Italy

Highlights Huge imbalance #1 is the euro area’s $150 billion trade surplus with the United States. Huge imbalance #1 has resulted from the ECB holding interest rates at the lower bound while the Fed tightened policy. The upshot is that the Fed now has the scope to cut rates while the ECB does not. Huge imbalance #2 is the euro area’s €1.5 trillion TARGET2 banking imbalance. Huge imbalance #2 means that Germany effectively has hundreds of billions of ‘Italian’ euro assets, making a euro break-up unthinkable for the euro area’s dominant economy. New structural recommendation for bond investors: overweight a 50:50 portfolio of U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs versus a 50:50 portfolio of German bunds and Spanish Bonos. Feature Huge Imbalance #1: The Euro Area’s $150 Billion Trade Surplus With The United States While the recent focus has been on the brewing trade war between the United States and China, trade tensions between the U.S. and Europe have also been escalating. The euro area trade surplus with the U.S. – standing near an all-time high of $150 billion – is extreme; and it is extreme because the undervaluation of the euro has made the euro area grossly over-competitive vis-à-vis the U.S., as claimed by the ECB’s own analysis (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3)! Chart of the WeekThe U.S./Euro Area Trade Imbalance Is A Near-Perfect Function Of Relative Monetary Policy Chart I-2Relative Monetary Policy Has Driven The Euro's Undervaluation... Chart I-3...And The Euro's Undervaluation Has Driven The U.S./Euro Area Trade Imbalance A common counterargument is that the euro area trade surplus is simply a structural issue. If a country, such as Germany, consistently consumes less than it produces, it must show up as a structural surplus. This argument is flawed. At least half of the surplus, including for Germany, has appeared since 2014, meaning it cannot be a structural issue (Chart I-4). In any case, if an economy consumes less than it produces, a higher exchange rate should help to facilitate the adjustment, encouraging under-consuming households to buy more imports, and discouraging over-producing firms from selling into foreign markets. Chart I-4Half Of Germany's Export Surplus Appeared After 2014 The Chart of the Week shows the true and damning reason for the trade imbalance. The euro area’s surplus with the U.S. is a near-perfect function of relative monetary policy. To be clear, the ECB is not explicitly depressing the exchange rate to make the euro area over-competitive, the ECB is just targeting its definition of price stability. However, the ECB’s definition of price stability omits owner-occupied housing (OOH) costs, and thereby understates true euro area inflation by 0.5 percent. To the extent that the ECB thinks in terms of real interest rates based on seemingly low (excluding OOH) inflation, this means that the ECB is setting real interest rates that are far too low for the euro area economy including OOH. This has resulted in the grossly over-competitive euro and the associated $150 billion surplus with the United States. The euro area trade surplus with the U.S. is a near-perfect function of relative monetary policy. Still, for 85 percent of the euro area, even inflation excluding OOH is reliably running within a 1.5-2 percent range, very close to the ECB’s definition of price stability. And bank lending is growing at a very healthy clip. For this vast majority of the bloc, the ECB’s zero and negative interest rate policy is wholly inappropriate. However, for the 15 percent of the euro area that is called Italy, ultra-loose monetary policy does seem more appropriate. Inflation is struggling to stay above 1 percent, and bank lending is still failing to gain traction (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5Italian Inflation Is Struggling To Stay Above 1 Percent Chart I-6Italian Banks Have Not ##br##Been Lending Therefore, an important way of thinking of the ECB’s stance is one of self-preservation – protecting the euro area’s obvious source of fissure. Effectively, the ECB is setting policy for the weakest link in the euro area, even if that policy means exacerbating strains outside the euro area – specifically, by generating a huge trade surplus with the United States. But in the interests of self-preservation, the external strain is a price worth paying. This leads us to believe that the inevitable convergence of euro area and U.S. monetary policies is now much more likely to happen via the Federal Reserve ultimately cutting rates, than by the ECB raising rates. Huge Imbalance #2: The Euro Area’s €1.5 Trillion TARGET2 Imbalance The euro area Target2 banking imbalance now stands close to €1.5 trillion (Chart I-7). What is this huge imbalance (Box 1), and why does it matter? Box 1: What Is Target2? Target2 stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. It is the settlement system for euro payment flows between banks in the euro area. These payment flows result from trade or financial transactions such as deposit transfers, sales of financial assets or debt repayments. If the banking system in one member country has more payment inflows than outflows, its national central bank (NCB) accrues a Target2 asset vis-à-vis the ECB. Conversely, if the banking system has more outflows than inflows, the respective NCB accrues a Target2 liability vis-à-vis the ECB. Target2 balances therefore show the cumulative net payment flows within the euro area.   The ECB delegated its QE sovereign bond purchases to the respective national central banks. In the case of Italian BTPs, Italian investors sold their bonds to the Bank of Italy and deposited the cash in banks healthier than those in Italy – for example, in Germany. Strictly speaking, this outflow of Italian cash to German banks is not the same as the deposit flight during the depths of the euro debt crisis in 2012. Rather, we might call it precautionary cash management. Nevertheless, in Eurosystem accounting terms it still means that the Bank of Italy has a new asset – the BTP – denominated in ‘Italian’ euros, while the Bundesbank has a new liability to German banks denominated in ‘German’ euros. The Target2 imbalance is the aggregate of such mismatches between Eurosystem assets denominated in ‘Italian and other periphery’ euros and liabilities denominated in ‘German and other core’ euros. If Italy owes Germany half a trillion euros then it is Germany that has the problem. Does the €1.5 trillion imbalance really matter? No, as long as an ‘Italian’ euro equals a ‘German’ euro, the imbalance is just an accounting identity within the Eurosystem. But if Italy and Germany started using different currencies, then suddenly it would matter with a vengeance. The Bank of Italy asset would be redenominated into lira, while the Bundesbank liability to German banks would be redenominated into deutschemarks. Thereby the ECB would end up with fewer assets than liabilities, and a solvency shortfall potentially equivalent to hundreds of billions of euros would end up on the shoulders of the ECB’s shareholders – largely, German taxpayers. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, if Italy owes Germany half a billion euros, then Italy has a problem; but if Italy owes Germany half a trillion euros, then it is Germany that has the problem (Chart I-8 and Chart I-9). In effect, the Target2 huge imbalance is a huge force for euro area self-preservation – because break-up means mutually assured destruction. Chart I-8The Target2 Imbalance Reflects The Cross-Border Flow Of Italian Investor Cash... Chart I-9...To German##br## Banks A New Structural Recommendation For Bond Investors To sum up, the euro area has two huge imbalances: one external, the other internal. The external imbalance is the $150 billion trade surplus with the United States. This huge imbalance has resulted from the ECB holding interest rates at the lower bound while the Fed tightened policy. The upshot is that the Fed now has the scope to cut rates while the ECB does not. And this makes the U.S. T-bond a much better haven asset than the German bund. The Target2 imbalance is a huge force for euro area self-preservation. The internal imbalance is the €1.5 trillion euro area Target2 imbalance. This huge imbalance means that Germany effectively has hundreds of billions of Italian ‘euro’ assets, making a euro break-up unthinkable for the euro area’s dominant economy. On this premise, the Italian BTP – which is offering a generous yield premium for such a break-up risk – is a good structural investment. Therefore, our new structural recommendation for bond investors is to overweight: A 50:50 portfolio of U.S. T-bonds and Italian BTPs Versus A 50:50 portfolio of German bunds and Spanish Bonos. Since 2018, the T-bond/BTP combination has underperformed by 20 percent and has considerable scope for ultimate catch-up one way or another (Chart I-10). Chart I-10A U.S. T-Bond/Italian BTP Combo Can Catch Up With A German Bund/Spanish Bono Combo Fractal Trading System * There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations    

Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why?   In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time.  It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome.   With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War   We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha.    Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2      Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3      Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008).  William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4      Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5      Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com.   Appendix Appendix France Appendix U.K. Appendix Germany Appendix Italy Appendix Spain Appendix Russia Appendix Korea Appendix Taiwan Appendix Turkey Appendix Brazil What’s On The Geopolitical Radar?      Geopolitical Calendar

Feature For a decade, mainstream economics has prescribed remedies for sluggish growth in the euro area on the basis of three articles of blind faith. First, that the ailment arises from structural impediments to growth; second, that in response to an ailing economy, ultra-loose monetary policy is always and everywhere effective; and third, that ‘Keynesian’ government stimuluses are at best a necessary evil and at worst a recipe for disaster. As a result, European policymakers have expended much time and energy attempting structural reforms, experimenting with ultra-loose monetary policy, while shirking government borrowing and spending. But have policymakers misdiagnosed the ailment? Chart of the WeekItaly’s Private Sector Is Paying Back Debt Why The Focus On Public Deficits And Debt Might Be Misplaced We frown upon government deficits. They are associated with crowding out and misallocation of resources. But when the private sector is running a financial surplus, the exact opposite is true. Government borrowing and spending causes no crowding out because the government is simply utilising the private sector’s surplus savings and debt repayments. And importantly, this deficit spending prevents a deflationary shrinkage of the broad money supply. Most people are aware of the size of government deficits. Few people are aware of the size of private sector surpluses; and the leakage from the national income stream that they create. By not making this connection, people might believe that government deficits are profligate. But if the private sector as a whole has a financial surplus, it makes sense for the government to borrow to support economic growth. In a similar vein, an economy’s debt sustainability depends on its total indebtedness, not on its public indebtedness or its private indebtedness in isolation. Debt becomes unsustainable when the marginal extra euro of debt results in misallocation of resources and mal-investment. At this point, the extra debt adds nothing to growth or, worse, it subtracts from growth. This is also the point at which lenders tend to be unwilling to provide the marginal loan. Therefore, debt reaches its sustainable limit when the economy has exhausted all productive uses for it. Deficit spending can prevent a deflationary shrinkage of the broad money supply. It does not matter whether these productive uses are funded with private debt or with public debt. For example, successful economies require investment in high-quality healthcare and education. Some economies fund this with private debt, while others fund it with public debt. This means that if productive private indebtedness is low, there is more scope for productive public indebtedness. Many people believe that Italy has one of the world’s most indebted economies. But this belief is wrong. Although Italy’s public indebtedness is high, Italy’s private indebtedness is one of the lowest in the world, making Italy’s total indebtedness less than that of France and the U.K., and broadly equal to that of the U.S. (Chart I-2-I-5). Crucially, Italy’s extremely low private indebtedness means that it could afford relatively high public indebtedness before reaching the limit of debt sustainability. Chart I-2Italy: Total Debt = 250% Of GDP Chart I-3France: Total Debt = 315% Of GDP Chart I-4U.K.: Total Debt = 280% Of GDP Chart I-5U.S: Total Debt = 250% Of GDP   Italy And Japan: Compare And Contrast In a normal world, the task of ensuring that private sector savings are borrowed and spent falls on the banks, which take in the savings and debt repayments and lend them out to others in the private sector who can make the best use of the funds. But if a dysfunctional banking system fails this task, the savings generated by the private sector will find no borrowers. The unrecycled funds become a leakage from the national income stream generating a persistent deflationary headwind for the economy. Welcome to Italy! Since 2008, the stock of loans to Italian households and firms has been stagnant while in real terms it has fallen (Chart of the Week). The upshot is that the real money supply has shrunk despite low private sector indebtedness, low interest rates and massive injections of ECB liquidity into the banking system. Japan’s public sector levering has been counterbalancing its private sector de-levering. After the 2008 global financial crisis Italian banks’ balance sheets were left unrepaired and undercapitalized. For an individual bank whose solvency is impaired, the right thing to do is shrink its loan book relative to its equity capital. But when the entire banking system is doing this simultaneously, the economy falls into a massive fallacy of composition: what is right for an individual bank becomes very deflationary when all banks are doing it together. Under these circumstances, an agent outside the fallacy of composition – namely, the government – must counter this deflationary headwind by borrowing and spending the un-recycled private sector savings. Welcome to Japan! The Japanese government has been doing precisely this for the past 25 years. Many people fret about the Japanese government’s persistent deficits and its