe. However, the Fed is likely to pause for one or two quarters, something made even more likely after the fall in the ISM manufacturing this week. Such a pause should create upward pressure on U.S. 10-year inflation breakevens, which currently trade at 1.7%, while also supporting risk asset prices. All these developments would be consistent with higher yields and thus, a stronger EUR/JPY. Chart I-1EUR/JPY Should Now Find Support Regarding AUD/JPY, this pair is now trading in line with the lows experienced in 2016, and at its worst Thursday morning, it traded at levels last recorded in the first half of 2009. We do anticipate continued weakness in the global economy, but not a recession. Hence, at current levels, the downside for AUD/JPY is limited. Beyond the global dynamics, we also need to take into account Japanese dynamics. The JPY may be cheap, but Japan’s core inflation remains well below the Bank of Japan’s objective, and shows little sign of hitting 2% within a reasonable period. The recent strength in the yen only re-enforces the inability of the BoJ to hit its target. In fact, the yen’s strength was met by a large rally in JGBs, with 10-year Japanese yields falling back to zero. We agree with the market’s assessment of the combined impact of a higher yen and slowing global growth: the BoJ will have to fight this deflationary impulse. How, though, is still unclear. The BoJ could cut rates while continuing to target a positive yield curve slope, something we think is likely. Also, Japan still sports a current account surplus as well as the largest positive net international investment position in the word. This means that this country has little to fear from a falling exchange rate. This raises the likelihood that the Ministry of Finance decides to intervene in the FX market in order to push the yen lower. The only constraint here is the U.S. Treasury, which could balk at such a move. Finally, the U.S. dollar has been losing momentum this December, and weaker U.S. economic data is likely to prompt the Fed to openly message that it will pause its hiking campaign for at least one quarter. This should cause a period of softness in the greenback. However, we continue to expect such softness to be temporary. The market anticipates rate cuts from the Fed, but this is not BCA’s baseline scenario. Thus, any pause along the hiking campaign should only have a transitory impact on the dollar, as the U.S. economy is likely to continue to grow above trend, preventing the need for lower rates. Bottom Line: Poor liquidity conditions may have facilitated the yen’s massive move this week, but its true driver was the weakness in global growth, which forced a massive liquidation of carry trades. As EUR/JPY has hit our 120 target, we are removing our long-standing negative bias on this pair. Staying short AUD/JPY at current levels does not make sense either, unless one expects a global recession, which is not our base case. Finally, the strength in the yen is hurting the Japanese economy, which will force the Bank of Japan to ease monetary conditions.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Dear Client, This is the final Global Fixed Income Strategy report for 2018. We will return with our first report of the new year on January 8th, 2019. Our entire team wishes you a very happy holiday season and a prosperous new year. Best regards, Rob Robis, Chief Strategist 2019 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2019 key global fixed income views into recommended overall positioning within our model bond portfolio yields the following: target a modest level of active portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and only neutral exposure to corporate credit. Country Allocation: Government bond allocation should continue to reflect relative expectations for monetary policy changes. That means an overweight in countries where central banks will have little scope to increase rates (core Europe, Japan, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand) and an underweight where central banks are likely to tighten more than markets currently discount (U.S., Canada, Sweden). Corporate Credit: We currently prefer U.S. corporate bonds to European and EM equivalents based on better U.S. profit prospects, which enhances debt serviceability. However, we will look to pare U.S. exposure as the Fed shifts to a more restrictive stance later in 2019. Feature Last week, we published our 2019 “Key Views” report, outlining the thematic implications of the 2019 BCA Outlook for global bond markets.1 In this follow-up report, we translate those themes into specific investment recommendations for next year. We also recommend changes to the allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio to reflect our 2019 themes. The main takeaway is that 2019 will be another year of poor returns, with increased volatility, for most global fixed income markets. The greater pressures should come in the latter half of the year, after the U.S. Federal Reserve delivers additional rate hikes and decisive signs of a slowing U.S. economy unfold. Investors should maintain a defensive strategic posture on fixed income markets throughout the year, both for interest rate duration and credit exposure. Selling into market rallies, rather than chasing them, will prove to be the prudent strategy. Top-Down Bond Market Implications Of Our Key Views As a reminder, the main fixed income investment themes from last week’s Key Views report were the following: Late-cycle pressures will keep bond yields elevated. Global growth will remain above trend in 2019, keeping unemployment rates low and preventing central banks from turning dovish. The unwind of crisis-era global monetary policies will continue. Slowing central bank asset purchases will worsen the supply/demand balance for both government bonds, resulting in gentle upward pressure on yields via higher term premia. It is too early to worry about inverted yield curves. The time to be concerned about the recessionary implications of an inverted U.S. Treasury curve will come after the Fed has lifted real interest rates to above neutral (R*), which should occur in the latter half of 2019. Expect poor corporate bond returns from an aging credit cycle. While default risk is likely to stay modest in 2019, the greater risk for corporates could come from concerns over future credit downgrades, as well as diminished inflows in a “post-QE” world. We now present the specific fixed income investment recommendations that flow from those themes in the following categories: overall portfolio risk, overall duration exposure, country allocations within government bonds, yield curve allocations within countries, and corporate credit allocations by country and credit rating. Overall Portfolio Risk: DEFENSIVE Government bond yields enter 2019 at very low (i.e. expensive) levels across the major developed markets, even after the cumulative rise in U.S. Treasury yields seen over the past twelve months. Real yields remain below trend real GDP growth rates, a consequence of central banks keeping policy rates below neutral levels as measured by concepts like the Taylor Rule (Chart of the Week). In addition, credit spreads remain near the low end of long-run historical ranges in all markets. Without the initial starting point of cheap valuations, fixed income return expectations in 2019 should be severely tempered (Charts 2& 3).   