ballooning public debt. What these people do not realise is that these persistent deficits are simply counterbalancing private sector de-levering. Hence, Japan’s all-important total (public plus private) indebtedness as a share of GDP has not been rising (Chart I-6). In Italy, the banking system has been dysfunctional for over a decade, preventing the private sector from borrowing (Chart I-7). Under these circumstances, the Italian government could borrow the private sector’s excess savings and debt repayments and put them to highly productive use, just like in Japan. Chart I-6Japan’s Persistent Deficits Have Been Counterbalancing Private Sector De-levering Chart I-7The Italian Banking System Has Been Dysfunctional Japan and Italy have quite similar demographics, but there is also a big difference. Despite the Japanese government’s persistent deficit and ballooning debt, the 10-year Japanese government bond seems not the slightest bit concerned and is yielding zero. Whereas in Italy, where the government finances are close to structural balance, the merest hint of a Keynesian stimulus sent the 10-year BTP yield rocketing towards 4 percent. Why? The answer is that Italy does not have its own central bank. The Japanese government bond yield is a direct function of the BoJ’s expected monetary policy. But the Italian BTP yield has two components: the ECB’s expected monetary policy plus a risk-premium for currency redenomination in the event that Italy left the euro. Italy’s problem is that even if modest deficit spending was the right policy, it would take time to prove. Meanwhile, bond vigilantes shoot first and ask questions later. The euro debt crisis was essentially a fear of currency redenomination which resulted from bond vigilantes running amok. When bond markets refuse to lend to sovereigns at a rational interest rate, maturing debt has to be refinanced at a penalising interest rate, causing an undeserved deterioration in the government’s finances. Thereby, the fear of redenomination could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In Italy, the banking system has been dysfunctional for over a decade. The bottom line is that every economy has its own ‘tipping-point’ interest rate, at which its debt financing can flip from stability to instability. But we believe this interest rate is low everywhere. Modern Monetary Theory Simplified Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is a hot topic of the moment. Our view is that its breakthrough is to establish the ‘appropriate’ public sector deficits in the context of private sector surpluses, and it simplifies to this question: In highly indebted economies, what is the interest rate needed to keep total (public plus private) indebtedness as a share of GDP stable, and prevent a deflationary shrinkage of the broad money supply? The answer differs slightly from economy to economy because private sector indebtedness is modestly rising in some places, stable in a few, while declining in others (Chart I-8).  But crucially, at a global level, total indebtedness is stabilising with the global bond yield within a historically depressed sideways channel (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Private Sector Indebtedness Is Not Rising As A Whole Chart I-9The Global Long Bond Yield Has Been In A Sideways Channel Admittedly, the global bond yield is now at the bottom of this channel. This means that from a tactical perspective, we can expect 10-year yields to go up about 50 bps before hitting the top of the channel. However, from a structural perspective, the interest rate needed to stabilise total indebtedness as a share of GDP now appears to be extremely low. And this means that structurally low bond yields are here to stay. Finally, I am excited to report that two of the main commentators on MMT – Richard Koo and Stephanie Kelton – are keynote speakers at our annual conference on September 26-27 in New York City. Suffice to say it will be an event not to be missed! Fractal Trading System* There are no new trades this week, leaving five open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. *  For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks. Tactically overweight Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM… …but prepare to take profits in the summer months. In the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps… …and EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Feature Without a shadow of a doubt, the chart that causes the greatest stir among our clients is the Chart of the Week. It shows that one of the biggest investment decisions, the choice between the euro area and U.S. equity markets, reduces to the choice between the three large euro area banks – Santander, BNP Paribas, and ING – and the three U.S. tech behemoths – Apple, Microsoft, and Google.  Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 Is Just 3 Banks Vs. 3 Tech Stocks! Clients are simultaneously amazed and unsettled by this manifestation of the Pareto Principle, which states that the vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes. Financials feature large in the Eurostoxx50 while tech giants dominate the S&P500. But the amazing thing is that almost all of the relative performance can be explained by just three stocks in each market. The vast majority of an effect is explained by a tiny minority of causes.  The chart creates a cognitive dissonance. What about the things that are supposed to matter for stock market selection: relative economic growth, profits growth, margins, valuations and geopolitics? The answer is that all of these are interesting areas of study, but they are mere details in the big picture. For the Eurostoxx50 to outperform the S&P500, the big euro area banks have to outperform the big U.S. tech stocks (Chart I-2). Period.  Chart 2For The Eurostoxx50 To Outperform The S&P500, Euro Area Banks Have To Outperform U.S. Tech Our view is that in the immediate future this is certainly possible, but that over the long haul it will prove to be a very tall order. When The Mean Is Meaningless The structural performances of vastly different equity sectors can diverge for a very long time. How long? Japanese banks have underperformed U.S. tech for thirty years and counting! In this situation, mean-reversion and ‘standard deviations’ from the mean become meaningless concepts (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Japanese Banks Have Underperformed U.S. Tech For Thirty Years And Counting! The statistical concept of a standard deviation is only meaningful if the underlying data is stationary, which is to say mean-reverting. If it isn’t, then it is impossible to say that a sector price or valuation is stretched either versus another sector, or versus its own history.  One problem is that sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. The structural outlook for bank profits experiences a phase-shift when a debt super-cycle ends. Therefore, comparing a bank valuation after a debt super-cycle with the valuation during a debt super-cycle is as meaningless as comparing your height as an adult to your height when you were a child! Sector performances and valuations undergo phase-shifts when they enter a different economic climate. To which, a frequent riposte is: within the same sector, euro area companies appear cheaper than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. But again, this apparent value is deceptive because it is simply an adjustment for the so-called ‘currency translation effect’ and the anticipated long-term moves in exchange rates. If investors anticipate the euro ultimately to strengthen – because they see that it is trading well below purchasing power parity – then a multinational company listed on a euro area bourse will suffer a future headwind to its mixed-currency denominated profits when they are translated back to a stronger euro. To discount this anticipated headwind, the euro area multinational must trade cheaper compared with a peer in, say, the U.S. But the cheapness is a false impression. Pulling together these complexities of sector effects, phase-shifts in sector valuations and currency effects, making the big call between Europe and America on the basis of performance or valuation mean-reversion is dangerous. Instead, we come back to the basic question: should you tilt towards euro area financials or towards U.S. tech? Own Banks For The Short Term Only Japanese financial sector profits peaked in 1990 and stand at less than half that level today. Euro area financial sector profits peaked in 2007, and are tracking the Japanese experience with a 17-year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan’s footsteps, expect no sustained growth through the next 17 years (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Euro Area Financial Profits Are Following Japanese Footsteps In a post credit boom era, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. This loss becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Bank profits are dependent on two other drivers. One is operational leverage – the amount of equity held against the balance sheet. More stringent European regulation is making this a headwind too. Banks have to hold more equity capital against assets, diluting their profitability. The other driver is the net interest margin – the difference between rates received on loans and rates paid on deposits. In this regard, both fintech and the blockchain are likely to create a further headwind to bank profitability. Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Admittedly, U.S. tech may also face its own headwinds or phase-shift, most obviously antitrust lawsuits to counter its near-monopoly status. But even allowing for this, Japan’s experience suggests that euro area financials will struggle to outperform structurally. Rather, financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. Last autumn, we noted that short-term credit impulses in the major economies were flipping from a sharp down-oscillation into an up-oscillation phase (Chart I-5). On that basis, we recommended a tactical overweight to Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 as well as other pro-cyclical positions such as overweight EM versus DM. Those pro-cyclical sector positions have broadly succeeded, but they are still appropriate given that up-oscillation phases very reliably last around nine months. Chart I-5Short-Term Credit Impulses Have Flipped To Up-Oscillations The caveat is: prepare to take profits in the summer months. The Fed Is Now At ‘Neutral’, But Where Is The ECB? Last week, the Federal Reserve confirmed that “the Federal funds rate (at 2.5 percent) is now in the broad range of estimates of neutral – the rate that tends neither to stimulate nor to restrain the economy.”  This begs the question: where is the ECB policy rate (now at 0 percent) relative to its neutral? Our very high conviction view is that the ECB policy rate is well below neutral. Financials is a sector to play for outperformance phases lasting no more than a few quarters. The twenty year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Through these twenty years, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -50 bps1 (Chart I-6). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -50 bps (Chart I-7). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the ex-post neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-6The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Yield Spread Has Averaged -50 Bps... Chart I-7...The Euro Area Vs. U.S. Inflation Spread Has Also Averaged -50 Bps With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there a valid reason to expect a difference in the future? An obvious response is the fragility of the euro area’s banking system will require the ECB to persist with its zero interest rate policy for years. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy. In fact, the evidence suggests that this fear is exaggerated. In Germany and France, bank lending is healthy, and could easily weather modestly tighter monetary policy (Chart I-8). The problem has been localised in Italy, where bank lending relapsed once again in 2018. Chart I-8Bank Lending Is Healthy In Germany And France However, on closer examination this was a direct result of political tensions. Recently, Italian bank lending has been a very tight (inverse) function of the Italian bond yield. The BTP yield spiked last year when Rome escalated its budget spat with Brussels, and bank lending took a hard hit. But now that the Italian bond yield has retraced, lending should recover (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Italian Bank Lending Should Recover Now That The Bond Yield Has Come Down The central issue is can the U.S. policy rate – which is at neutral – and the ECB policy – which is below neutral – diverge much from here? Our high conviction answer is no. Therefore, in the medium term, the euro area versus U.S. long-bond yield spread has plenty of scope to compress from its current -180 bps, one way or the other (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Can Interest Rate Expectations Diverge Much From Here? It also implies that after remaining range-bound in the immediate future, EUR/USD has the scope to head higher. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System This week’s recommended trade is to go long SEK/NOK, as it is close to the limit of tight liquidity that has signaled many previous technical reversals in this currency cross. Set a profit target of 1.5 percent with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, the on-going rally in government bonds caused the short position in 30-year T-bonds to hit its stop-loss. This leaves us with five open positions. Long SEK/NOK. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights European Growth: Europe’s economy is slowing, while core inflation remains subdued. The ECB must now contemplate the need for a monetary policy ease so soon after ending its bond buying program. Likely ECB Options: The ECB will likely have no choice but to initiate a new round of LTROs – likely to be announced in either April or May – to prevent an unwanted tightening of credit conditions at a time of slowing economic growth. Fixed Income Implications: Stay below-benchmark on euro area duration, with inflation expectations likely to rebound alongside a more dovish ECB and rising global oil prices. Stay underweight Italian government bonds and neutral overall euro area corporate credit exposure, however, until there are more decisive signs that growth is stabilizing. Feature Back in December, the European Central Bank (ECB) - confident that the euro zone economy was healthy enough to allow the slow process of policy normalization to begin - ended its Asset Purchase Program and signaled that rate hikes could commence as soon as late 2019. Just two months later, the central bank is faced with an unexpectedly persistent and broad-based growth slump. Markets now expect no change in short-term interest rates until well into 2020. By most conventional measures, the ECB is running a very accommodative monetary stance, with a €4.7 trillion balance sheet and negative interest rates (both in nominal and inflation-adjusted terms). On a rate-of-change basis, however, policy has become incrementally less stimulative, with the balance sheet no longer expanding and real interest rates unchanged from levels of a year ago (Chart 1). An additional potential tightening of liquidity conditions is on the horizon with the ECB’s long-term funding operations for euro zone banks (LTROs and TLTROs) set to begin rolling off next year. Chart 1The ECB Needs To Ease Policy Somehow Our ECB Monitor indicates that fresh monetary easing will soon be required if the current downtrend in growth persists. Given the persistent fragilities within the European banking system, not only in Italy but increasingly in core countries like Germany, a combination of slowing economic momentum and tightening monetary liquidity is a potentially toxic brew. Weaker growth raises the specter of a rise in non-performing loans held by banks that also have significant sovereign debt exposures (the so-called “Doom Loop”). In this Special Report, we consider the policy options that the ECB could realistically deliver in the coming months - given the state of the economy, inflation and banking system – with the associated investment implications for European fixed income markets. Our conclusion: the ECB will be forced to take a dovish turn as an insurance policy against tighter credit conditions and weak growth. Eurozone Economy: Broad-Based Mediocrity The ECB has categorized the current downturn, which has pushed real GDP growth in the Eurozone to a below-trend pace of 1.7% and triggered a technical recession in Italy, as simply the product of a bunch of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks (a cut in Germany auto production due to changing emissions standards, Italy-EU fiscal policy debates that raised the cost of capital in Italy, and political unrest in France damaging consumer spending). The biggest shock, however, has been exogenous. Trade policy uncertainty and a weakening Chinese economy have both been a major drag on growth for euro zone countries that rely heavily on exports, in general, and Chinese import demand, in particular. The “one-off shocks” narrative is incorrect because the slowdown has been broad-based. The majority of countries within the euro zone are suffering slowing GDP growth, falling leading economic indicators and decelerating headline inflation, according to our diffusion indices for each (Chart 2). The previous three times such a synchronized slowdown unfolded (2001, 2009 and 2012), the ECB responded with a full-blown rate cutting cycle. Inflation trends today, however, make it a bit more difficult for the ECB to consider any such possible shift in a more dovish direction. Chart 2ECB Typically Eases After A Broad-Based Economic Downturn The overall unemployment rate for the region is 7.8%, well below the OECD’s estimate of the full employment NAIRU1 rate. In contrast to our diffusion indicators for the economy, the majority of euro area countries (83%) have unemployment rates lower than NAIRU (Chart 3). The previous two times labor markets were so tight in the euro area, wage inflation reached 4%, core inflation climbed beyond 2.5% and the ECB pushed policy interest rates to between 4-5%. Today, a large majority of countries are witnessing faster wage growth and core inflation, but the overall level of both is still relatively low (2.5% and 1%, respectively). Chart 3ECB Policy Is Already Very Easy So from the point of view of the state of overall growth and inflation, the ECB is in a difficult position. Euro area growth has slowed, but not by enough to ease the nascent inflation pressures in labor markets. The story gets more complex when looking at growth and inflation at the individual country level. For the four largest economies in the region – Germany, France, Italy and Spain – the latter two remain a source of concern. Unemployment in both Spain and Italy remains in double-digits, with headline and core inflation rates at 1% or lower (Chart 4). Italy’s manufacturing PMI is now at 47.6 and Spain’s is now at 49.9, both below the 50 level indicating an expanding economy. Chart 4Italy & Spain Are Becoming An Issue (Again) Credit growth exhibits a similar pattern. Total bank lending is contracting on a year-over-year basis in Italy (-4.3%) and Spain (-2.1%), while still growing at a positive, albeit decelerating, rate in Germany (+1.5%) and France (+5.3%). The most recent ECB Bank Lending Survey for the fourth quarter of 2018 showed that lending standards were becoming more stringent in Italy and Spain than in Germany or France (Chart 5). In Italy, where the growth downturn has been deeper and borrowing costs have gone up due to the Italian populist government’s repudiation of EU deficit limits, banks are actually tightening lending standards. Chart 5Credit Conditions Tightening At The Margin The last thing the ECB wants to see now is a sustained credit contraction in the large economies where growth and banking systems are the most fragile – most notably, Italy. Bottom Line: Europe’s economy is slowing, while core inflation remains subdued. Weakness is more pronounced in the Peripheral countries compared to the Core, especially Italy. The ECB must now contemplate the need for a monetary policy ease so soon after ending its bond buying program. Italy’s Banks Are Still A Huge Headache For The ECB European banks have struggled to generate acceptable profits in recent years against a backdrop of sluggish economic growth, negative interest rates and increased regulatory capital requirements. Bank equity values remain near post-2008 crisis lows, with Italian bank stocks severely underperforming their competitors within the euro zone (Chart 6). Credit spreads for Italian banks are also far more elevated than those of their euro area peers, a reflection of the higher yields and wider spreads on Italian government bonds (which, given Italy’s BBB sovereign credit rating, means that the floor on Italian yields and credit spreads is higher than those of other euro zone countries with better credit ratings). Chart 6Italy's Fiscal Problems Impacting The Banks Even given the economic fragility in Italy, Italian banks remain reasonably well-capitalized. According to the data from the European Banking Authority (EBA), Italian banks have a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of 13.8%, well above the minimum levels required by Basel III bank regulations and close to the overall euro area CET1 ratio of 14.7% (Chart 7). The problem for Italian banks, however, remains the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs). EBA data shows that Italian banks have an NPL ratio of 9.4%, nearly three times the total euro area NPL ratio of 3.4%. While this is a substantial improvement from the near-20% NPL ratio seen after the 2011 European debt crisis, the absolute level of NPLs remains high. The other major risk for Italian banks is their large holdings of Italian sovereign bonds, which raises the risk of mark-to-market losses hitting the banks’ capital position as government bond yields rise (i.e. the “Doom Loop”). The ECB’s bond purchases have helped to reduce the share of Italian sovereign debt held by Italy’s banks from 25% to around 19% over the past five years (Chart 8). Yet with Italy’s sovereign credit rating now BBB – on the cusp of junk – Italian bank balance sheets remain heavily exposed to sovereign debt risk. The ECB has tried to mitigate the impact of its extraordinary monetary stimulus on the profitability of Europe’s banks by offering longer-term loans (against acceptable collateral) at low interest rates. These programs, known as Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), have mostly been used by banks in Italy and Spain, which have taken up a combined 56% of all outstanding LTROs (Chart 9). Chart 956% Of ECB LTROs Have Gone To Italy & Spain The most recent LTRO operation launched in 2016 was a Targeted LTRO (TLTRO) that tied the extension of ECB funding directly to the amount of new loans made by any bank that received the funding. Those TLTROs were offered at the ECB’s Marginal Deposit Rate of -0.4%, effectively providing a 40bps subsidy for new bank lending. The impact on loan growth from the TLTROs was far greater in Italy and Spain, where the share of total bank lending funded by LTROs in each country is now 10% compared to 4% for all euro area bank loans (Chart 10). Chart 10LTROs Funding 10% Of Bank Lending In Italy & Spain The TLTROs extended in 2016 had a maturity of four years, which means that the loans will begin to mature next year.2 If the ECB lets these operations expire without any offering of a new program, then banks that have used that cheap liquidity will be faced with one of two choices: replace that funding with bank debt at much higher market interest rates, or reduce the size of their loan books (i.e. delever their balance sheets). For Italy’s banks, replacing all of that cheap TLTRO funding with expensive bank debt is highly unlikely. According to the Bank of Italy’s latest Financial Stability Report, bank debt represents as large a share of overall Italy bank funding as the TLTROs (around 10%), but the growth rate of that debt has been contracting at a -15% to -20% rate over the past couple of years (Table 1).3 This is how rising Italian sovereign bond yields translate into higher bank debt yields and market funding costs, restricting lending activity. Table 1Italian Banks Have Slashed Expensive Debt Market Funding Already, Italian banks have been cutting back on lending to the most risky borrowers, according to Bank of Italy data (Chart 11). The growth rates of loans deemed “risky” and “vulnerable” contracted at a faster pace in 2018 than during 2015-17, while loans extended to “solvent” and “safe” borrowers grew more quickly in 2018 than the prior three years. These trends are likely to continue with credit standards now being tightened by Italian banks according to the ECB Bank Lending Survey. An additional factor for the banks to consider is the upcoming implementation of the Basel III regulatory requirement that banks must maintain a minimum amount of funding with a maturity greater than one year (the Net Stable Funding Ratio, or NSFR). Even though the current round of TLTROs do not begin to expire until June 2020, they will turn into “short-term” funding as of June of this year when it comes to banks calculating their NSFR. That ratio is not yet binding, but banks will likely seek to plan ahead for their long-term funding and will seek guidance from the ECB. So the ECB is now faced with the prospect of letting the TLTROs begin to expire next year, placing 4% of total euro area bank lending and 10% of Italian and Spanish bank lending at risk. Given the current fragile state of growth in the euro area, especially in Italy, the central bank would be taking a huge gamble by risking an even deeper downturn through banks shrinking their loan books. The easiest way to prevent that outcome – more LTROs. Bottom Line: The ECB will likely have no choice but to initiate a new round of LTROs – likely to be announced in April or May - to prevent an unwanted tightening of credit conditions amid slowing economic growth. The ECB’s Likely Next Move? New LTROs With More Dovish Forward Guidance The ECB Governing Council meets this week. There will be a new set of economic projections prepared for this meeting, and the ECB has typically chosen to make changes to its monetary policies alongside shifts in its economic forecasts. ECB President Mario Draghi has already noted that the growth risks in the euro zone are now tilted to the downside. Even noted monetary hawks like German Bundesbank President Jans Weidmann and Dutch Central Bank President Klaas Knot – both candidates to replace Draghi when his term expires in October – have toned down their calls for monetary tightening given the weak growth in their own economies. We expect the ECB to follow a dovish script at the March ECB meeting, along these lines: Downgrade the ECB’s growth forecasts Delay the date when inflation is projected to return back to 2% target Extend forward guidance on the first rate hike out to “mid-2020 or later” (which only validates current market pricing) A pessimistic assessment of the outlook for bank lending based on elevated bank funding costs impairing the transmission of ECB’s “highly accommodative” monetary policy A discussion about the need for a new LTRO program to replace the ones that start expiring in 2020 Step 4 in that script could be delayed until the April or May ECB meetings, to allow for more time to see how the economic data unfolds. Almost all of the current downturn in real GDP growth can be attributed to the plunge in net exports – the contribution to growth from domestic demand has been stable over the past year (Chart 12). Thus, the ECB will likely want to see if the current indications of a U.S.-China trade deal, combined with more stimulus from China’s policymakers, puts a floor under the downturn in euro area trade activity. Chart 12ECB Growth Forecasts Require A Rebound In Exports Step 5 in our March ECB meeting script can also be delayed to April or May, but the ECB is not likely to wait longer than that and run the risk of letting the current slowing of euro area credit growth turn into a full-blown contraction due to the end of cheap funding (Chart 13). Chart 13Tightening Lending Standards: Trigger For A New LTRO? There has also been some speculation that the ECB could satisfy both the hawks and doves on the Governing Council by announcing a hike in the ECB Overnight Deposit rate at the same time as a new LTRO program. The Overnight Deposit rate represents the floor of the ECB’s policy interest rate corridor, with the Marginal Lending rate representing the ceiling and the Main Refinancing rate acting as the midpoint of the corridor. Yet with the ECB maintaining such a large balance sheet, with €1.2 trillion in excess reserves, the effective short-term interest rate (1-week EONIA) has traded near the Overnight Deposit Rate floor. Thus, lifting only the Overnight Deposit Rate, which is -0.4% and has been blamed for damaging the earnings of euro area banks, would effectively be the same as a traditional hike in the ECB’s main interest rate tool, the Main Refinancing Rate (Chart 14). Chart 14The ECB Cannot Bottom Line: Offering a new LTRO, but perhaps for only a shorter time period than the expiring TLTROs (i.e. two years instead of four), seems to be the best solution for the ECB. This will prevent a potential liquidity-driven bank credit crunch in the most vulnerable parts of the European economy – Italy and Spain. Fixed Income Investment Implications Of Our ECB View 1. Duration: the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield had fallen as low as 0.09% in the most recent global bond rally, largely driven by a collapse in inflation expectations. The ECB’s likely dovish guidance on rate hikes will prevent any meaningful rise in real Bund yields. Inflation expectations, however, do have a lot more upside if BCA’s bullish oil forecast is realized – especially so if the ECB also takes a more dovish turn (Chart 15). Stay below-benchmark on euro zone duration, and stay long inflation-linked instruments like CPI swaps. Chart 15Stay Below-Benchmark On European Duration Exposure 2. Italian Sovereign Debt: A new LTRO program, combined with more dovish forward guidance, should help prevent the current Italian growth downturn from intensifying. However, a weak economy will sustain pressure on Italian sovereign spreads. Stay underweight for now, but look to upgrade when growth stabilizes (Chart 16). Chart 16Stay Cautious On Euro Area Spread Product Until Growth Bottoms 3. Euro Area Corporates: A more dovish ECB will help stabilize corporate credit spreads in the euro area, but like Italian sovereign debt, signs of more stable growth are required before spreads can meaningfully compress. Stay neutral for now.