Chart 2Low Yields = Low Expected Returns For U.S. Corporates …   Chart 3… And European Corporates Volatility measures like the VIX index will remain elevated until markets begin to sniff out a bottoming of global growth. Much will depend on developments in China, but our expectation is that policymakers there will only act to stabilize the economy rather than provide large, 2016-scale stimulus. That may be enough to create a tactical “risk-on” trading opportunity by mid-year but we recommend using any such rally to reduce credit exposure given the risk of a more lasting global economic downturn in 2020. Importantly, cross-asset correlations should continue to drift lower without broad support from coordinated global economic growth or expanding monetary liquidity via central bank asset purchases (Chart 4). Without those rising tides lifting all boats, more active security selection by country, sector and credit rating should help portfolio managers outperform their benchmarks in what is likely to be another down year for absolute returns. Chart 4High Volatilities With Low Correlations That combination of diminished return prospects and elevated volatility means investors should maintain a defensive bias in fixed income portfolios heading into 2019. Within our own GFIS recommended model bond portfolio, this means keeping our tracking error (the relative expected volatility versus our custom benchmark performance index) well below our maximum target level of 100bps (Chart 5). Chart 5Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Overall Duration Stance: BELOW BENCHMARK We do not think that global bond yields have peaked for this business cycle. The current period of softening global economic momentum will not turn into a prolonged period of sub-trend growth that would push up unemployment rates in the major developed economies. With the global output gap nearly closed, and monetary policymakers firmly believing in the Phillips Curve framework (lower unemployment leads to higher inflation) to forecast inflation, a more dovish stance from the major central banks seems unlikely. As we discussed in last week’s report, global bond yields are in a process of normalization away from the depressed levels seen after the 2008-09 global financial crisis and recession (Chart 6). Term premia, inflation expectations and real yields all have upside potential as central banks slowly back away from quantitative easing and low interest rate policies. Thus, we continue to recommend a defensive, below-benchmark strategic stance on overall portfolio duration exposure (Chart 7). Chart 6Bond Yields Will Continue To Normalize In 2019   Chart 7Stay Below-Benchmark On Duration Risk Government Bond Country Allocation: Underweight U.S., Canada, Sweden, Italy. Overweight Germany, France, U.K., Japan, Australia, New Zealand At the country level, we recommend underweighting government bond markets where central banks will be more likely to raise interest rates (because of firm domestic economic growth and building inflation pressures), but where too few rate hikes are currently discounted in money market yield curves. The U.S., Canada and Sweden fit that description (Chart 8). The U.K. would also be part of this group, but the Brexit uncertainty leads us to maintain an overweight stance on U.K. Gilts entering 2019. Chart 8Monetary Policy Expectations Drive Country Allocations By the same token, we are recommending overweights in countries where rate hikes are unlikely to occur in 2019 because of underwhelming inflation, like core Europe, Japan and New Zealand. We are currently overweight Australian government bonds, but we expect to cut that exposure in 2019 as pressure builds for a rate hike in the latter half of the year as inflation picks up. Italian government bonds represent a special case of a developed market trading off sovereign credit risk rather than interest rate or inflation risk. We continue to treat Italian government bonds the same way we view corporate debt, as a growth-sensitive asset. On that basis, we will remain underweight Italian government bonds until Italy’s leading economic indicator bottoms out, mollifying concerns about debt sustainability. The Fed is still the one central bank that is most likely to hike rates multiple times in 2019, which will sustain wide differentials between Treasuries and non-U.S. bond yields (Chart 9). Chart 9ECB, BoE, BoJ Resisting Pressure From Tight Labor Markets The greatest potential for spread widening will be for Treasuries versus JGBs, with no changes in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy expected due to stubbornly low inflation. The 10-year Treasury-Gilt spread could also widen if the Bank of England stays on the sidelines for longer until Brexit uncertainty is resolved. The 10-year U.S.-New Zealand spread should also widen with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand staying on hold for a while due to underwhelming growth and inflation momentum. The U.S.-Canada spread will be rangebound, with the Bank of Canada likely to match, but not exceed, Fed tightening in 2019. There are some markets, though, where yields could rise a bit more than Treasury yields due to shifting monetary policies. While the ECB will refrain from raising rates next year, there is a potential for the U.S. Treasury-German Bund spread to narrow marginally if the end of ECB new asset purchases lifts Bund yields via a recovery in the German term premium. There is more (albeit still modest) scope for a narrowing in the 10-year U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Sweden spreads. After keeping monetary policy very loose for a long time, the beginning of rate hikes next year by the Reserve Bank of Australia and Riksbank could put meaningful upward pressure on deeply depressed longer-maturity Australian and Swedish yields. Yield Curve Positioning: Favor Bearish Steepeners Everywhere In The First Half Of 2019, Then Switch To Bearish Flatteners In The U.S., Canada, Australia And Sweden We expect some bearish steepening pressures to appear in most countries in the first quarter of 2019 with inflation breakevens likely to rebound if the bullish oil forecast of BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy team comes to fruition (Charts 10 & 11). The end of the net new buying phase of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program in January will also put upward pressure on longer-dated European yields through a worsening supply/demand balance for European government bonds and a wider term premium, helping keep European yield curves steep. Chart 10Inflation Expectations & Bond Yields Will Rebound In 2019 …   Chart 11… As BCA’s Bullish Oil View Comes To Fruition Importantly, it is too soon to worry about an inversion of the U.S. Treasury curve, as we discussed in last week’s report, with the fed funds rate not yet at a restrictive level (i.e. real rates above measures of neutral like R-star). That outcome should occur by the end of 2019, when we expect the Treasury curve to move towards a true monetary policy-induced inversion. Similar patterns – steepening first from rising inflation expectations, flattening later from more hawkish central banks delivering rate hikes – should unfold in Canada, Australia and Sweden. Applying Our Global Golden Rule To Government Bond Allocations Back in September, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.”2 This is an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, U.S. Bond Strategy, that links U.S. Treasury returns to changes in the fed funds rate that are not discounted in money markets (using our 12-month Discounters derived from Overnight Index Swap curves). In Table 1, we show the expected returns generated by the Global Golden Rule (shown hedged into U.S. dollars) for the countries in our model bond portfolio custom benchmark, based on monetary policy scenarios that we deem to be most plausible for 2019. In Table 2, we show the returns on a duration-adjusted basis (expected total return divided by duration). We then rank the return scenarios for overall country indices, aggregating the returns of the individual yield curve maturity buckets shown in those two tables, in Table 3. Table 1Global Golden Rule Return Forecasts For 2019   Table 2Global Golden Rule Duration-Adjusted Return Forecasts For 2019 The shaded cells in Table 3 represent our base case forecasts for policy rate changes in each country. On this basis, the better return prospects for 2019 will be in markets where central banks will stand pat throughout the year (Germany, Japan). Conversely, the weaker returns will occur where we expect more rate hikes than currently discounted by markets (U.S., Canada). These returns fit with our recommended country allocation outlined above. Table 3Ranking The 2019 Return Scenarios Corporate Credit Allocation: Neutral Overall, But Overweight In U.S. Investment Grade And High-Yield Relative To European And Emerging Market Equivalents. Look To Cut The U.S. To Underweight In The Latter Half Of 2019. We enter 2019 maintaining our recommended overall neutral exposure to corporate debt. As discussed earlier, we expect to see some stabilization of global growth in the first half of 2019. This will create a playable “risk-on” rally for growth sensitive assets like corporates, but we anticipate selling into that rally by downgrading our recommended U.S. credit allocations to underweight. Within U.S. credit markets, we are recommending a less aggressive medium-term stance, staying up in quality within investment grade debt (single-B and single-A rated names versus BBBs) and high-yield (BB-rated vs CCC-rated). With 50% of the investment grade benchmark index now rated just above junk, there is a growing risk of “fallen angel” downgrades to junk status in the event of a material slowing of U.S. economic growth. At the same time, default-adjusted spreads on U.S. high-yield debt only appear attractive if the current exceptionally low default rate backdrop persists (Chart 12). In other words, both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate debt are vulnerable to any major slowing of U.S. economic growth and slump in corporate profits. Chart 12U.S. Corporates Vulnerable To Slower Growth The confluence of above-trend U.S. growth and still pro-cyclical Fed policy will support U.S. credit in the near-term, but that will all change later in 2019. We expect the Fed to deliver at least 75bps of rate hikes in 2019 – perhaps only pausing from the current 25bps per quarter pace at the March meeting – which will push the funds rate into restrictive territory and invert the Treasury curve sometime in the 4th quarter of the year. This will cause investors to start to discount a deep growth slowdown in 2020, which will trigger systemic credit spread widening (Chart 13). We expect our next move on U.S. corporate debt to be a downgrade to underweight, likely sometime around mid-year. Chart 13Growth Differentials Continue To Favor U.S. We still prefer U.S. corporates to European or Emerging Market (EM) equivalents, however, thanks to the likelihood of better near-term growth prospects in the U.S. We are concerned about how the European corporate bond market will perform without the support of ECB asset purchases, which leads us to underweight both investment grade and high-yield European corporates (Chart 14).3 Chart 14Stay Overweight U.S. Corporates Vs European Corporates EM corporates will continue to suffer from the toxic combination of rising U.S. interest rates, a stronger dollar and global growth concerns. Our political strategists remain skeptical on the prospects for a permanent deal on thorny U.S.-China trade issues, leaving EM assets exposed to slowing momentum in China’s economy. We continue to prefer owning U.S. credit, given how the relative performance of EM and U.S. credit has not yet converged to levels implied by U.S./EM growth differentials (Chart 15). Chart 15Stay Overweight U.S. Corporates Vs EM Corporates Model Portfolio Adjustments To Begin 2019 In terms of our model bond portfolio, we recommend a few changes to our current allocations to reflect our 2019 outlook and key views (see the table below). We make a few adjustments to our individual country duration allocations, given our expectations of some re-steepening of global yield curves. We also bump up our allocation to core European debt given our expectation that the ECB will keep policy rates on hold throughout 2019. We fund that increase in European exposure from U.S. Treasuries, where too few Fed rate hikes are now discounted. Finally, we make a modest adjustment to our U.S. high-yield allocations, cutting CCC-rated exposure and upgrading B-rated credit.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “2019 Key Views: Normalization Is The “New Normal””, dated December 12th 2018, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated September 25th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Stubbornly Resilient Bond Yields”, dated November 13th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights So What? Global divergence will persist beyond the near term. Why? China’s stimulus will be disappointing unless things get much worse. U.S.-China trade war will reignite and strategic tensions will continue. European risks are limited short-term, but will surge without reform. U.S. assets will outperform; oil and the yen will rise; the pound is a long-term play; EM pain will continue. Feature The year 2019 will be one of considerable geopolitical uncertainty. Three issues dominate our Outlook, with low-conviction views on all three questions: Question 1: How much will China stimulate? Question 2: Will the trade war abate? Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? The main story in 2018 was policy divergence. American policymakers ramped up stimulus – both through the profligate tax cuts and fiscal spending – at the same time that Chinese policymakers stuck to their guns on de-levering the economy. The consequence of this policy mix was that the synchronized global recovery of late 2016 and 2017 evolved into a massive outperformance by the U.S. economy (Chart 1). The Fed responded to the bullish domestic conditions with little regard for the global economy, causing the DXY to rally from a 2018 low of 88.59 in February to 97.04 today. While the policy divergence narrative appears to be macroeconomic in nature, it is purely political. There is nothing cyclical about the ‘U.S.’ economic outperformance in 2018. President Donald Trump campaigned on an economic populist agenda and then proceeded to deliver on it throughout 2017 and 2018. He faced little opposition from fiscal conservatives, mainly because fiscal conservativism melts away from the public discourse when budget deficits are low (Chart 2) and when the president is a Republican (Chart 3). Meanwhile, Chinese policymakers have decided to tolerate greater economic pain in an effort to escape the Middle Income Trap (Chart 4). They believe this trap will envelop them if they cannot grow the economy without expanding the already-massive build-up of leverage (Chart 5). Geopolitics is not just about “things blowing up somewhere in the desert.” In today’s world, emblematized by paradigm shifts, politicians are more than ever in the driver’s seat. While technocrats respond to macroeconomic factors, politicians respond to political and geopolitical constraints. Few investment narratives last much longer than a year and policy divergence is coming to a close. Will the Fed pause given the turn in global growth? Will China respond with effective stimulus in 2019? If the answer to both questions is yes, global risk assets could light up in the next quarter and potentially beyond. Already EM has outperformed DM assets for a month and some canaries in the coal mine for global growth – like the performance of Swedish economic indicators – signal that the outperformance is real. We are skeptical that the move is sustainable beyond a quarter or two (Chart 6). As our colleague Peter Berezin has highlighted, the market is pricing less than one hike in 2019 (Chart 7). Regardless, the impact on the U.S. dollar, remains muted, with the DXY at 97.04. This suggests that the backing off that the Fed may or may not have already done is still not enough from the perspective of weakening global growth (Chart 8). Global risk assets need more from the Fed than what the market is already pricing. And with U.S. inflationary pressures building (Chart 9), the BCA House View expects to see multiple Fed hikes in 2019, disappointing investors bullish on EM and global risk assets. With our Fed view set by the House View, we therefore turn to where we can add value. To this end, the most important question of 2018 largely remains the same in 2019: How much will China stimulate? Question 1: How Much Will China Stimulate In 2019? China is undoubtedly already stimulating, with a surge in local government bond issuance earlier this year and a bottoming in the broad money impulse (Chart 10). M2 is in positive territory. However, the effort can best be characterized as tepid, with a late-year collapse in bond issuance (Chart 11) and a still-negative total social financing (TSF) impulse (Chart 12). TSF is the broadest measure of private credit in China’s economy.   We expect a surge in TSF in Q1, but this is a normal seasonal effect. A typical Q1 credit surge will not be enough to set global risk assets alight for very long, particularly if the market has already priced in as much of a “pause” from the Fed as we are going to get. Investors should specifically focus on new local government bond issuance and whether the “shadow financing” component of TSF gets a bid, since the primary reason for the weakness in TSF over the past year is the government’s crackdown on shadow lending. As Chart 13A & B shows, it was new local government bonds that led the way for stimulus efforts in 2015, followed by a surge in both bank lending and shadow lending in 2016. We would also expect further monetary policy easing, with extra RRR cuts or even a benchmark policy rate cut. However, monetary policy has been easy all year and yet the impact on credit growth has remained muted. This begs two important questions: Is the credit channel impaired? A slew of macroprudential reforms – which we have dubbed China’s “Preemptive Dodd-Frank” – may have impaired the flow of credit in the system. The official policy of “opening the front door, closing the back door” has seen bank loans pick up modestly but shadow lending has been curtailed (Chart 14A & B). This way of controlling the rise of leverage has its costs. For private enterprises – with poor access to the official banking sector – the shadow financial system was an important source of funding over the past several years. Is policy pushing on a string? An even more dire scenario would be if China’s credit channel is not technically, but rather psychologically, impaired. Multiple reasons may be to blame: a negative net return on the assets of state-owned enterprises (Chart 15); widespread trade war worries; mixed signals from policymakers; or a general lack of confidence in the political direction of the country. The rising M2/M1 ratio suggests that the overall economy’s “propensity to save” is rising (Chart 16). Why would Chinese policymakers keep their cool despite a slow pickup in credit growth? Are they not concerned about unemployment, social unrest, and instability? Of course, they are. But Chinese policymakers are not myopic. They also want to improve potential GDP over the long run. Table 1China: The Trend In Domestic Demand, And The Outlook For Trade, Is Negative So far, the economy has weathered the storm relatively well. First, eight out of ten of our China Investment Strategy’s housing price indicators (Table 1) are flat-to-up – although it is true that the October deterioration in floor space started and especially floor space sold (Chart 17) is cause for concern. If and when the housing market weakens further, stimulus will be used to offset it, despite the fact that the government is attempting to prevent a sharp increase in prices at the same time. With so much of China’s middle-class savings invested in the housing market, the key pillar of socio-economic stability is therefore real estate. Second, credit has fueled China’s “old economy,” but policymakers want to buoy “new China” (Chart 18). This means that measures to boost consumption and the service sector economy will be emphasized in new rounds of stimulus, as has occurred thus far (tax cuts, tariff cuts, deregulation, etc). This kind of stimulus is not great news for global risk assets leveraged to “old China,” such as EM and industrial metals. Third, policymakers are not exclusively focused on day-to-day stability but are also focused on the decades-long perseverance of China’s political model. And that means moving away from leverage and credit as the sole fuel for the economy. This is not just about the Middle Income Trap, it is also about national security and ultimately sovereignty. Relying on corporate re-levering for stimulus simply doubles-down on the current economic model, which is still export-oriented given that most investment is geared toward the export sector. But this also means that China will be held hostage to foreign demand and thus geopolitical pressures, a fact that has been revealed this year through the protectionism of the White House. As such, moving away from the investment-led growth model and towards a more endogenous, consumer-led model is not just good macro policy, it makes sense geopolitically as well. Will the trade war – or the current period of trade truce – change Chinese policymakers’ decision-making? We do not see why it would. First, if the trade truce evolves into a trade deal, the expected export shock will not happen (Chart 19) and thus major stimulative measures would be less necessary. Second, if we understand correctly why policymakers have cited leverage as an “ill” in the first place, then we would assume that they would use the trade war as an excuse for the pain that they themselves have instigated. In other words, the trade war with the U.S. gives President Xi Jinping the perfect excuse for the slowdown, one that draws attention from the real culprit: domestic rebalancing. Bottom Line: Since mid-2018, we have been asking clients to focus on our “Stimulus Overshoot” checklist (Table 2). We give the first item – “broad money and/or total credit growth