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment. 2 The loans were offered in four allotments in June 2016, September 2016, December 2016 and March 2017. Hence, the loans will mature in June 2020, September 2020, December 2020 and March 2021. 3 The November 2018 Bank of Italy Financial Stability Report can be found here: https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/2018-2/index.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights Investors are currently too pessimistic on Europe’s growth prospects. In fact, European growth will soon bottom. European growth and inflation are also set to improve relative to the U.S. This should give investors an opportunity to reassess the long-term outlook for European Central Bank policy relative to the Fed. Global growth dynamics are also moving in an increasingly dollar-bearish direction, which should create a tailwind for the euro. Based on the pricing of European assets relative to the U.S., there is scope to see more capital flows into the euro area, implying that more euro buying is forthcoming. The entire European currency complex is a buy relative to the dollar; while the NOK, the SEK, and even the GBP could outperform the euro, the CHF will underperform. EUR/JPY also has upside. Feature The case to sell the euro is easy to make. European growth has been very poor: PMIs, industrial production and even German exports are all pointing to a contraction in output; and economic surprises are testing levels recorded during the euro area crisis. Most importantly, this economic retrenchment is particularly sharp when compared to the U.S., which suggests that real interest rate differentials should continue to hurt EUR/USD (Chart 1). Chart 1Selling The Euro Seems So Easy... The problem with this narrative is that investors are already well aware of Europe’s woes. Could Europe instead recover and the euro rebound against the dollar? After all, in the past, when investor pessimism towards Europe experienced as pronounced a dip as the one just witnessed, EUR/USD invariably rebounded soon after (Chart 2). Chart 2...But Maybe We Should Look The Other Way In this piece, we explore what could go right for the euro, and argue that the euro is indeed attractive at current levels. European Growth Has Hit A Nadir It is safe to say that the euro area is in a funk today: European real GDP growth dipped to a 1.1% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2018, while industrial production has plunged by 3.9% on a year-on-year basis. But the markets warned us this would happen: The euro has fallen 9% from its February 2018 top, German bund yields are again flirting with the 0.1% level and European banks plunged by more than 40% between January and December last year. Going forward, for European yields to remain as depressed as they are, for the euro to fall again by a similar margin, or for domestic plays to suffer large declines, European growth will have to slow even further. We are not expecting such a scenario. Instead, we expect European growth to recover significantly this year. First, when it comes to Germany, the locomotive of Europe, the shock from the implementation of the new WLTP auto emission standards is passing: Automobile production is stabilizing, capex is accelerating and inventories have been pared down. Moreover, the slowdown in foreign demand has already percolated through the domestic economy, as domestic manufacturing orders are already experiencing one of their sharpest declines since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 3, top panel). Chart 3European Growth Is Set To Rebound Another source of optimism comes from the credit market. As the middle panel of Chart 3 illustrates, the European 12-month credit impulse has begun to bottom. This points to stronger euro area-wide domestic demand. Moreover, the Chinese credit and fiscal impulse is also bottoming, suggesting the drag from foreign demand could be dissipating (Chart 3, bottom panel). When looking at other specific trouble spots, Italy first springs to mind. In our view, the most recent deceleration in Italy was mainly a consequence of the tightening in financial conditions that resulted from the surge in Italian yields following the budget standoff between Rome and Brussels. However, the Lega Nord / Five Star Movement coalition has folded and is more or less acquiescing to the EU’s demands. Moreover, the rising probability that the European Central Bank will continue to provide long-term liquidity to the eurozone banking system via some form of new LTRO should diminish the funding risk to the Italian banking system, and thus, the risks to Rome’s fiscal sustainability. This implies that the decline in Italian borrowing costs could deepen (Chart 4), further easing Italian financial conditions and improving the growth outlook in the euro area’s third-largest economy. Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions In Italy France, too, has had its fair share of problems, though it is interesting that its industrial sector is not suffering as much as Germany’s, as highlighted by a French manufacturing PMI above the 50 boom/bust line. Instead, the French service sector is the one contracting (Chart 5). This bifurcation is likely to be a byproduct of the gilets jaunes protests that have lasted since November 2018 and affected retail trade. However, the intensity of the protests is declining and the French population is getting used to this. As a result, we are seeing a rebound in French household confidence, which implies that consumption, the main engine of French growth, is likely to perk up. Chart 5Fade The Gilets Jaunes, Paris In Spring Is Beautiful Finally, euro area fiscal policy is set to be loosened this year, with the fiscal thrust moving from 0.05% of GDP to 0.4% of GDP (Chart 6). The response of French President Emmanuel Macron to the gilets jaunes protests could even make the fiscal policy support slightly bigger this year. Chart 6Positive Fiscal Thrust In 2019 Ultimately, this combination of factors suggests that the large dip in European industrial production is likely to prove transitory, and that European activity will revert back toward the levels implied by the Belgian Business Confidence Index, which has historically been a good leading indicator of European growth (Chart 7). Chart 7European IP To Follow Brussels' Mood Bottom Line: The deterioration in European growth has captured the imagination of investors. However, the performance of European assets last year forewarned that growth would decelerate meaningfully. What matters now is how growth will evolve. Developments from Germany, France, Italy, the credit channel and the fiscal front all suggest that European activity will perk up soon. It’s All Relative While getting a sense of European growth is important when making a call on EUR/USD, economic trends must also be considered relative to the U.S. Surprisingly, despite notorious European growth underperformance, rays of hope are emerging. A major structural negative for EUR/USD has abated: The European debt crisis is behind us, and the aggregate European banking sector has been getting healthier, albeit slowly. This means that the euro area credit growth is not declining anymore against that of the U.S. This is a very long-term force that dictates multi-year cycles in the EUR/USD. As Chart 8 shows, it will be difficult for EUR/USD to move below 1.10 so long as the broad trend in the relative credit growth does not weaken anew. Chart 8Credit Dynamics Suggest That The Worst Is Over For EUR/USD More immediately, the euro area leading economic indicator relative to the U.S. is forming a bottom (Chart 9). Since the U.S. is not benefiting from as large a fiscal boost as in 2018, and financial as well as monetary conditions have tightened there relative to Europe, this suggests the improvement in the euro area relative LEI could continue this year. Chart 9Bottoming European LEI Versus U.S. Relative labor market slack is also evolving in a euro-friendly fashion. From 2013 to 2018, the euro area suffered from greater labor market slack than the U.S., courtesy of a double-dip recession and generally more-moribund growth. However, thanks to a 4.2-percentage-point fall in the European unemployment rate since 2013 to 7.9%, the euro area unemployment gap has not only closed, it is also below that of the U.S. Historically, when the U.S. unemployment gap leapfrogs that of Europe, EUR/USD tends to appreciate (Chart 10). Chart 10Less Slack Leads To A Stronger EUR/USD Relative slack does not only have value in itself, it also matters for relative inflation trends, which have been a crucial determinant of EUR/USD. As Chart 11 illustrates, EUR/USD tends to follow how euro area core CPI evolves relative to the U.S. After sharply falling last year, European relative core inflation is trying to rebound, which at a minimum suggests that EUR/USD has limited downside. Moreover, EUR/USD has correlated positively with German market-based inflation expectations (Chart 11, bottom panel). This suggests that actual relative inflation as well as euro area inflation expectations play a key role in determining perceptions among investors of how ECB policy will evolve relative to the Federal Reserve. Chart 11EUR/USD Trades Off Of Inflation Dynamics The recent euro decline has matched the decline in inflation expectations. However, inflation expectations have been much weaker than implied by the level of wage growth in Europe (Chart 12). This suggests that European inflation breakevens have scope to improve, a positive for the euro. Moreover, European wage growth is not only picking up steam in isolation, it is also rising relative to the U.S., which highlights that European inflation should not just stabilize vis-à-vis the U.S., but also accelerate. Chart 12European Wages Point To Rising Inflation Expectations This case is made even more saliently by looking at relative financial conditions. Due to the tightening in U.S. financial conditions compared to the euro area, European headline and core inflation is set to accelerate relative to the U.S. (Chart 13). Again, this reinforces the case that maybe the euro has upside this year. Chart 13Relative Euro Area Inflation Will Rise Thanks To Easier FCI Ultimately, for the euro to rise, investors will have to begin pricing in some switch in policy spreads between the ECB and the Fed. In the past, we showed that short-term policy expectations are important, but long-term ones can be even more relevant, especially when a central bank is well along the path of lifting rates, as the Fed is, while the other remains at maximum accommodation, like the ECB is today.1  Currently, investors expect euro area short rates to be only 0.5% 5-years from now (Chart 14, top panel). The spread between the eurozone and U.S. 5-year forward 1-month OIS rates remains near all-time lows, which explains the weakness in the euro. Now that European policy is much more accommodative than the U.S.’s, there’s scope for investors to upgrade the path of long-term euro area rates relative to the U.S. This would be bullish for the euro (Chart 14, bottom panel). Recovering relative credit flows and improving relative slack and inflation dynamics could catalyze this change. Chart 14The ECB Is Never Raising Rates Bottom Line: To make the euro an attractive buy, European growth and inflation conditions cannot just increase, they need to improve relative to the U.S. Since long-term interest rate expectations are very depressed in Europe relative to the U.S., a small improvement in the relative growth profile could be enough to catalyze a repricing of the ECB vis-à-vis the Fed, creating a powerful tailwind behind the euro. Nothing Happens In A Vacuum Ultimately, exchange rates, like other prices in the economy, do not only respond to domestic determinants but are also influenced by much larger, global forces. This is because those global trends percolate through domestic economies, resulting in changing relative expected returns that drive money across borders, leading to currency movements. In the case of the euro, global growth matters a lot, because European growth is much more sensitive to global economic fluctuations than U.S. growth is. This is particularly true if shocks emanate from emerging markets (Chart 15). Today, global cyclical variables are increasingly pointing toward an end to the global growth slowdown. A stabilization and reacceleration in global activity would support the euro. First, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to ease, which historically tends to be linked with improvements in European growth relative to the U.S. (Chart 16). Questions remain surrounding this point: How durable will the rebound in Chinese credit be? By how much will Chinese policymakers nurture this bounce? And will this jump be large enough to lift economic activity in the Middle Kingdom? Nonetheless, a reflationary wind from China has begun to blow, and since investors have already discounted much bad news out of Europe, only small improvements could turn the euro around.   Chart 16If China Is Really Stimulating, Europe Will Rip A Greater Dividend Second, as Chart 17 shows, our Nowcast for global industrial activity has decisively stepped down. Yet, the countercyclical dollar has been flat since October 2018. Historically, the performance of EM carry trades funded in yen tends to lead global growth. Currently the performance of these strategies is stabilizing. If EM carry trades funded in yen can rally further, this will spell trouble for the greenback, helping the euro – the anti-dollar – in the process. Chart 17An Early Positive For Global Growth Third, EUR/USD tends to correlate with the relative performance of global cyclical equities (Chart 18). The stabilization in these sectors since 2015 suggests it will be difficult for the euro to fall further from current levels. In fact, if EM carry trades can rebound more, cyclicals have additional scope to outperform, and the euro could rally. Chart 18Cyclical Stocks Pointing To No Real Downside In EUR/USD Fourth, the prospects for the semiconductor sector are improving. Demand for semis is highly pro-cyclical, and the U.S. Chip Stock Timing Model developed by our U.S. Equity Strategy service colleagues is currently sending a bullish signal.2 Since such developments link to improving global growth prospects, they are also associated with a stronger EUR/USD (Chart 19). This is also consistent with a generally weaker dollar and stronger Asian currencies. Chart 19The Outlook For Semiconductors Point Toward A Stronger Euro And A Weaker Dollar Finally, the breakout in copper prices, the stabilization in the CRB Raw Industrials Index and the rally in gold prices all support an improving global growth outlook that could lift EUR/USD. Bottom Line: Various indicators, such as Chinese monetary conditions, EM carry trades, semiconductor demand determinants and commodity prices are suggesting that global growth may soon bottom. Such a development should hurt the countercyclical dollar, amounting to a macro tailwind for EUR/USD. The Bad News Is Priced In Ultimately, the capacity of EUR/USD to rally rests on how much investors upgrade their outlook for Europe. It is therefore crucial to get a sense of exactly how uninspiring Europe currently is to global market participants. There is no better gauge of relative economic pessimism than the price of euro area financial assets relative to U.S. ones. Essentially, money talks. On this front, markets already seem to have internalized the known bad news from Europe, and there is scope for a contrarian rally in the euro, especially if, as we expect, European economic activity improves. First, on a 12-month forward P/E ratio basis, euro area equities are trading at the kind of deep discount to U.S. stocks normally symptomatic of a trough in relative sentiment toward Europe. Such a discount is often followed by a rally in EUR/USD (Chart 20). Chart 20Stock Valuations: Investors Do Not Like Europe Second, retailers’ equities can often give a more focused assessment of how investors perceive the comparative outlook for domestic demand between two nations. Currently, euro area retailers trade at a 16-year low versus their U.S. counterparts (Chart 21). Investors are therefore much more ebullient about the prospects for U.S. domestic demand than in Europe. Interestingly, the euro’s gyrations since 2016 have tracked the direction of the relative performance of retailers but have diverged in terms of levels. This suggests some underlying support for the currency. Chart 21Can European Domestic Demand Really Validate Such Pessimistic Expectations? Third, the relative stock-to-bond ratio also often provides a good read on investors’ comparative economic euphoria/pessimism towards two nations. In 2018, the annual performance of the euro area stock-to-bond ratio relative to the U.S. collapsed to levels not recorded since the euro area crisis was at its apex (Chart 22). This further confirms that investors were massively depressed on European growth prospects relative to the U.S. While this indicator is rebounding, it is still in negative territory, implying that market participants still have room to upgrade their assessment of the euro area relative to the U.S. Historically, this kind of setup has been associated with a rebound in the EUR/USD. Chart 22The Stock-To-Bond Ratio Points To Some Upside Potential Fourth, European net earnings revisions relative to the U.S. have also hit bombed-out levels and are in the process of improving. Since earnings are tightly linked to global growth and reflect the same information that informs capital flows into a country (Chart 23), sell-side analysts becoming more positive on Europe at the margin could indicate that investors are in the process of re-assessing whether to buy European assets. A decision to do so would support EUR/USD. Chart 23When The Sell-Side Move From Deeply To Mildly Bearish, EUR/USD Rallies Bottom Line: Financial market pricing suggests that investors are displaying deep pessimism toward the euro area’s relative growth prospects. The euro could be a contrarian buy. Most importantly, there are early signs that this growth pricing is starting to move in favor of Europe. If our economic view on Europe and global growth is correct, this trend has further to go, implying that more capital could move into Europe, creating a potent tailwind for EUR/USD. What Else? Three additional factors need to be considered: Currency valuations, balance-of-payment dynamics, and technicals. First, while it is not as cheap as it once was, the real trade-weighted euro is still trading below its historical average (Chart 24). Purchasing-power considerations can rarely be used as a timing tool, but our confidence in the euro’s upside would be greatly dented if the euro were a very expensive currency. It is not even mildly pricey. Chart 24Euro Valuations: No Headwinds There Second, balance-of-payment considerations have become increasingly euro-positive. The euro area runs a current account surplus of 3.3% of GDP, and despite large FDI outflows – a natural consequence of being a savings-rich economy – the basic balance of payments remains in surplus. Moreover, as fixed-income outflows have been dissipating, the aggregate portfolio flows into Europe have also been improving (Chart 25). The end of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Program should solidify this trend. Chart 25The Euro Area Balance Of Payments Is Increasingly Favorable Finally, technical oscillators are behaving increasingly well. As Chart 26 shows, not only does our Intermediate-Term Indicator remains oversold, but also, it is has begun to form a positive divergence with the price of EUR/USD. If the economic outlook is becoming more bullish, such a technical setup can often be translated into significant gains. Chart 26EUR/USD: Oversold And A Positive Divergence Is Forming Bottom Line: The euro’s valuation is not as attractive as it once was, but it remains cheap. Moreover, the euro area’s balance-of-payment dynamics and the EUR/USD’s technical setup both suggest the timing is increasingly ripe to buy the euro against the dollar. Investment Conclusions A trough in European growth, improving growth and inflation prospects relative to the U.S., green shoots for global growth and deep pessimism toward Europe relative to the U.S. all argue that the timing is right to bet on a euro rebound. At this point, the durability of the euro rebound remains unclear. Investors are under-appreciating the ability of the Fed to raise rates this year, which could help the dollar. On the other hand, they seem even more sanguine toward the ECB ever lifting rates. Ultimately, the capacity of the euro to rebound on a long-term basis against the dollar will be constrained by global growth. This means that China will continue to play a center-stage role for this crucial FX pair. At this point, it is unclear how determined Chinese policymakers are to reflate their economy. Thus, we recommend investors monitor Chinese policy to gauge how long to stay in the euro. For the time being, enough pieces are falling into place to warrant buying EUR/USD for three to six months. However, if the Chinese credit impulse can continue on its recent rebound, the durability of a euro rally could be extended, implying that the euro may be in the process of forming a long-term bottom against the dollar. A strengthening euro should support the entire European currency complex against the dollar. In fact, the NOK, the SEK and the GBP may even outperform the EUR. The NOK is being boosted by rising oil prices, a more hawkish central bank, better valuations and an even healthier balance of payments. The SEK is also supported by a Riksbank that is slightly more hawkish than the ECB, and better valuations; it also benefits from a Swedish economy that is even more pro-cyclical than the euro area’s. The GBP also benefits from a greater valuation discount than the euro, and political developments in the U.K. are beginning to move toward a more clear-cut positive outcome on the Brexit front.3 The countercyclical and expensive CHF will prove the European laggard. Finally, EUR/JPY is also set to continue its rebound that began on January 4th. In fact, it may be one of the best vehicles to express a euro-bullish view because it is less sensitive to what the Fed does than EUR/USD is. Rising bond yields are an unmitigated positive for EUR/JPY, and BCA firmly believes that U.S. Treasury yields have upside, whether or not the Fed goes back to lifting rates. The Fed will mostly impact whether it is the real or inflation component that lifts Treasury yields. Bottom Line: The entire European currency complex is set to rise along with the euro against the greenback. In fact, the NOK, the SEK and the GBP are likely to outperform the euro, while the CHF should underperform. EUR/JPY may in fact offer the best risk-adjusted returns to play a euro rebound. While it is clear that at this moment that buying the euro makes sense, the principal risk lies around how long this rally will last. We are increasingly convinced that the euro has made a low for the cycle and that its long-term outlook is looking increasingly bright.  Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the EUR/USD: Focus On The Western Shores Of The Atlantic section of the Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades”, dated December 1, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Reflationary Or Recessionary”, dated February 25, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Why A Catastrophic No-Deal Might Be Good… For The EU”, dated February 28, 2019, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Global growth is still slowing. Having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a “dead zone” over the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout. We think they will appear in the second quarter, setting the scene for a reacceleration in global growth in the second half of the year, and an accompanying rally in global risk assets. Investors should overweight stocks and spread product while underweighting safe government bonds over a 12-month horizon. The U.S. dollar will strengthen a bit over the next few months, but should start to weaken in the summer as the global economy catches fire. Stronger global growth and a weaker dollar in the back half of the year will benefit EM assets and European stocks. Feature I skate to where the puck is going to be, not to where it has been. — Wayne Gretzky How To Be A Good Macro Strategist To paraphrase Gretzky, a mediocre macro strategist draws conclusions based solely on incoming data. A good macro strategist, in contrast, tries to figure out where the data is heading. How can one predict how the economic data will evolve? Examining forward-looking indicators is helpful, but it is not enough. One also has to understand why the data is evolving the way it is. If one knows this, one can then assess whether the forces either hurting or helping growth will diminish, intensify, or remain the same.  What Accounts For the Growth Slowdown? There is little mystery as to why global growth slowed in 2018. Chinese credit growth fell steadily over the course of the year, which generated a negative credit impulse. Unlike in the past, China is now the most important driver of global credit flows (Chart 1). Chart 1Global Credit Flows Are Increasingly Driven By China Meanwhile, the global economy was rocked by rising oil prices. Brent rose from $55/bbl on October 5, 2017 to $85/bbl on October 4, 2018. Government bond yields also increased, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield rising from 2.05% on September 7, 2017 to 3.23% on October 5, 2018 (Chart 2). Chart 2Rising Oil Prices And Bond Yields Contributed To Slower Global Growth Last Year A mediocre macro strategist draws conclusions based solely on incoming data. A good macro strategist, in contrast, tries to figure out where the data is heading. In an ironic twist, Jay Powell’s ill-timed comment that rates were “a long way” from neutral marked the peak in bond yields. Unfortunately, the subsequent decline in yields was accompanied by a vicious stock market correction and a widening in credit spreads. This led to an overall tightening in financial conditions, which further hurt growth (Chart 3). Chart 3Financial Conditions Tightened In 2018, Especially After Powell's Hawkish Comments The critical point is that all of these negative forces are behind us: Financial conditions have eased significantly over the past two months; oil prices have rebounded, but are still well below their 2018 highs; and as we explain later on, Chinese growth is likely to bottom by the middle of this year. This means that global growth should start to improve over the coming months. The United States: Better News Ahead The latest U.S. economic data has been weak, with this morning’s disappointing ISM manufacturing print being the latest example. The New York Fed’s GDP Nowcast is pointing to annualized growth of 0.9% in the first quarter. While there is no doubt that underlying growth has decelerated, data distortions have probably also contributed to the perceived slowdown. For instance, the dismal December retail sales report reduced the base for consumer spending going into 2019, thus shaving about 0.4 percentage points off Q1 growth. The drop in real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) cut the New York Fed’s Q1 growth estimate by a further 0.15 percentage points. We suspect that much of the weakness in December retail sales and PCE was linked to the government shutdown. The closure caused some of the surveys used to compile these reports to be postponed until January, which is historically the weakest month for retail sales. The Johnson Redbook Index – which covers 80% of the retail sales surveyed by the Department of Commerce – as well as the sales figures from Amazon and Walmart all point to strong spending during the holiday season (Chart 4). Chart 4The December U.S. Retail Sales Report Was Probably A Fluke Fundamentally, U.S. consumers are in good shape (Chart 5). As a share of disposable income, household debt is over 30 percentage points lower than it was in 2007. The savings rate stands at an elevated level, which gives households the wherewithal to increase spending. Job openings hit another record high, while wage growth continues to trend upwards. Fundamentally, U.S. consumers are in good shape. Chart 5U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Solid The housing market should improve. Rising mortgage rates weighed on housing last year. However, rates have been declining for several months now, which augurs well for home sales and construction over the next six months (Chart 6). Chart 6Mortgage Rates Will Not Be A Headwind For U.S. Housing Activity Over The Next 6 Months While capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to reasonably solid expansion plans (Chart 7). Rising labor costs and high levels of capacity utilization will induce firms to invest in more capital equipment, which should support business spending. Chart 7U.S. Capex Plans Have Come Off Their Highs, But Remain Solid Government expenditures should also recover. By most estimates, the shutdown shaved one percentage point from Q1 growth. This is likely to be completely reversed in the second quarter. The End Of The Chinese Deleveraging Campaign? The popular narrative about weaker Chinese growth has focused on the trade war. While trade uncertainty undoubtedly hurt growth last year – and has continued to weigh on growth so far this year – most of the weakness in the Chinese economy can be traced to the deleveraging campaign which started in 2017, long before the surge in trade flow angst. Fixed investment spending in China is generally financed through credit markets. Chart 8 shows that the contribution of investment spending to GDP growth has declined in tandem with decelerating credit growth.   