spike” – a premier spot on the list. If a surge in total credit occurs, we will know that policymakers are throwing in the towel and stimulating in a major way. It will be time to turn super-positive on global risk assets, beyond a mere tactical trade, as a cyclical view at that point. Note that if one had gone long EM in early February 2016, when January data revealed a truly epic TSF splurge, one would not have been late to the rally. Table 2Will China’s Stimulus Overshoot In 2019? Our low-conviction view, at the moment, is that the increase in credit growth that we will see in Q1 will be seasonal – the usual frontloading of lending at the beginning of the year – rather than an extraordinary surge that would signal a policy change. A modest increase in credit growth will not be enough to spark a sustainable – year-long – rally in global risk assets. The Fed has already backed off as far as the market is concerned. As such, a pickup in Chinese credit could temporarily excite investors. But global stabilization may only embolden the Fed to refocus on tightening after a Q1 pause. Question 2: Will The Trade War Abate? The first question for investors when it comes to the trade war is “Why should we care?” Sure, trade policy uncertainty appears to have correlated with the underperformance of global equity indices relative to the U.S. (Chart 20). However, such market action was as much caused by our policy divergence story – being as it is deeply negative for EM assets – as by a trade war whose impact on the real economy has not yet been felt. Nonetheless, we do believe that getting the trade war “right” is a big call for 2019. First, while the impact of the U.S.-China trade war has been minimal thus far, it is only because China front-loaded its exports ahead of the expected tariffs, cut interbank rates and RRRs, accelerated local government spending, and allowed CNY/USD to depreciate by 10%. A restart of trade tensions that leads to further tariffs will make frontloading untenable over time, whereas further currency depreciation would be severely debilitating for EMs. We doubt the sustainability of the trade truce for three reasons: U.S. domestic politics: The just-concluded midterm election saw no opposition to President Trump on trade. The Democratic Party candidates campaigned against the president on a range of issues, but not on his aggressive China policy. Polling from the summer also shows that a majority of American voters consider trade with China unfair (Chart 21). In addition, President Trump will walk into the 2020 election with a wider trade deficit, due to his own stimulative economic policy (Chart 22). He will need to explain why he is “losing” on the one measure of national power that he campaigned on in 2016. Structural trade tensions: Ahead of the G20 truce, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a hawkish report that concluded that China has not substantively changed any of the trade practices that initiated U.S. tariffs. Lighthizer has been put in charge of the current trade negotiations, which is a step-up in intensity from Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who was in charge of the failed May 2018 round. Geopolitical tensions: The G20 truce did not contain any substantive resolution to the ongoing strategic tensions between the U.S. and China, such as in the South China Sea. Beyond traditional geopolitics, tensions are increasingly involving high-tech trade and investment between the two countries and American allegations of cyber theft and spying by China. The recent arrest of Huawei’s CFO in Canada, on an American warrant, will likely deepen this high-tech conflict in the short term. Since the G20 truce with Xi, President Trump has seen no significant pickup in approval ratings (Chart 23). Given that the median American voter has embraced protectionism – against China at least – we would not expect any. Meanwhile, U.S. equities have sold off, contrary to what President Trump, or his pro-trade advisors, likely expected in making the G20 decision to delay tariffs. At some point, President Trump will realize that he risks considerable political capital on a trade deal with China that very few voters actually want or that the U.S. intelligence and defense community supports. Democrats did not oppose his aggressive China policy in the midterm election because they know that the median voter does not want it. As such, it is guaranteed that Trump’s 2020 Democratic Party opponent will accuse him of “surrender,” or at least “weakness.” If, over the next quarter, the economic and market returns on his gambit are paltry, we would expect President Trump to end the truce. Furthermore, we believe that a substantive, and long-lasting, trade deal is unlikely given the mounting tensions between China and the U.S. These tensions are not a product of President Trump, but are rather a long-run, structural feature of the twenty-first century that we have been tracking since 2012.1 Tensions are likely to rise in parallel to the trade talks on the technology front. We expect 2019 to be the year when investors price in what we have called Bifurcated Capitalism: the segmentation of capital, labor, and trade flows into geopolitically adversarial – and yet capitalist in nature – economic blocs. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for their Chinese counterparts. Countries will fall into either the Tencent and Huawei bloc or the Apple and Ericsson bloc. This development is different from the Cold War. Note our emphasis on capitalism in the term Bifurcated Capitalism. The Soviet Union was obviously not capitalist, and clients of BCA did not have interests in its assets in the 1970s and 1980s. Trade between Cold War economic blocs was also limited, particularly outside of commodities. The closest comparison to the world we now inhabit is that of the nineteenth century. Almost all global powers were quite capitalist at the time, but they engaged in imperialism in order to expand their economic spheres of influence and thus economies of scale. In the twenty-first century, Africa and Asia – the targets of nineteenth century imperialism – may be replaced with market share wars in novel technologies and the Internet. This will put a ceiling on how much expansion tech and telecommunication companies can expect in the competing parts of Bifurcated Capitalism. The investment consequences of this concept are still unclear. But what is clear is that American policymakers are already planning for some version of the world we are describing. The orchestrated effort by the U.S. intelligence community to encourage its geopolitical allies to ban the use of Huawei equipment in their 5G mobile networks suggests that there are limits to the current truce ever becoming a sustainable deal. So does the repeated use of economic sanctions originally designed for Iran and Russia against Chinese companies. President Trump sets short- and medium-term policies given that he is the president. However, the intelligence and defense communities have “pivoted to Asia” gradually since 2012. This shift has occurred because the U.S. increasingly sees China as a peer competitor, for the time being confined in East Asia but with intentions of projecting power globally. To what extent could President Trump produce a trade deal with Xi that also encompasses a change in the U.S. perception of China as an adversary? We assign a low probability to it. As such, President Xi has little reason to give in to U.S. pressure on trade, as he knows that the geopolitical and technology pressure will continue. In fact, President Xi may have all the reason to double-down on his transformative reforms, which would mean more pain for high-beta global plays. Bottom Line: What may have appeared as merely a trade conflict has evolved into a broad geopolitical confrontation. President Trump has little reason to conclude a deal with China by March. Domestic political pressures are not pushing in the direction of the deal, while America’s “Deep State” is eager for a confrontation with China. Furthermore, with President Trump “blinking” on Iranian sanctions, his administration has implicitly acknowledged the constraints discouraging a deeper involvement in the Middle East. This puts the geopolitical focus squarely on China. Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? The last two years have been a dud in Europe. Since the Brexit referendum in mid-2016, European politics have not been a catalyst for global markets, save for an Italy-induced sell-off or two. This could substantively change in 2019. And, as with the first two questions, the results could be binary. On one hand, there is the positive scenario where the stalled and scaled-back reforms on the banking union and Euro Area budget get a shot in the arm in the middle of the year. On the other hand, the negative scenario would see European-wide reforms stall, leaving the continent particularly vulnerable as the next global recession inevitably nears. At the heart of the binary distribution is the broader question of whether populism in Europe is trending higher. Most commentators and our clients would say yes, especially after the protests and rioting in Paris over the course of November. But the answer is more complicated than that. While populists have found considerable success in the ballot box (Chart 24), they have not managed to turn sentiment in Europe against the currency union (Chart 25). Even in Italy, which has a populist coalition government in power, the support for currency union is at 61%, the highest since 2012. This number has apparently risen since populists took over. What explains this divergence? Effectively, Europe’s establishment parties are being blamed for a lot of alleged ills, liberal immigration policy first amongst them. However, European integration remains favored across the ideological spectrum. Few parties that solely focus on Euroskepticism have any chance of winning power, something that both Lega and Five Star Movement found out in Italy. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini confirmed his conversion away from Euroskepticism by stating that he wants to “reform the EU from the inside” and that it was time to give the “Rome-Berlin axis” another go.2 Salvini is making a bet – correct in our view – that by moderating Lega’s populism on Europe, he can capture the center ground and win the majority in the next Italian election, which could happen as soon as 2019. As such, we don’t think that the “rise of populism” in Europe is either dramatic or market-relevant. In fact, mainstream parties are quickly adopting parts of the anti-establishment agenda, particularly on immigration, in a bid to recoup lost voters. A much bigger risk for Europe than populism is stagnation on the reform front, a perpetual Eurosclerosis that leaves the bloc vulnerable in the next recession. What Europe needs is the completion of a backstop to prevent contagion. Such a backstop necessitates greatly enhancing the just-passed banking union reforms. The watered-down reforms did not include a common backstop to the EU’s single resolution fund nor a deposit union. A working group will report on both by June 2019, with a potential legislative act set for some time in 2024. What could be a sign that the EU is close to a grand package of reforms in 2019? We see three main avenues. First, a political shift in Germany. Investors almost had one, with conservative Friedrich Merz coming close to defeating Merkel’s hand-picked successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (also known as AKK) for the leadership of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Merz combined a right-leaning anti-immigrant stance with staunch pro-European integration outlook. It is unclear whether AKK will be willing to make the same type of “grand bargain” with the more conservative factions of the CDU electorate. However, AKK may not have a choice, with both Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Green Party nibbling at the heels of the right-of-center CDU and left-of-center Social-Democratic Party (SPD) (Chart 26). The rise of the Green party is particularly extraordinary, suggesting that a larger portion of the German electorate is radically Europhile rather than Euroskeptic. AKK may have to adopt Merz’s platform and then push for EU reforms. Second, French President Emmanuel Macron may have to look abroad for relevance. With his reform agenda stalled and political capital drained, it would make sense for Macron to spend 2019 and beyond on European reforms. Third, a resolution of the Brexit debacle. The longer the saga with the U.K. drags on, the less focus there will be in Europe on integration of the Euro Area. If the U.K. decides to extend the current negotiating period, it may even have to hold elections for the European Parliament. As such, we are not focusing on the budget crisis in Italy – our view that Rome is “bluffing” is coming to fruition –or a potential early election in Spain. And we are definitely not focusing on the EU Parliamentary election in May. These will largely be red herrings. The real question is whether European policymakers will finally have a window of opportunity for strategic reforms. And that will require Merkel, AKK, and Macron to expend whatever little political capital they have left and invest it in restructuring European institutions. Finally, a word on Europe’s role in the global trade war. While Europe is a natural ally for the U.S. against China – given its institutional connections, existing alliance, and trade surplus with the latter and deficit with the former (Chart 27) – we believe that the odds are rising of a unilateral tariff action by the U.S. on car imports. This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production in the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but it can shake up the markets with actions in that direction. Bottom Line: In the near term, there are no existential political risks in Europe in 2019. As such, investors who are bullish on European assets should not let geopolitics stand in the way of executing on their sentiment. We remain cautious for macroeconomic reasons, namely that Europe is a high-beta DM play that needs global growth to outperform in order to catch a bid. However, 2019 is a make-or-break year on key structural reforms in Europe. Without more work on the banking union – and without greater burden sharing, broadly defined – the Euro Area will remain woefully unprepared for the next global recession. Question 4: Will Brexit Happen? Given the volume of market-relevant geopolitical issues, we have decided to pose (and attempt to answer) five additional questions for 2019. We start with Brexit. Prime Minister Theresa May has asked for a delay to the vote in the House of Commons on the Withdrawal Treaty, which she would have inevitably lost. The defeat of the subsequent leadership challenge is not confidence-inspiring as the vote was close and a third of Tory MPs voted against her. May likely has until sometime in January to pass the EU Withdrawal Agreement setting out the terms of Brexit, given that all other EU member states have to get it through their parliaments before the Brexit date on March 29. The real question is whether any deal can get through Westminster. The numbers are there for the softest of soft Brexits, the so-called Norway+ option where the U.K. effectively gets the same deal as Norway, if May convinces the Labour Party to break ranks. Such a deal would entail Common Market access, but at the cost of having to pay essentially for full EU membership with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. The alternative is to call for a new election – which may usher the even less pro-Brexit Labour Party into power – or to delay Brexit for a more substantive period of time, or simply to buckle under the pressure and call for a second referendum. We disagree that the delay signals that the “no deal Brexit,” or the “Brexit cliff,” is nigh. Such an outcome is in nobody’s interest and both May and the EU can offer delays to ensure that it does not happen. Whatever happens, one thing is clear: the median voter is turning forcefully towards Bremain (Chart 28). It will soon become untenable to delay the second referendum. And even if the House of Commons passes the softest of Soft Brexit deals, we expect that the Norway+ option will prove to be unacceptable when Westminster has to vote on it again in two or three year’s time. Is it time to buy the pound, particularly cable, which is cheap on a long-term basis (Chart 29)? It is a tough call. On one hand, our confidence that the U.K. ultimately has to remain in the EU is rising. However, to get there, the U.K. may need one last major dose of volatility, either in the form of a slow-burn crisis caused by Tory indecision or in the form of a far-left Labour government that tries its own hand at Brexit while pursuing a 1970s style left-wing economic agenda. Can any investor withstand this kind of volatility in the short and potentially long-ish term? Only the longest of the long-term investors can.  Question 5: Will Oil Prices Rally Substantively In 2019? Several risks to oil supply remain for 2019. First, there is little basis for stabilization in Venezuelan oil production, and further deterioration is likely (Chart 30). Second, sectarian tensions in Iraq remain unresolved. Third, supply risks in other geopolitical hot spots – like Nigeria and Libya – could surprise in 2019. The most pressing geopolitical issue, however, is a decision on the Iranian sanction waivers. President Trump induced considerable market-volatility in 2019 by signaling that he would use “maximum pressure” against Iran. As a result, the risk premium contribution to the oil price – illustrated in Chart 31 by the red bar – rose throughout 2018, only to collapse as the White House offered six-month sanction waivers. Not only did the risk premium dissipate, but Saudi Arabia then scrambled to reverse the production surge it had instituted to offset the Iran sanctions. We agree with BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy that oil market fundamentals are tight and numerous supply risks loom. We also struggle to see why President Trump will seek to pick a fight with Iran in the summer of 2019. Our suspicion is that if President Trump was afraid of a gasoline-price spike right after the midterm election, why would he not “blink” at the end of the spring? Not only will the U.S. summer driving season be in full swing – a time of peak U.S. gasoline demand – but the 2020 election primaries will only be six months away. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that OPEC and Russia will do the U.S. president’s bidding by turning on the taps to offset any unforeseen supply losses in 2019. They did not do so even when President Trump asked, very nicely, ahead of the just-concluded Vienna meeting. Once Trump prioritized domestic politics over Saudi geopolitical interests – by backing away from his maximum pressure tactic against Iran – he illustrated to Riyadh that his administration is about as reliable of an ally as the Obama White House. Meanwhile, his ardent defense of Riyadh in the Khashoggi affair, at a cost of domestic political capital, means that he lost the very leverage that he could have used to pressure Saudi Arabia. We therefore remain cautiously bullish on oil prices in 2019, but with the caveat that a big-bang surge in prices due to a U.S.-Iran confrontation – our main risk for 2019 just a few months ago – is now less likely. Question 6: Will Impeachment Become A Risk In 2019? While we have no way to forecast the Mueller investigation, it is undoubtedly clear that risks are rising on the U.S. domestic front. President Trump’s popularity among GOP voters is elevated and far from levels needed to convince enough senators to remove him from power (Chart 32). However, a substantive finding by Mueller may leave the moderate Democrats in the House with no choice but to pursue impeachment. This may rattle the market for both headline and fundamental reasons. The headline reasons are obvious. The fundamental reasons have to do with the looming stimulus cliff in 2020. A pitched battle between the House Democrats and the White House would make cooperation on another substantive stimulus effort less likely and thus a recession in 2020 more likely. The market may start pricing in such an outcome at some point in 2019. Furthermore, sentiment could be significantly impacted by a protracted domestic battle that impairs Trump’s domestic agenda. President Bill Clinton sought relevance abroad amidst his impeachment proceedings by initiating an air war against Yugoslavia. President Trump may do something similar. There is also an unclear relationship between domestic tensions and trade war. On one hand, President Trump may want a clear win and so hasten a deal. On the other hand, he may want to extend the trade war to encourage citizens to “rally around the flag” and show his geopolitical mettle amidst a distracting “witch hunt.” While we have faded these domestic risks in 2017 and 2018, we think that it may be difficult to do so in 2019. We stick by our view that previous impeachment bouts in the U.S. have had a temporary effect on the markets. But if market sentiment is already weakened by global growth and end of cycle concerns, a political crisis may become a bearish catalyst.  Question 7: What About Japan? Japan faces higher policy uncertainty in 2019, after a period of calm following the 2015-16 global turmoil. We expect to see “peak Shinzo Abe” – in the sense that after this year, his political capital will be spent and all that will remain will be for him to preside over the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The primary challenge for Abe is getting his proposed constitutional revisions passed despite economic headwinds. Assuming he goes forward, he must get a two-thirds vote in both houses of parliament plus a majority vote in a popular referendum. The referendum is unscheduled but could coincide with the July upper house elections. This will be a knife’s edge vote according to polling. If he holds the referendum and it passes, he will have achieved the historic goal of making Japan a more “normal” country, i.e. capable of revising its own constitution and maintaining armed forces. He will never outdo this. If he fails, he will become a lame duck – if he does not retire immediately like David Cameron or Matteo Renzi. And if he delays the revisions, he could miss his window of opportunity.   This uncertain domestic political context will combine with China/EM and trade issues that entail significant risks for Japan and upward pressure on the yen. Hence government policy will resume its decidedly reflationary tilt in 2019. It makes little sense for Abe, looking to his legacy, to abandon his constitutional dream while agreeing to raise the consumption tax from 8% to 10% as expected in October. We would take the opposite side of the bet: he is more likely to delay the tax hike than he is to abandon constitutional revision. If Abe becomes a lame duck, whether through a failed referendum, a disappointing election, or a consumption tax hike amid a slowdown, it is important for investors to remember that “Abenomics” will smell just as sweet by any other name. Japan experienced a paradigm shift after a series of “earthquakes” from 2008-12. No leader is likely to raise taxes or cut spending aggressively, and monetary policy will remain ultra-easy for quite some time. The global backdrop is negative for Japan but its policy framework will act as a salve. Question 8: Are There Any Winners In EM? We think that EM and global risk assets could have a window of outperformance in early 2019. However, given the persistence of the policy divergence narrative, it will be difficult to see EM substantively outperforming DM over the course of 2019. Mexico Over Brazil That said, we do like a few EM plays in 2019. In particular, we believe that investors are overly bullish on Brazil and overly bearish on Mexico. In both countries, we think that voters turned to anti-establishment candidates due to concerns over violence and corruption. However, Brazilian President-elect Jair Bolsonaro has a high hurdle to clear. He must convince a traditionally fractured Congress to pass a complex and painful pension reform. In other words, Bolsonaro must show that he can do something in order to justify a rally that has already happened in Brazilian assets. In Mexico, on the other hand, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) remains constrained by the constitution (which he will be unable to change), the National Supreme Court of Justice, and political convention that Mexico is right-of-center on economic policy (an outwardly left-wing president has not won an election since 1924). In other words, AMLO has to show that he can get out of his constraints in order to justify a selloff that has already happened. To be clear, we are not saying that AMLO is a positive, in the absolute, for Mexico. The decision to scrap the Mexico City airport plans, to sideline the finance ministry from key economic decisions, and to threaten a return to an old-school PRI-era statism is deeply concerning. At the same time, we are not of the view that Bolsonaro is, in the absolute, a negative for Brazil. Rather, we are pointing out that the relative investor sentiment is overly bullish Bolsonaro versus AMLO. Especially given that both presidents remain constrained by domestic political intricacies and largely campaigned on the same set of issues that have little to do with their perceived economic preferences. They also face respective median voters that are diametrically opposed to their economic agendas – Bolsonaro, we think, is facing a left-leaning median voter, whereas the Mexican median voter is center-right. The macroeconomic perspective also supports our relative call. If our view on China and the Fed is correct, high-beta plays like Brazil will suffer, while an economy that is tied-to-the-hip of the U.S., like Mexico, ought to outperform EM peers. As such, we are putting a long MXN/BRL trade on, to capture this sentiment gap between the two EM markets. Investors will be receiving positive carry on Mexico relative to Brazil for the first time in a long time (Chart 33). The relative change in the current account balance also favors Mexico (Chart 34). Finally, the technicals of the trade look good as well (Chart 35). South Korea Over Taiwan  Diplomacy remains on track on the Korean peninsula, despite U.S.-China tensions in other areas. Ultimately China believes that peace on the peninsula will remove the raison d’être of American troops stationed there. Moreover, Beijing has witnessed the U.S.’s resolve in deterring North Korean nuclear and missile tests and belligerent rhetoric. It will want to trade North Korean cooperation for a trade truce. By contrast, if Trump’s signature foreign policy effort fails, he may well lash out. We view deeply discounted South Korean equities as a long-term buy relative to other EMs. Taiwan, by contrast, is a similar EM economy but faces even greater short-term risks than South Korea. In the next 13-month period, the Tsai Ing-wen administration, along with the Trump administration, could try to seize a rare chance to upgrade diplomatic and military relations. This could heighten cross-strait tensions and lead to a geopolitical incident or crisis. More broadly, U.S.-China trade and tech tensions create a negative investment outlook for Taiwan. Thailand Over India Five state elections this fall have turned out very badly for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his National Democratic Alliance (NDA). These local elections have a negative impact, albeit a limited one, on Modi’s and the NDA’s reelection chances in the federal election due in April (or May). Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to lose Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan while still winning a majority in the Lok Sabha – this is what happened to the Indian National Congress in 2004 and 2009. So far federal election opinion polling suggests anything from a hung parliament to a smaller, but still substantial, BJP majority. Modi was never likely to maintain control of 20 out of 29 states for very long, nor to repeat his party’s sweeping 2014 victory. He was also never likely to continue his reform push uninhibited in the lead up to the general election. Nevertheless, the resignation of Reserve Bank of India Governor Urjit Patel on December 10 is a very worrisome sign. Given that Indian stocks are richly valued, and that we expect oil prices to drift upwards, we remain negative on India until the opportunity emerges to upgrade in accordance with our long-term bullish outlook. By contrast, we see the return to civilian rule in Thailand as a market-positive event in the context of favorable macro fundamentals. Thai elections always favor the rural populist “red” movement of the Shinawatra family, but presumably the military junta would not hold elections if it thought it had not sufficiently adjusted the electoral system in favor of itself and its political proxies. Either way, the cycle of polarization and social unrest will only reemerge gradually, so next year Thailand will largely maintain policy continuity and its risk assets will hold up better than most other EMs.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” dated September 25, 2012, Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Searing Sun: Japan-China Conflict Heating Up,” dated January 25, 2013, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II,” dated November 6, 2015, and “The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?” dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      Yes. He literally said that.   Geopolitical Calendar