Most of the weakness in the Chinese economy can be traced to the deleveraging campaign which started in 2017, long before the surge in trade flow angst. Chart 8China: Deleveraging Means Less Investment-Led Growth Chinese credit growth has typically reaccelerated whenever it has dipped towards trend nominal GDP growth. We may have already reached this point (Chart 9). New credit formation came in well above expectations in January. Given possible distortions caused by the timing of the Chinese lunar new year, investors should wait until the February data is released in mid-March before drawing any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, it is starting to look increasingly likely that credit growth has bottomed. The 6-month credit impulse has already surged (Chart 10). The 12-month impulse should also begin moving up provided that month-over-month credit growth simply maintains its recent trend (Chart 11). Chart 9Historically, China Has Scaled Back On Deleveraging When Credit Growth Has Fallen Close To Nominal GDP Growth Chart 10A Rebound In The Chinese 6-Month Credit Impulse Chart 11The 12-Month Impulse Is Set To Turn Up On the trade front, President Trump’s decision to delay the implementation of tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese imports is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, gauging whether the trade war will continue to de-escalate is extraordinarily difficult. There is no major constituency within the Republican Party campaigning for protectionism. It ultimately boils down to what one man – Trump – wants. Our best guess is that President Trump will try to score a few political points by “declaring victory” – deservedly or not – in his battle with China in order to pivot to more pressing domestic issues such as immigration. However, there can be no assurance of this, which is why China’s leaders are likely to prioritize growth over deleveraging, at least for the time being. They know full well that the only way they can credibly threaten to walk away from the negotiating table is if their economy is humming along. Europe: From Headwinds To Tailwinds? Slower global growth, higher oil prices, and a spike in Italian bonds yields all contributed to the poor performance of the European economy last year. Economic activity was further hampered by a decline in German automobile production following the introduction of more stringent emission standards. The good news is that these headwinds are set to reverse course. Italian bond yields are well off their highs, as are oil prices (Chart 12). German automobile production is recovering (Chart 13). In addition, the European Commission expects the euro area fiscal thrust to reach 0.40% of GDP this year, up from 0.05% of GDP last year (Chart 14). This should add about half a percentage point to growth. Finally, if our expectation that Chinese growth will bottom out by mid-year proves correct, European exports should benefit. If neither the political establishment nor the general public favor Brexit, it will not happen. Chart 12Headwind No More (I): Italian Bond Yields Chart 13Headwind No More (II): German Auto Sector Chart 14The Euro Area Will Benefit From A Modest Amount Of Fiscal Easing This Year Brexit still remains a risk, but a receding one. We have consistently argued that the political establishment on both sides of the British channel will not accept anything resembling a hard Brexit. As was the case with the EU treaty referendums involving Denmark and Ireland in the 1990s, the European political elites will insist on a “No fair! Let’s play again! Best two-out-of-three?” do-overs until they get the result they want. Theresa May’s efforts to cobble together a parliamentary majority that precludes a hard Brexit, along with the Labor Party’s increasing willingness to pursue a second vote, is consistent with our thesis. Fortunately for the “remain” side, public opinion is shifting in favor of staying in the EU (Chart 15). Focusing on the minutiae of various timetables, rules, and regulations is largely a waste of time. If neither the political establishment nor the general public favor Brexit, it will not happen. We are short EUR/GBP, a trade recommendation that has gained 5.2% since we initiated it. We continue to see upside for the pound. Chart 15The ''Remain'' Side Would Likely Win Another Referendum Investment Conclusions Global growth is still slowing. Having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a “dead zone” for the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout. We think they will appear in the second quarter, setting the scene for a reacceleration in global growth in the second half of the year, and an accompanying rally in global risk assets. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of the global business cycle (Chart 16). The greenback will strengthen a bit over the next few months, but should start to weaken in the summer as the global economy catches fire. Chart 16The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency We sold our put on the EEM ETF for a gain of 104% on Jan 3rd, and are now outright long EM equities. We do not have a strong view on EM versus DM equities at the moment, but expect to shift EM to overweight once we see more confirmatory evidence that Chinese growth is stabilizing. Having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a “dead zone” for the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout. In conjunction with our expected upgrade on EM assets, we will move European equities to overweight. Stronger global growth will benefit European multinational exporters, while brisker domestic growth should allow the market to price in a few more ECB rate hikes starting in 2020. The latter will lead to a somewhat steeper yield curve which, along with rising demand for credit, should boost financial sector earnings (Chart 17). This will give European bank stocks a welcome boost. Chart 17Stronger Euro Area Credit Growth Will Boost Bank Earnings Japanese equities will also benefit from faster global growth, but domestic demand will suffer from the government’s ill-advised plan to raise the sales tax in October. As such, we do not anticipate upgrading Japanese stocks. We also expect the yen to come under some pressure as the BoJ is forced to maintain its ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance, while bond yields elsewhere move modestly higher.      Peter Berezin Chief Global Investment Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Strategy & Market Trends* MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Bank Credit Analyst

  Highlights Global growth is still slowing. Having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a “dead zone” over the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout. We think they will appear in the second quarter, setting the scene for a reacceleration in global growth in the second half of the year, and an accompanying rally in global risk assets. Investors should overweight stocks and spread product while underweighting safe government bonds over a 12-month horizon. The U.S. dollar will strengthen a bit over the next few months, but should start to weaken in the summer as the global economy catches fire. Stronger global growth and a weaker dollar in the back half of the year will benefit EM assets and European stocks. Feature I skate to where the puck is going to be, not to where it has been.  — Wayne Gretzky Gretzky's Doctrine To paraphrase Gretzky, a mediocre macro strategist draws conclusions based solely on incoming data. A good macro strategist, in contrast, tries to figure out where the data is heading. How can one predict how the economic data will evolve? Examining forward-looking indicators is helpful, but it is not enough. One also has to understand why the data is evolving the way it is. If one knows this, one can then assess whether the forces either hurting or helping growth will diminish, intensify, or remain the same. What Accounts For The Growth Slowdown? There is little mystery as to why global growth slowed in 2018. Chinese credit growth fell steadily over the course of the year, which generated a negative credit impulse. Unlike in the past, China is now the most important driver of global credit flows (Chart I-1). Meanwhile, the global economy was rocked by rising oil prices. Brent rose from $55/bbl on October 5, 2017 to $85/bbl on October 4, 2018. Government bond yields also increased, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield rising from 2.05% on September 7, 2017 to 3.23% on October 5, 2018 (Chart I-2). In an ironic twist, Jay Powell’s ill-timed comment that rates were “a long way” from neutral marked the peak in bond yields. Unfortunately, the subsequent decline in yields was accompanied by a vicious stock market correction and a widening in credit spreads. This led to an overall tightening in financial conditions, which further hurt growth (Chart I-3). The critical point is that all of these negative forces are behind us: Financial conditions have eased significantly over the past two months; oil prices have rebounded, but are still well below their 2018 highs; and as we explain later on, Chinese growth is likely to bottom by the middle of this year. This means that global growth should start to improve over the coming months. The United States: Better News Ahead The latest U.S. economic data has been weak, with this morning’s disappointing ISM manufacturing print being the latest example. The New York Fed’s GDP Nowcast is pointing to annualized growth of 0.9% in the first quarter. While there is no doubt that underlying growth has decelerated, data distortions have probably also contributed to the perceived slowdown. For instance, the dismal December retail sales report reduced the base for consumer spending going into 2019, thus shaving about 0.4 percentage points off Q1 growth. The drop in real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) cut the New York Fed’s Q1 growth estimate by a further 0.15 percentage points. We suspect that much of the weakness in December retail sales and PCE was linked to the government shutdown. The closure caused some of the surveys used to compile these reports to be postponed until January, which is historically the weakest month for retail sales. The Johnson Redbook Index – which covers 80% of the retail sales surveyed by the Department of Commerce – as well as the sales figures from Amazon and Walmart all point to strong spending during the holiday season (Chart I-4). Fundamentally, U.S. consumers are in good shape (Chart I-5). As a share of disposable income, household debt is over 30 percentage points lower than it was in 2007. The savings rate stands at an elevated level, which gives households the wherewithal to increase spending. Job openings hit another record high, while wage growth continues to trend upwards. The housing market should improve. Rising mortgage rates weighed on housing last year. However, rates have been declining for several months now, which augurs well for home sales and construction over the next six months (Chart I-6). While capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to reasonably solid expansion plans (Chart I-7). Rising labor costs and high levels of capacity utilization will induce firms to invest in more capital equipment, which should support business spending. Government expenditures should also recover. By most estimates, the shutdown shaved one percentage point from Q1 growth. This is likely to be completely reversed in the second quarter. The End Of The Chinese Deleveraging Campaign? The popular narrative about weaker Chinese growth has focused on the trade war. While trade uncertainty undoubtedly hurt growth last year – and has continued to weigh on growth so far this year – most of the weakness in the Chinese economy can be traced to the deleveraging campaign which started in 2017, long before the surge in trade flow angst. Fixed investment spending in China is generally financed through credit markets. Chart I-8 shows that the contribution of investment spending to GDP growth has declined in tandem with decelerating credit growth.   Chinese credit growth has typically reaccelerated whenever it has dipped towards trend nominal GDP growth. We may have already reached this point (Chart I-9). New credit formation came in well above expectations in January. Given possible distortions caused by the timing of the Chinese lunar new year, investors should wait until the February data is released in mid-March before drawing any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, it is starting to look increasingly likely that credit growth has bottomed. The 6-month credit impulse has already surged (Chart I-10). The 12-month impulse should also begin moving up provided that month-over-month credit growth simply maintains its recent trend (Chart I-11). On the trade front, President Trump’s decision to delay the implementation of tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese imports is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, gauging whether the trade war will continue to de-escalate is extraordinarily difficult. There is no major constituency within the Republican Party campaigning for protectionism. It ultimately boils down to what one man – Trump – wants. Our best guess is that President Trump will try to score a few political points by “declaring victory” – deservedly or not – in his battle with China in order to pivot to more pressing domestic issues such as immigration. However, there can be no assurance of this, which is why China’s leaders are likely to prioritize growth over deleveraging, at least for the time being. They know full well that the only way they can credibly threaten to walk away from the negotiating table is if their economy is humming along. Europe: From Headwinds To Tailwinds? Slower global growth, higher oil prices, and a spike in Italian bonds yields all contributed to the poor performance of the European economy last year. Economic activity was further hampered by a decline in German automobile production following the introduction of more stringent emission standards. The good news is that these headwinds are set to reverse course. Italian bond yields are well off their highs, as are oil prices (Chart I-12). German automobile production is recovering (Chart I-13). In addition, the European Commission expects the euro area fiscal thrust to reach 0.40% of GDP this year, up from 0.05% of GDP last year (Chart I-14). This should add about half a percentage point to growth. Finally, if our expectation that Chinese growth will bottom out by mid-year proves correct, European exports should benefit. Brexit still remains a risk, but a receding one. The political establishment on both sides of the British channel will not accept anything resembling a hard Brexit. As was the case with the EU treaty referendums involving Denmark and Ireland in the 1990s, the European political elites will insist on a “No fair! Let’s play again! Best two-out-of-three?” do-overs until they get the result they want. Theresa May’s efforts to cobble together a parliamentary majority that precludes a hard Brexit, along with the Labor Party’s increasing willingness to pursue a second vote, is consistent with our thesis. Fortunately for the “remain” side, public opinion is shifting in favor of staying in the EU (Chart I-15). Focusing on the minutiae of various timetables, rules, and regulations is largely a waste of time. If neither the political establishment nor the general public favor Brexit, it will not happen. Investment Conclusions Global growth is still slowing. Having rallied since the start of the year, global stocks will likely enter a “dead zone” for the next six-to-eight weeks as investors nervously await the proverbial green shoots to sprout. We think they will appear in the second quarter, setting the scene for a reacceleration in global growth in the second half of the year, and an accompanying rally in global risk assets. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it moves in the opposite direction of the global business cycle (Chart I-16). The greenback will strengthen a bit over the next few months, but should start to weaken in the summer as the global economy catches fire. We do not have a strong view on EM versus DM equities at the moment, but expect to shift EM to overweight once we see more confirmatory evidence that Chinese growth is stabilizing. In conjunction with our expected upgrade on EM assets, we will move European equities to overweight. Stronger global growth will benefit European multinational exporters, while brisker domestic growth should allow the market to price in a few more ECB rate hikes starting in 2020. The latter will lead to a somewhat steeper yield curve which, along with rising demand for credit, should boost financial sector earnings (Chart I-17). This will give European bank stocks a welcome boost. Japanese equities will also benefit from faster global growth, but domestic demand will suffer from the government’s ill-advised plan to raise the sales tax in October. As such, we do not anticipate upgrading Japanese stocks. We also expect the yen to come under some pressure as the BoJ is forced to maintain its ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance, while bond yields elsewhere move modestly higher. Peter Berezin    Chief Global Investment Strategist March 1, 2019 Next Report: March 28, 2019 II. Troubling Implications Of Global Demographic Trends Developed economies are challenged by two powerful and related demographic trends: declining growth in working-age populations, and a rapidly-aging population structure. Working-age populations are in absolute decline in Japan and much of Europe and growth is slowing sharply in the U.S. An offsetting acceleration in productivity growth is unlikely, implying a marked deceleration in economic growth potential. The combination of slower growth in the number of taxpayers and rising numbers of retirees is toxic for government finances. Future generations face sharply rising debt burdens and increased taxes to pay for entitlements. The correlation between aging and asset prices is inconclusive but common sense suggests it is more likely to be bearish than bullish. Population growth remains rapid throughout most of the developing world, China being a notable exception. It is especially strong in Africa, a region that has historically faced economic mismanagement and thus poor economic prospects for most of its inhabitants. Migration from the emerging to developed world is a logical solution to global demographic trends, but faces a backlash in many countries for both economic and cultural reasons. These tensions are likely to increase. Making accurate economic and market forecasts is daunting because there are so many moving parts and unanticipated events are inevitable. Quantitative models are destined to fail because of the unpredictability of human behavior and random shocks. Demographic forecasts are a lot easier, at least over the short-to-medium term. If you want to know how many 70-year olds there will be in 10 years’ time, then count how many 60-year olds there are today and adjust by the mortality rate for that age group. Demographic trends are very incremental from year to year and their impact is swamped by economic, political and financial events. Thus, it rarely makes sense to blame demographics for cyclical swings in the economy or markets. In some respects, demographics can be likened to glaciers. You will quickly get bored standing by a glacier to watch it move. But, over long time periods, glaciers cover enormous distances and can completely reshape the landscape. Similarly, over the timespan of one or more generations, demographics can have powerful effects on economies and societies. Some important demographic trends have been going on for long enough that their effects are visible. The most common concern about global demographics has tended to be overpopulation and pressure on resources and the environment. And this is hardly new. In 1798, Thomas Malthus published his “Essay on The Principles of Population” in which he argued that population growth would outstrip food supply, leading to a very miserable outcome. Of course, what he missed was the revolution in agricultural techniques that meant food supply kept up with population growth. In 1972, a group of experts calling themselves The Club of Rome published a report titled “The Limits to Growth” which argued that a rising world population would outstrip the supply of natural resources, putting a limit to economic growth. Again, that report underestimated the ability of technology to solve the problem of scarcity, although many still believe the essence of the report has yet to be proved wrong. Phenomena such as climate change and rising numbers of animal species facing extinction are seen as supporting the thesis that the world’s population is putting unsustainable demands on the planet. Rather than get into that debate, this report will focus on three particular big-picture problems associated with demographic trends: Declining working-age populations in most major industrialized economies during the next several decades. Population aging throughout the developed world. Continued rapid population growth in many of the world’s poorest and most troubled countries. According to the UN’s latest projections, the world’s population will increase from around 7.5 billion today to almost 10 billion by 2050.1 The population growth rate peaked in the 1970s and is expected to slow sharply over the next several decades (Chart II-1). Despite slower percentage growth rates, the population keeps going up steadily because one percent of the 1970 global population was about 3.7 million, while one percent of the current population is about 7.5 million. But here is an important point: virtually all future growth in the global population will come from the developing world (Chart II-2). The population of the developed world is expected to be broadly flat over the period to 2050, and this has some significant economic implications. Let’s first look at why population growth has stagnated in the developed world. Population growth is a function of three things: the birth rate, the death rate and net migration. Obviously, if there are more births than deaths then there will be a natural increase in the population and net migration will either add or subtract to that. Over time, there have been major changes in some of these drivers. In the developed world, a stable population requires that, on average, there are 2.1 children born for every woman. The fact that it is not exactly 2 accounts for infant mortality and because there are slightly more males than females born. The replacement-level fertility rate needs to be higher than 2.1 in the developing world because of higher infant mortality rates. After WWII, the fertility rate throughout most of the developed world was well above 2.1 as soldiers returned home and the baby boom generation was born. But, by the end of the 1970s, the rate had dropped below the replacement level in most countries and currently is a lowly 1.5 in Japan, Germany and Italy (Table II-1). It has stayed higher in the U.S. but even there it has dipped below the critical 2.1 level. This trend has reflected lot of factors including more widespread use of birth control and more women entering the labor force. In the developed world, the birth rate is expected to drop below the death rate in the next ten years (Chart II-3). That means there will be a natural decrease in the population. In the case of Japan, Germany, Italy and Portugal that change already occurred between 2005 and 2010. In the U.S., the UN expects birth rates to stay just above death rates in the period to 2050, but the gap narrows sharply. Births exceed deaths throughout most of the developing world meaning that populations continue to grow. Notable exceptions to this are Eastern Europe where populations are already in sharp decline and China, where deaths begin to exceed births in the 2030s. Although life expectancy is rising, death rates in the developed world will rise simply because the rapidly growing number of old people more than offsets the impact of longer lifespans. Of course, the population of a country can also be boosted by immigration, and that has been true for much of the developed world. In Canada and most of Europe, net migration already is the dominant source of overall population growth and it will become so in the U.S. in the coming decades, based on current trends (Chart II-4). This is the background to the first key issue addressed in this report: the declining trend in the growth of the working-age population in the developed world. Slowing Growth In Working-Age Populations An economy’s growth potential depends on only two things: the number of people working and their productivity. If the labor force grows at 1% a year and productivity also increases by 1%, then the economy’s trend growth rate is 2%. In the short-run, the economy may grow faster or slower than that, depending on issues like fiscal and monetary policy, oil prices etc. Over the long run, growth is constrained by people and productivity. The potential labor force is generally regarded to be the people aged 15 to 64. The growth trend in this age segment has slowed sharply in recent years in the major economies and is set to weaken further in the years ahead (Chart II-5). The problem is most severe in Japan and Europe where the working-age population is already declining. In the case of the U.S., growth in this age cohort slows from an average 1.5% a year in the 1960s and 1970s to a projected pace of less than 0.5% in the coming decades. While this generally is not a problem faced by the developing world, a notable exception is China, now reaping the consequences of its one-child policy. Its working-age population is set to decline steadily in the years ahead. Thus, it is inevitable that Chinese growth also will slow in the absence of an acceleration of productivity growth The slowing trend in the working-age population could be offset if we could get more 15-64 year olds to join the labor force, or get more older people to stay working. In the U.S., almost 85% of male 15-64 year olds were either employed or were wanting a job in the mid-1990s. This has since dropped to below 80% - a marked divergence from the trend in most other countries (Chart II-6). And the female participation rate in the U.S. also is below that of other countries. The reason for the decline in U.S. labor participation rates for prime-aged adults is unclear. Explanations include increased levels of people in full-time education, in prison, or claiming disability. A breakdown of male participation rates by age shows particularly sharp drops in the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups, though the key 20-54 age category also is far below earlier peaks (Chart II-7). The U.S. participation rate has recently picked up but it seems doubtful that it will return to earlier highs. Other solutions to the problem would be getting more people aged 65 and above to stay in the labor force, and/or faster growth in productivity. The former probably will require changes to the retirement age and we will return to that issue shortly. There always are hopes for faster productivity growth, but recent data have remained disappointing for most developed economies (Chart II-8). New technologies hold out some hope but this is a contentious topic. On a positive note, the shrinking growth of the working-age population may be easier to live with in a world of robotization and artificial intelligence where machines are expected to take over many jobs. That would support a more optimistic view of productivity but it remains to be seen how powerful the impact will be. Another important problem related to the slowing growth of the working-age population relates to fiscal burdens. In 1980, the level of government debt per taxpayer (ages 20-64) was around $58,000 in the U.S. in today’s money and this is on track for $104,000 by 2020 (Chart II-9). But this pales in comparison to Japan where it rises from $9,000 to $170,000 over the same period. Canada looks more favorable, rising from $23,000 in 1980 to $68,000 in 2020. These burdens will keep rising beyond 2020 until governments start running budget surpluses. Our children and grandchildren will bear the burden of this and won’t thank us for allowing the debt to build up in the first place. There will be a large transfer of privately-held assets from the baby boomers to the next generation, but the ownership of this wealth is heavily skewed. According to one study, the top 1% owned 40% of U.S. wealth in 2016, while the bottom 90% owned 20%.2 And it seems likely that this pool of wealth will erode over time, providing a smaller cushion to the following generation. This leads in to the next topic – aging populations. Aging Populations In The Developed World The inevitable result of the combination of increased life expectancy and declining birth rates has been a marked aging of populations throughout the developed world. Between 2000 and 2050, the developed world will see the number of those aged 65 and over more than double while the numbers in other age groups are projected to show little change (Chart II-10). As long as the growing numbers of those aged 65 and above are in decent health, then life is quite good. Fifty years ago in the U.S., poverty rates were very high for those of retirement age compared to the young (i.e. under 18). But that has changed as the baby boomer generation made sure that they voted for increased entitlement programs. Now poverty rates for the 65+ group are far below those of the young (Chart II-11). At the same time, real incomes for those 65 and older have significantly outperformed those of younger age groups. A major problem is that aging baby boomers are expensive because of the cost of pensions and medical care. As would be expected, health care costs rise dramatically with age. For those aged 44 and under, health care costs in the U.S. averaged around $2,000 per person in 2015. For those 65 and over, it was more than $11,000 per person. And per capita spending doubles between the ages of 70 and 90. So here we have the problem: a growing number of expensive older people supported by a shrinking number of taxpayers. This is illustrated by the ratio of the number of people between 20 and 64 divided by those 65 and older. In other words, the number of taxpayers supporting each retiree (Chart II-12). In 1980, there were five taxpayers for every retiree in the U.S., four in W. Europe and seven in Japan. These ratios have since dropped sharply, and in the next few decades will be down to 2.5 in the U.S., 1.8 in Europe and 1.3 in Japan. For each young Japanese taxpayer, it will be like having the cost of a retiree deducted from their paycheck. Throughout the developed world, the baby boomers’ children and grandchildren face a growing burden of entitlements. Some of the statistics related to Japan’s demographics are dramatic. In the first half of the 1980s there were more than twice as many births as deaths (Chart II-13). They become equal around ten years ago and in another ten years deaths are projected to exceed births by around three million a year. In 1990, the number of people aged four and under was more than double the number aged 80 and above. Now the situation is reversed with those aged 80 years and above more than double those four and under. That is why sales of adult diapers reportedly exceed those of baby diapers – very depressing!3 What’s the solution to aging populations? An obvious one is for people to retire later. When pension systems were set up, life expectancy at birth was below the age pensions were granted - typically around 65. In other words, not many people were expected to live long enough to get a government pension. And the lucky ones who did live long enough were not expected to be around to receive a pension for more than a few years. By 1950, those males who had reached the age of 65 were expected, on average, to live another 11 to 13 years in the major developed countries (Table II-2). This rose to 16-18 years by 2000 and is expected to reach 22-23 years by 2050. Governments have made a huge error in failing to raise the retirement age as life expectancy increased. Pension systems were never designed to allow people to receive government pensions for more than 20 years. Some countries have raised the retirement age for pensions, but progress on this front is painfully slow. Other solutions would be to raise pension contributions or to means-test benefits. Not surprisingly, governments are reluctant to take such unpopular actions. At some point, they will have no choice, but that awaits pressures from the financial markets. Currently, not many people aged over 65 remain in the workforce. The participation rate for men is less than 10% in Europe and less than 25% in the U.S. And it is a lot lower for women (Chart II-14). The rate in Japan is much higher reflecting the fact that it is at the leading edge of aging. Participation rates are moving higher in Europe and the U.S. and further increases are likely in the years ahead if Japan’s experience is anything to go by. Having people staying in the workforce for longer will help offset the decline in prime-age workers, but there is a downside. While it is a contentious topic, many studies point to a negative correlation between age and productivity after the age of 50. As we age, there is some decline in cognitive abilities and older people may be less willing or able to adapt to new technologies and working practices. These would only be partly offset by the benefits of experience that comes with age. Therefore, an aging workforce is not one where one would expect productivity growth to accelerate, other things being equal. An IMF study concluded that a 1% increase in the labor force share of the 55-64 age cohort in Europe could reduce the growth in total factor productivity by 0.2% a year over the next 20 years.4 Another study published by the NBER paper estimated that aging will reduce the U.S. economic growth rate by 1.2% a year this decade and 0.6% a year next decade.5 Other studies are less gloomy but it would be hard to argue that aging is actually good for productivity. Another aging-related issue is the implications for asset prices. It is generally believed that aging will be bad for asset prices as people move from their high-saving years to a period where they will be liquidating assets to supplement their incomes. This is supported by a loose correlation between the percentage of the labor force between 35 and 64 (the higher-saving years) and stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP (Chart II-15). However, other studies cast doubts on this relationship.6 One might think real estate is even more vulnerable than stocks to aging. However, in late 1988, two high-profile economists (Greg Mankiw and David Weil) published a report arguing that real house prices would fall substantially over the next two decades as the baby boom generation aged.7 That forecast was catastrophically wrong. Of course, that does not mean that the more dramatic aging occurring over the next couple of decades will not have a major negative impact on home prices. Numerous studies have been carried out on the relationship between demographics and asset prices and the conclusions are all over the place.8 Time and space constraints prevent a more in-depth discussion of this topic. Nonetheless, common sense would suggest that aging is more likely to be bearish than bullish for asset prices. Thus far, we have addressed two demographic challenges facing the developed world: slowing growth in the number of working-age people and a marked aging of the population. Much of the developing world has the opposite issue: continued rapid population growth and large numbers of young people. This is my third topic. Rapid Population Growth In The Developing World We already noted that nearly all future growth in global population will occur in the developing world, China being a notable exception. With birth rates remaining far above death rates, emerging countries will not have the aging problem of the developed world and this has some positives and negatives. On the positive side, a rapidly-growing young population creates the potential for strong economic growth – the opposite of the situation in advanced economies. But this assumes that the institutional and political framework is conducive to growth. Unfortunately, the history of many developing countries is that corrupt and incompetent governments prevent economies from ever reaching their potential. This means there will be a growing pool of young people likely facing a dim economic future. In some cases, these young people could be an excellent recruiting ground for extremist groups. It is unfortunate that there is particularly rapid population growth in some of the most troubled countries in the world. The Institute for Economics and Peace ranks countries by whether they are safe or dangerous.9 According to their ranking, the eight most dangerous countries in the world will see their population grow at a much faster pace than the developing world as a whole (Chart II-16). Some individual country comparisons are striking. The UN’s projections show that Nigeria’s population will exceed that of the U.S. by 2050, The Democratic Republic of Congo’s population will match that of Japan by 2030 and by 2050 will be 80% larger (Chart II-17A and B). Similarly, Afghanistan will overtake Italy in the 2040s. Most incredibly, Africa’s overall population surpassed that of the whole of Europe in the second half of the 1990s and is projected to be 3.5 times larger by 2050. That suggests that the numbers seeking to migrate from Africa to Europe will increase dramatically in the next couple of decades. Controlling these flows will become an increasing challenge for countries in Southern Europe. Migration is the logical solution to declining working-age populations in the developed world and expanding young populations in the developing world. However, there currently is a backlash against immigration in many developed countries. Anti-immigration political parties are gaining strength in many European countries and immigration was a major factor influencing the Brexit vote in the U.K. And it is a hot-button political issue in the U.S. Concerns about immigration are twofold: competition for employment and potential cultural change. Employment fears have coincided with a long period of severely depressed wages for low-skill workers in many developed economies and immigration is an easy target for blame. Meanwhile, the cultural challenge of absorbing large numbers of immigrants clearly has fueled increased nationalist sentiment in a number of countries. In the U.S., projections by the Bureau of the Census show that the non-Hispanic white population will fall below 50% of the total by 2045. That has implications for voting patterns and lies behind some of the concerns about high levels of immigration. There is no simple solution to this controversial issue and an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article. Conclusions We have only touched on some aspects of demographic trends. It is a huge topic and has many other implications. For example, the political and cultural views of each generation are shaped by the environment they grow up in and this changes over time. This year, the number of millennials (those born from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s) in the U.S. is expected to surpass those of baby boomers and that will have important political and social implications. Again, that is beyond the scope of this report. The demographic trends we have discussed will pose serious challenges to policymakers. In the developed world, the baby boom generation has accumulated huge amounts of government debt, partly to fund generous entitlement programs and did not have enough children to ease the burdens on future generations. The young have good reason to feel frustrated by the actions of their elders (see cartoon). In the developing world, the challenge will be to provide economic opportunities for a growing pool of young people. The biggest problems will be in Africa, a continent where economic success stories have been few and far between in the past. Failure to deal with this will have troubling implications for geopolitical stability. Martin H. Barnes Senior Vice President Economic Advisor III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our tactical equity upgrade is beginning to pay off, and an increasing proportion of our proprietary indicators is confirming that stocks have more upside over the next few quarters. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. has stopped falling. This pattern is also evident in both Europe and Japan. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. After clearly pulling funds out of the equity markets, investors are beginning to tip their toes back in. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) has clearly shifted back into stocks. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. According to BCA’s composite valuation indicator, the U.S. stock market remains overvalued from a long-term perspective, despite the dip in multiples since last fall. It is a composite of 11 different valuation measures. Moreover, our Monetary Indicator has shifted out of negative territory for stocks, and is now decisively in stimulative territory. The Fed pause, along with some dovish-sounding commentaries have improved the monetary backdrop by removing expected rate hikes from the money market curve. Our Composite Technical indicator for stocks broke down in December, providing a clear ‘sell’ signal, and has not yet delivered a ‘buy’. However, if the recent improvement in this indicator can continue, the S&P 500 will likely be able to punch above the 2800 level. The 10-year Treasury yield is in the neutral range according to our valuation model. Bonds are not overbought, but they have now fully worked out their previously deeply-oversold conditions. The Adrian, Crump & Moench formulation of the 10-year term premium remains close to its 2016 nadir, suggesting that yields are unsustainably low. Our bond-bearish bias is consistent with the view that the Fed rate hike cycle is not over. The U.S. dollar is still very expensive on a PPP basis. Our Composite Technical Indicator is not as overbought as it once was, but it is far from having reached oversold levels either. This combination suggests that the greenback could experience further downside over the coming month. It remains to be seen if this wave of depreciation will mark the beginning of the cyclical bear market required to correct the dollar’s overvaluation. EQUITIES: FIXED INCOME:     CURRENCIES:   COMMODITIES:   ECONOMY: Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Most of the data referred to in this report comes from the medium variant projections from the United Nation’s World Population Prospects report, 2017 revision. There is an excellent online database tool that allows users to access numerous demographic series for every country and region in the world. This can be found at https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/ 2       Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016. NBER Working Paper 24085, November 2017. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w24085. 3       This is not a joke: https://www.businessinsider.com/signs-japan-demographic-time-bomb-2017-3 4       The Impact of Workforce Aging on European Productivity. IMF Working Paper, December 2016. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Impact-of-Workforce-Aging-on-European-Productivity-44450 5       The Effect of Population Aging on Economic Growth, the Labor Force and Productivity. NBER Working Paper 22452, July 2016. Available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w22452.pdf 6              For example, see “Will Grandpa Sink The Stock Market?”, The Bank Credit Analyst, September 2014. 7       The Baby Boom, The Bay Bust, and the Housing Market. NBER Working Paper 2794. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w2794 8       For those interested in this topic, we recommend the following paper: Demographics and Asset Markets: A Survey of the Literature. Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/912a/5d6d196c3405e37b3a50d797cbf65a27ba44.pdf 9       Global Peace Index, 2018. Available at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf. According to this index, the eight least-safe countries are (starting with the most dangerous): Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Democratic Republic of the Congo. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY: